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This research is concerned with aspects of the long running debate about 'What is History?' It
focuses on the recent postmodern sceptical challenge to traditional historiography by Keith Jenkins,
Alun Munslow and Beverley Southgate and the rebuttal of that challenge by empirical historians
such as Richard Evans, Arthur Marwick and Perez Zagorin.
The problem with this controversy is that its grounds are narrow. The exchanges have polarised
around a particular postmodern treatment of scepticism, arguing for and against whether present
empirical methods are capable of providing adequate explanations of the past. What I hope to
contribute to this debate is a broadening of its frame of reference to a more general question of how
historians might respond to wider questions about the nature of knowledge in the face of apparent
epistemological uncertainty. I am using the concept of 'aporia' to express this sense of ultimate
uncertainty about the possibility of true, objective, knowledge. The study takes seriously the
scepticism of both positions - empirical as well as postmodem - and it does this in two ways.
First, it places contemporary empiricism into an historical context that includes the empiricism of
sophists and pyrrhonists of the ancient world, of Hume in the enlightenment, ofComte and J. S. Mill
in the nineteenth century and more recently the radical empiricism of American pragmatism. This
part of the study concludes that empiricism has long been associated with philosophical scepticism
to the extent that it can be regarded as a legitimate and traditional, if sometimes unselfconscious,
response to aporia. Thus scepticism can be thought to be integral to this approach to knowledge, not
corrosive of it. Attempts by contemporary empirical historians to overcome the postmodem
challenge by arguing for objective certainty in history, are therefore unnecessary and inappropriate.
Similarly, postmodem critiques of empirical historiography that simply direct attention to the
existence of aporia, rather than discuss forms of response to it, demonstrate a weakness in their
analysis of empiricism.
Second, the study contextualises this controversy within a broader debate about how other groups of
historians are currently responding to issues of aporia. It notes how some contemporary Marxist
historians, for example Patrick Joyce, are opening a fruitful dialogue with poststructural linguistic
theorists, developing interpretative concepts of a cultural kind that are thought to function more
flexibly than traditional ones.
Overall the research concludes that the negativity of the postmodem critique, which seems to
suffuse much discussion of historical theory and methods, is not a necessary outcome of such
explorations. A broader view, taking into account how empiricism has functioned in the past, and
how it is evolving in branches of the discipline, shows the possibility of more positive, reflexive
approaches to scepticism and to the role of interpretation in the making of historical knowledge.
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4Introduction
Section I
This study attempts to clarify certain problems that have arisen in my experience of
teaching history at undergraduate and pre-degree level. It derives from the period
between the late 1970s and the 1990s - that is from when the' What is history?'
debate was still firmly influenced by the Elton Carr exchanges through to the present
controversy between postmodern historians such as Keith Jenkins, Alun Munslow
and Beverley Southgate, and those representing traditional empirical historiography,
such as Richard Evans, Arthur Marwick and Perez Zagorin. The research is
concerned with the philosophy of history in the sense that it focuses on what might
count as contributing to historians' understanding of history, but it is also historical
in that a large part of the work takes the form of a history of ideas. What follows in
this introduction is first, an identification of the central question and thesis, second,
an indication of the background and assumptions informing the project and finally a
sketch of how the argument of the study is supported within the main body of the
work.
What is aimed for in this research is the identification of common ground between a
range of historiographical positions. The intention is to provide a practical
contribution for historians, and history teachers, to enable them to make sense of,
and work with, the present configuration of ideas about the discipline. However,
'practical' here does not mean pedagogy in the narrow sense of classroom practice,
nor is the study about the history or politics of history teaching. Instead, through an
examination of the sceptical dimensions of several approaches to historical
knowledge, I hope that the work will enable a broader conception of history to be
5held, than seems possible at present. This is not to try to erase debate by flattening
out differences, but to establish a common basis for operational discussions to take
place between historians holding different account of the discipline; between,
specifically, empirical historians, those working in a Marxist tradition and
poststructuralists. In doing this it will be suggested here that what is needed is a
broadly constructivist approach to history. But what is not required is another <New
History', as Alun Munslow (2003) has argued, in which earlier views are denounced
as 'wrong' and rejected in favour of newer ones. Instead of this traditionally
combative style. a more naturalist conception of the discipline is envisaged. This is
taken here to be one inwhich it is accepted that ideas about how historical
knowledge is acquired are no different, at root, from ideas about how humans gain
any other form of human knowledge, and that a multiplicity of approaches can
coexist, as ideas change and develop over time.'
The debate on which this project is focused can be contextualised within a longer on-
going concern by historians about what is involved in making sense of the past; a
concern that stretches hack into the nineteenth century and beyond. More
specifically it is a debate that can be associated with key exchanges between
Geoffrey Elton and Edward Carr during the 1960's (Carr: 1964;Elton: 1969). The
apparent simplicity, and the enduring influence of that core controversy between
Elton and Carr - about whether historical knowledge is made in the present or found
in the past - can be thought sometimes, even now nearly forty years later, to have
overshadowed the complexity of a larger discussion to which it was related. At
different times this broader debate has included approaches to history deriving from
empiricism, Marxism, realism, pragmatism, feminism and ethics as well as, more
I There is of course more to naturalism than this simple statement, and this will be discussed
at length further in the study.
6recently, those from postmodemism and poststructuralism.' Those categories have
inevitably included sub-divisions of standpoint, resulting in a rich and varied debate
which continues into the present'.
Within such a discourse few historians can be unaware of the emergence in the last
seven years or so of a controversy - a sometimes distinctly acrimonious one - led by
a group of postmodem historians who have challenged the theoretical perspectives of
those adhering to traditional empirical historiography. It is a controversy which in
recent years has been carried on in a number of leading British and American history
journals" and which has given rise to exchanges of view, typical of which has been
that between Richard Evans in defence of History (1997) and Keith Jenkins's Why
History (1999). In brief what is at stake here is the extent to which postmodem
approaches to knowledge might be considered relevant within accepted practices of
academic history and centrally whether historical practice as it has been known until
now, can continue to function in conditions described by the challengers as
postmodemity .
This research centrally engages with the issues raised by this current
postmodernlempirical controversy and it does so for several reasons. The first of
these - and perhaps the most important - is that the core question about whether
traditional history has an adequate epistemology is clearly an important one which
2 It is notoriously difficult to identify essential constituents of postmodern thought and
especially so in seeking agreement on similarities and differences between variants such as
poststructuralism, deconstruction, pragmatism and the 'linguistic tum'. However, this study
takes the work ofDerrida (1976), Foucault (1977&1980) Lyotard (1984), and Rorty (1989)
to be exemplary of a postmodern genre. Differences between these and other postmodernists
will emerge in the course of the study.
3 In the case of Marxism, for example, these include the broad descriptors of 'Orthodox' as
distinct from 'Western', but also the variants within; for example, those of Stalinism,
Leninism, Gramscian, Althussarian or Thompsonian, to mention just the more prominent
applications of Marx's thought to historical practice.
_.For example, between F.R. Ankersmit (1989&1990) and Perez Zagorin (1990) in History
and Theory, between Arthur Marwick (1995) and Hayden White (1995) and others in The
Journal a/Contemporary History.
7relates to earlier challenges and sites of dispute within the debate'. It is, moreover, a
point on which there has been a measure of agreement between Evans and Jenkins in
that they both see the rise ofpostmodem approaches to knowledge as a major
phenomenon. They also agree that the discipline of history is facing a crisis at the
end of the twentieth century. The difference between them however is that Evans,
along with Arthur Marwick and others, believe that the threatening crisis becomes
real to the extent that historians are influenced by the postmodem critique. Jenkins
on the other hand, and his circle of postmodem historians, argue that it is precisely
the refusal of traditional empirical historians to accept the ideas ofpostmodemism
that is the cause of its alleged crisis (Evans: 1997:3-4; Jenkins: 1999: Intro). It is true
that some historians have regarded the whole general position of postmodemism
(ButIer:2002) and the particular insights ofpoststructuralism (Wolin:2000) as now
waning in influence, but it is the case that studies in support of this postmodem
critique of history continue to be published
(Jenkins:2003;Munslow:2000,2003;Southgate:2003). Of course debate and
dissension is germane to intellectual endeavour but there is little evidence that the
postmodem account of history is making any headway in influencing mainstream
historians and the situation appears to be that of stalemate, if not that of incipient
schism.
At the same time - and this is the second reason for examining that particular
controversy - the 'traditional against postmodem' exchanges do not exhaust the
totality of the broader debate within history. There is a significant number of
historians whose contributions to the debate are not encompassed within the
5 These include for example many and various Marxists challenges beyond that ofE.H.Carr-
some directly methodological, such as Anderson:1976 &1983;Cohen:1978; Kieman:1983;
Ruben:1979; Stedman-Jones:1971 or from branches of the discipline, ego the Thompsonian
social historians - but also criticism of traditional practice from developments in historical
pedagogy, as will be discussed in the next section of this introduction - (eg. Jenkins &
8Evans/Jenkins differences or those of their supporters and neither side here appear
show much interest in understanding why that might be. It is interesting to
conjecture that, were one or other of these contenders to gain ascendancy over the
other, the supposed 'peripheral' historiographies could be in danger of being
effectively written out of British historical practice altogether. At the very least,
there is the possibility that, like the Elton Carr differences of the 1960's, the vigour
with which the traditional/postmodern exchanges have been conducted can obscure
the issues of an equally important broader debate/' The reality however is that
historians in this broader debate appear to be continuing to make interesting and
useful explanations of the past, seemingly free from concern, either that postmodem
- or similar - ideas should be shunned to ensure the purity of the discipline or that
postmodemity implies anything more than an adjustment of existing practice.' It
will be seen that some of these historians are working on the borders of other
disciplines and have gained fresh methodological insights from those associations.
Others can, to a greater or lesser extent, be described as working in a Marxist
tradition while a further group are clearly drawing upon a reading of
poststructuralism different from that of the postmodem challengers in this
controversy. Common sense suggests that the existence of a substantial number of
historians who cannot be characterised as a part of either side in the major current
controversy within history, rather calls into question the legitimacy of that
Brickley: 1986 a&b,1988 a-f 1989).The point is simply that later critiques may have
significance for earlier, seemingly obsolete ones.
6Obviously no discussion of the forms of knowledge of one country could carry on without
reference to those of a host of other cultures, communities and countries and this study is no
different from others in this respect Thus reference is made to works, ideas and critiques
originating at different locations in the western world in almost every section of the piece.
Nevertheless, for clarity and for depth within the limitations of the project, this study focuses
most directly on historical practice in the United Kingdom and works from other countries
are considered with that intention in mind.
7 This group of historians will be considered more closely in the main body of the study and
others will be discussed there, but a brief survey of the field would include works by
Andress: 1998; Amold:200 IArthur & Phillips:2000;Bevir:2000a&b;Bourdillon:1994;
Feldman&Stedman-Jones:1989;
Ferguson:1998;Gray:1989;Jordanova:2000;Joyce:1980&1991;Loftus:2002;
Lunn&Day:I999, Thompson:1995;Tosh:1991 and Wilson:1993.
9controversy as being representative of the discipline, or of the notion that history's
epistemology is in crisis. And yet still the bitter exchanges continue (eg.
Marwick:200 1) as though theirs - their articulation of either postmodernism or
traditional empirical practice - constitutes the whole range of historiographical
possibility. There would therefore appear to be a need for an examination of not
only the parties to this controversy; ie. the challengers, and defenders, but also of
those who stand within the debate but outside this controversy.i
It is difficult to form a comparison between what theorists of history say about the
methods they think should be followed by their professional colleagues and what
they actually do themselves, in their own work. What is interesting - and is the third
reason for focusing on this particular controversy - is that there is no clear pattern
here. It will be seen that it is simply not possible to describe the participants' ideas
in terms of their historical writing. The significance of this is that what is important
is what these historians say about the subject, rather than what they do. Indeed there
is a precedent here. It will be remembered for example that for all Elton and Carr's
differences at the level of theory, their actual historical writings were remarkably
similar to each other. This is not to say, however, that an Elton or a Carr would
make the same sense of, say the Russian revolution, but that is a theoretical issue,
not a practical one. On the page their work would look similar and their writing
procedures comparable. Nevertheless, whatever the merits of the traditionalists' in
terms of their own practice - and it will be clear that there are some - what is
arguably unacceptable on the part of these mainstream historians is the seemingly
• For clarity I am using the term 'controversy' throughout the study to indicate the particular
exchanges between the postmodem challengers and the empirical defenders (ie. Jenkins and
Evans et. al.) and the expression 'the debate' to refer to the broader discussions that will be
considered initially in Chapter One.
9 For clarity this group of historians -Evans, Marwick et.al, will be referred to as 'mainstream
empirical historians' for most of the study. Itwill be apparent however that their claim to
centrality and to be the only possible voice of historical empiricism, is misplaced.
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routine and casual dismissal of any suggestion that historical thought and practice
could or should gain insights from philosophers and theorists from outside the
discipline, or discussions beyond the practical. The point Keith Jenkins has made
repeatedly about the weakness of history in comparison with theory in other
disciplines, is regarded here as a sound one and it has been one of the starting points
for the thinking that has led to this research (Jenkins: 1991 :2). What follows from
this is that the discussion ofthis project is of argued importance, not in relation to a
practical prescription for a certain kind of historical writing or method - although
there are some clear practical principles which do emerge from it. Rather the
research is angled towards identifying ways in which history might be conceived,
how it is thought to relate to other forms of knowledge within our culture, how
generically reliable a form of knowledge we might think it to be and how our
understanding of it can cohere with new as well as with traditional accounts of
knowledge. If the conclusions of the study prove to be of use to historians, it is
likely to be in the relevance of these conceptions for the more pedagogic dimensions
of the debate where ideas about the discipline are to some extent formed - from
where, indeed, the initial thrust for the study came.
The fourth main reason for thinking that this particular controversy will repay
examination is that it has been conducted with a curious degree of certainty on both
sides. This is strange since, as it will be seen, both the mainstream empiricists and
the postmodems claim to be the party of subjectivity, offering epistemologically
open-ended accounts of the past. Evans is particularly dismissive of
postmodemism. He approvingly quotes Arthur Marwick in asserting that
postmodemist ideas are a 'menace to serious historical study' (1997:7) and he
himself speaks ofpostmodems as 'intellectual barbarians at the disciplinary gates'
who are 'loitering with distinctly hostile intent (p8). For his part Jenkins has been
declaring since 1996, (when he switched his view from a previously positive stance
11
about the role of postmodemism in historical explanation (1991 :25) ) that, since
postmodemity - is 'precisely our condition: it is our fate' (Jenkins: 1995:6) - he
insists that we can learn nothing from history 'other than that which we have put into
it' (1999:3). He argues therefore that we might as well simply 'forget history' and
lead lives within grammatical formulations which have no reference to a past tense
articulated in ways which are, as it were, "historically" familiar to us
(Jenkins: 1997a:57).
Jenkins's certainty is all the more odd for being somewhat at variance with the views
of some of his fellow postmodems. While they share his pessimistic stance towards
knowledge in the conditions they call postmodemity, they stop short of calling for an
ending of the discipline of'history.l" A question thus arises as to how far the views
of Jenkins and Ermarth are reliably postmodem and whether such ajudgement is
significant in the broader debate.
It is clear that despite the evident polemics there is more to this controversy than is at
first apparent. The understandings which can be made of it and of the constituent
arguments, are not exhausted by the participants' own descriptions of them. It is
possible to arrive at a quite different account of how they interact, other than the one
which Evans and Jenkins make - or which is made for them by their supporters. The
response which these two historians make to the process through which postrnodem
10 Within the application of postmodemism to history there is a range of expression; for
example, that of Frank Ankersmit (1989), Tony Bennett (1997), Robert Berkhoffer, Jnr,
(1997), Alun Munslow (1997a, 2000,2003) and Beverley Southgate (I996b,2000,2003), all
of whom, in various ways, have argued for a reconstituted, more thoroughly reflexive
historical discipline and some of whom offer accounts of the discipline not dissimilar to those
of the non-combatant group. These postmodems can to an extent (an extent which is
discussed more fully in the main body of the study) be contrasted with proponents of a
stronger version of historical postmodemism, such as Elizabeth Ermarth's (1992) ore-timing
of time' and Keith Jenkins's (1997a&b,1999,2000,2003) 'end of history' argument. As with
generic postmodemism, their ideas have met with fierce resistance. Significant players in the
opposition to historical postmodemism being in addition to Marwick and Evans, the
historians Gertrude Himmelfarb (1987), Gabrielle Spiegel (1990), Lawrence Stone (1991)
and Perez Zagorin (1990& 1999).
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ideas could begin to be assimilated into disciplinary norms is illustrative of this
point. The result is the opposite of what might be expected, ie. that empiricists
assume a reality that corresponds more or less directly to their findings and that
postmoderns are playful relativists. For all his polemical objection to
postmodernism Evans sees the need for the discipline to evolve with the changing
times and he deplores attempts of historians such as Geoffrey Elton to raise a
'disciplinary drawbridge' against ideas from non-historians (1997:8-11). What he
sees happening is that postmodernism is being gradually assimilated into the
discipline and, as it is slowly being accepted by historians, it is being modified -
quite naturally in Evans's view. He places postmodernism in a context which
includes, what he suggests have been earlier claims, by for example, Rankeans,
cliometricians, psychohistorians and early social historians. These, he says, have
argued in their turn that all previous ways of doing history were 'redundant, biased,
useless or false' but, they have nevertheless, one after another, settled down to
become proponents of sub-specialisms 'coexisting happily with all other sub-
special isms' (1997:201l3} Jenkins, on the other hand, clearly laments, even as he
accepts, that this is what is taking place; that Evans
replays the old strategies of divide and rule, "us against them" and
"some of us against others of them": the really barbaric are kept out,
while the more moderate and usable are let in to bolster the ranks.
It is the typical assimilationist gesture so beloved of conservatives,
and it permeates the whole of Evans's text (1999:97).
It is interesting here and important for this study that it is Evans - as a supposed
'certaintist' 'lower case' historian, to use Jenkins's own terms - who as an
acknowledged representative of traditional empiricist historians is here readily
13
accepting that the exposure to challenge, which is implied in the assimilation of new
ideas into an existing discipline, is likely to change not only the challenging ideas
but also those of existing practices. Thus whether Evans notices it or not - and the
evidence is somewhat ambivalent - both he and those historians like him appear to
be working more with constructivist assumptions about the nature of knowledge than
with the realist, objectivist, epistemological stance attributed to him (and them) by
postmodemists in general and by Jenkins in particular (Jenkins: 1991 :28, 1995:8-10
& 1999: 100). At the same time, Jenkins himself shows a quite different set of
assumption than the ones he is noted for supporting. Evans has already pointed out
an inconsistency in Jenkins's actual, rather than advocated, approach to knowledge,
ie.
Given the stress laid upon the shifting nature of concepts by
postmodernists, and the emphasis given to the indirect, contingent
or even arbitrary or non-existent correspondence of words to reality,
the dogmatic and apodictic tone of Jenkins's declaration that
postmodernity is an indisputable fact of life seems strangely out of
place, coming as it does from a self-confessed proponent of such ideas
(Evans:1997:13).
That this definition of postmodernity by Jenkins was perhaps no one-off slip by him
seems evident from his negative reaction here to the suggestion by Evans that
postmodernism could possibly evolve through being accepted by historians.
Postmodernism, for Jenkins, seems to be a fixed category which can be understood,
accepted or employed only as Jenkins would have it understood. Clearly all might
not be as it seems in a characterisation of postmodemists (represented by Jenkins in
relation to himself) as 'generous, quasi-transcendental, cross-discursive, playful and
radical and who can be compared with traditional empirical historians (represented
14
by Jenkins in relation to Evans) as 'practical, technical, "serious men" of the flat-
earth variety' who are 'suffering very badly from the "effects of gravity" , and who
preside over a 'mean-spirited, often arrogant and dismissive discourse'
(Jenkins: 1999:95).
It is the central aim of this research to avoid both of these positions, of Evans and
Jenkins, and to argue that not only is it possible to conceive of history as being
constructed by historians - which in their various ways both Evans and Jenkins
effectively accept - but that such construction is no bar to history's being of value as
a discrete form of knowledge. This is evidenced by the group of historians outside
of the controversy, whose work testifies to the existence of one or more other ways
forward, beyond that of rejection or pessimism.
Section IT
What is at stake here is not, as is so often thought, a question of whether history - or
indeed any form of knowledge - can or cannot provide objective knowledge. The
issue is rather, a struggle over how a broadly accepted sense of an open-endedness in
knowledge should be understood and expressed". Within this view it will be
suggested that an historically sound basis exists to say that in the western intellectual
II The expression 'open-endedness has been deliberately chosen for its vagueness; to avoid
the use of a more philosophical term that would, of necessity, carry with it a particular view
of 'open-endedness' and which, at this stage in the explanation, would have complicated-
pre-empted - the way it is intended to be used in this study. The issue is discussed in the
opening section of Chapter Two.
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tradition there has always been an assumption that knowledge is - in principle at
least - open to ongoing interpretation.
However this is an assumption that in different times and in different cultures has
been articulated and handled in different ways and what is being argued in this study
is not that empiricism is the same as, or can be reduced to, the postmodernism of this
controversy, for it is not, and there is no wish for it to be so. Postmodernist's
conception of history in this controversy - even in the more moderate postmodern
accounts - suffers from a sense of negativity; one that regards interpretation as less
than wholly satisfactory. This will be seen in the challengers' own explanations but
also through the work of Beverley Southgate in the early modem period. His
postmodern treatment of sceptical themes in the western tradition is noticeably
pessimistic as distinct from that of other historians working in the same field.12
Indeed it is possible to see a sense of progress in empirical accounts of knowledge
which is largely missing from postmodernism. The gradual accumulation of more or
less reliable accounts of different aspects of the world has been an important part of
empiricism since the renaissance," but arguably this is a different way of saying the
same thing - that empiricism is simply positive in its approach to knowledge." As
an issue this is more apparent than real, for postmodern historians do not critique
their empirical colleagues' optimism (in believing that the human condition is
improving), simply because they object to the optimism. Rather they claim that the
optimism is not justified, or they attempt to establish that it rests on a notion of pre-
existing reality. It is a difference in the use of knowledge between these positions
which is being contested rather than in basic epistemology. as will be discussed in
12 Eg. Popkin: 1963,1966, 1979&1999.
13 And, to put it plainly, this has been the basis of our modem world of knowledge and
human capacity within it.
14 This view relies somewhat on David Bebbington's account of progress as being a
secularisation of the Christian view of history (Bebbington:1990) What is not accepted is
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Chapters Three and Four." Empiricism and postmodernism make use of a common
scepticism, but they do not handle it in the same way. In fact empiricism hardly
acknowledges the existence of it at all, and it is this that has given rise to the charge
by postmoderns of realism. This research attempts to improve on this situation by
identifying resources from within the western intellectual tradition - that is, from the
established historical record - which will enable empirical historians to account
historically for their practice, in a different way. Hitherto, the sceptical dimension to
empiricism is something that mainstream historians have admitted to - usually when
under pressure from postmodernists - but which they do not utilise. As a result it is
treated, often by both sides, as the province ofpostmodernism. It is argued here that
if empirical historians were prepared to redefine the empirical approach to
knowledge in terms of a structural relationship with scepticism, their position in
relation to a range of challenges could be significantly strengthened. This is
important, for what is perhaps at stake now is that within a cultural context in which
interpretation in all forms of knowledge has become increasingly important,
empiricism and postmodernism are competing for a dominance of expression. 16
It is in such an intellectual context that Jenkins's stance here can be understood as
being something more than simply irascibility on his part. His insistence that
postmodernism be understood as postmodernists would have it understood now,
that a sense of progress inhistory entails, of necessity, a metaphysical or realist account of
knowledge.
13 Karl Popper's falsificationism (1968) is a good example of the way empiricists have
worked with, rather than been stopped by, their awareness ofphilosophicaJ uncertainty;
although this is not a defence ofbis position against alternative accounts, notably those of
Imre Lakatos (1970) or Thomas Kuhn (1970). Popper clearly saw knowledge as progressive
but at the same time viewed it as based not on certainty, but on uncertainty. The starting
point for gaining understanding of the world was unimportant. What mattered was whether
accounts of knowledge would cohere with other accounts ie. whether or not they could be
falsified. Conversely it can be shown that even radically pessimistic postmoderns such as
Keith Jenkins believe that if their view prevails, what will be left of history will be better than
what was there before; more honest etc. It would seem then that, whether in stronger and
weaker forms, a sense of progress is, like the deployment of scepticism, common to both
sides.
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rather than accept that its meaning be watered down through a process of
assimilation, does makes sense in terms of his own project. It will be argued, there
are important consequences resting upon which interpretative model the historical
community chooses. This is not, it will be seen, because empiricism assumes the
existence of an impossible grounding objectivity and postmodemism, a radical
subjectivity, but rather the opposite. Empiricism in historical practice may stand in
need of a degree of adaptation to present social conditions, but it is - potentially at
least - an approach which is comfortable with the idea of knowledge as being
uncertain. There is much evidence available that several of the main players in this
controversy - the empirical side - do see empiricism as a human strategy for making
communicative meaning where it is obvious that no absolute objectivity is possible
or indeed desirable. On the other hand the postmodemism of this controversy,
demonstrates an anxiety about truth. It is an anxiety held to such an extent that the
absence of certainty in knowledge - an absence that is easy to show - is taken by
them to herald the beginning of a new historical epoch. Some moreover go on to call
for an astonishingly radical programme of methodological and disciplinary change
including the relinquishing of the human means of making sense of the past.
Within this analysis it is argued that despite appearances to the contrary Jenkins, and
his group's use ofpostmodemism, can be associated with an approach to knowledge
that is effectively metaphysical." This is not to say that he, and they, are wrong to do
so, but rather that the epistemological pessimism which results from it is alien to the
more positive stance of mainstream empirical historiography and from both Marxism
and some readings of poststructuraiism. It will be suggested that the negativity which
16 The context envisaged here is that of 'mass society'. This is discussed more fully in the
main body of the study.
17 The term 'metaphysics' is taken here to refer to an approach to knowledge that, in an
apparent desire to gain some firm epistemological ground, attempts to reach (or to assume the
importance of trying to reach) for a degree of certainty beyond what seems to be available to
the senses, or what can be derived from them.
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can be seen to be - to a greater or lesser degrees - at the heart of this version of
historical postmodernism, can be thought to be a consequence of its tending to
regard ordinary, everyday, messy and uncertain history as somehow less satisfactory
than a posited (but unachievable) objectivity. Again, however, this characteristic is
not common to all usages of postmodernist thought and poststructuralist approaches
to knowledge. These versions of postmodernism, like empiricism and Marxism,
have the potential of providing an effective basis for historical knowledge."
So far it is perhaps clear that what is being sought in this study is not a collapse of
one side of the controversy into the other - either way around - so much as a means
of drawing empirical, Marxist and postmodern/poststructuralist practice closer
together into a more effective discourse. If there is a collapse it is of the controversy
into the debate. What is aimed for is an explanation of history that allows for
differences but which is capable of functioning within a community of knowers.
This is taken to refer to a situation where members can be secure in an awareness
that their approach to knowledge may be somewhat different from those of other
historians but that at the level of epistemology, their accounts cohere with each other
sufficiently for them to be able to communicate with each other within the
discipline.l"
II Indeed it is the case that ideas on either side of the controversy are not set in stone and
some of them have changed during the period this study has been written. A clear example
of this is the softening of tone to be found in Alun Munslow's latest work The New History
2003 where his critique calls for little more than a shift in outlook on the part of mainstream
historians.
19 It is easy to equate this desired position with that of the 'meta-narrative' that Lyotard
famously critiqued with his definition ofpostmodernism as 'incredulity to meta-narratives' in
The Postmodern Condition (1984). The difference however is that in the conception of
history argued for here, it is perfectly reasonable for it to be held 'incredulously'. Indeed I
entirely accept Lyotard's point - there is no need whatsoever for any account of history or
historiography to be held as 'true'. To function paradigmatically, such a conception need
only be coherent across the range and area of its applicability. This will of course be
discussed further.
19
It is perhaps helpful here to sketch out briefly my earlier involvement within the
debate - working within postmodem critiques of traditional historiography - before
those critiques developed into this controversy. Like the majority of historians in the
broader debate, and having its origins in the teaching of the discipline, I support the
encouragement of a critically reflexive historical practice as a means of participation
in a history conceived of as a community of knowersr'" and as a consequence of that,
I believe that knowledge of a historian's perspective is as important as the facts of
the content. As a historian working a Marxist tradition Ludmilla Jordanova makes
the same point, although more politically. She is, she says, arguing 'for the
importance of knowing an author's position'. Since 'for the entire time I have been
doing historical work, politics has loomed large in every aspect of it. .. although there
is much about any writer that can never be known ...readers still need to know, more
or less, where an author is coming from' (2000:xiv). I have long endorsed
Jordanova's position here; it is, moreover, one that both empirical and
postmodernlpoststructuralist historians are capable of holding, within the specificity
of their approaches to knowledge.
Thus, holding a broadly Marxist historical position in the early 1980's I worked in
collaboration with Keith Jenkins in trying to combat some of what we saw at the
time as being an unhelpful enthusiasm in school history for the so called 'skills'
approach to historical knowledge, at the expense of an awareness of methods. The
title of our first joint article, 'From Skillology to Methodology'. written in 1986 for
A Level history teachers, sums up the argument of the time. It was an attempt to
refocus teachers towards a need for the historical content they were working with to
be engaged with, self-consciously, against the then prevailing orthodoxy that just any
content would do - that the important thing in the teaching of school history was the
skills that were being developed. Our leftish sensibilities were outraged that under
20 Where knowledge is the result of an active construction, on the part of the knower.
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the guise of a radical-seeming 'New History' banner school practice was moving
from a traditional 'given' historical content - the old grand narrative - directly to a
model in which there was no longer any role for the questioning of the selective
process which produced its content. A difficulty at the time was that we were
witnessing the fragmentation of the Marxist class criterion (a sign of its success in a
way, perhaps) into the now familiar multifaceted historical criteria of 'class, gender,
ethnicity'. A shift of our 'brand' from Marxist to what we loosely (to start with
anyway) called postmodemist was deliberate, and in part a response to that process.
It simply seemed an easier - less restrictive - methodological horne." From here we
continued a fruitful collaboration for some ten years, arguing for reflexivity in the
teaching of history. Influenced particularly at the time by the poststructuralist
deployment of Saussurean linguistics (Gottdienner: 1995; Sheriff: 1989 & Sturrock:
1979 & 1986), the early writing of Lyotard (1984), New Historicism (Veeser: 1989)
and Richard Rorty's postmodem version of pragmatism (Rorty: 1980, 1982,
1991a&b & 1992) we used postmodemism's scepticism as a means of arguing that
the element of judgement in the creation of historical knowledge should be open and
accountable.22 We were active in developmental work for an A Level history
research projecf3 and although unable to claim it as a successful outcome to our
work, it was gratifying to see that the kind of interpretative practice which we had
been trying to get accepted by teachers, became written into the National Curriculum
for History in schools (attainment target Two at the time) as a requirement for all
history lessons. Indeed one of our joint papers of those years seems still to be
regarded as relevant (Phillips: 1998:231).
21 Perhaps it is just hindsight (although a formative one) but our postmodemism of the time
rested easily on our Marxism. The notion of a break between modernity and postmodernity
was associated (like Harvey's in 1990) with changing conditions of mass society. For us,
reflexivity was a tool in our Gramscian armoury. And of course - and this will be returned to
in the main body of the study - there were models available, for example Baudrillard and
Foucault, to encourage a slide from Marxist influenced work to postmodemism. ( I am aware
of course that the issue of whether Foucault was ever a Marxist as such. is controversial).
II See Jenkins & Brickley: 1986a &b; 1988a,b,c,d&e; 1989; 19908&b; 1991.
II The Nuffield funded project ETHOS, based at the University of Exeter.
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This collaboration carne to a gradual end in the middle 1990's when the group of
postmodem historians I was involved with began to read and re-read our postmodern
texts in a different, more negative, manner. There was a greater reliance at this time
on Derrida and Baudrillard than hitherto. 'Argument', in the sense of the marshalling
of evidence to help change minds, along with any form of clear written
communication and attempts at synthesis, were increasingly regarded as suspect
practices, appropriate only to uncomprehending and outdated historians who were
unable to move with the times. Those types were, as Elizabeth Ennarth wrote more
generally, but effectively expressing the mood of the time, as boringly 'regular as
bad breath' (Ennarth:1992:SI). This seemed to me rather like a replay of the
stultifying effects of the emphasis on 'skills' in history and the change resulted
steadily in a lessening of our intellectual association as we went out separate ways.
Keith Jenkins went on to playa central role in the present postmodern history
controversy - arguing from poststructuralism that history cannot continue in
postmodernity - and I have maintained the original position. This is one committed
to the view that reflexivity, whilst not a panacea" is nevertheless a sound way
forward for the discipline, whether it is articulated within empiricism, Marxism or
via poststructuralist insights.2s What was needed it seemed to me, was a return to the
arguments about values and politics in history, but in a way that respected not only
the newer accounts of knowledge - specifically poststructuralism - but also the
utility of a basic empirical method.
24 The Thatcherite 'revolution' for example showed how the self-aware use of theory is by no
means the exclusive property of the political left. The benefit of reflexivity is seen as being
at the level of strategy - at forcing disclosure and at avoiding mystification. There is no
sense of it being employed in any supposed 'pure' form, Culler's discussion ofDerrida's
concept of invagination, provides a caution against overweighted expectations in the use of
the concept. (Culler: 1983).
2' See Brickley: 1992; 1994; 1997; I999a&b.
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It needs to be said here that Jenkins may well not really believe that historians are
going to give up making sense of the past at his behest, however enticing the
argument. As Culler reminds us, it is a feature of the poststructuralist genre to work,
not from within the 'accepted procedures of a particular discipline, but from the
persuasive novelty of their redescriptions.' It is quite reasonable to accept this and to
recognise the validity of a role in a challenge that aims to 'make strange the familiar
and to make readers conceive of their thinking, behaviour and institutions in new
ways (Culler: 1983:9). It would be hard to object to this - to thought experiments of
the Jenkinsean kind - but there is a limit to the extent that the words on the page can
be discounted as simply the means to a discursive end. If the challenge itself is to
mean anything at all, it must be worthy of a response to what has actually been said,
however outrageous, or unrealistic, that challenge may seem. I agree with Keith
Jenkins that the argument of the postmodem side in this controversy - and his in
particular - is an important one that has significance for the broader debate in the
way that historians, and history student, may think about their discipline. It deserves
a better response than it has yet received from mainstream empirical historians and
the intention of this study is to attempt to provide it.26
Section DI
It has to be admitted that a degree of disenchantment with the usefulness of
poststructuralism (as a broad methodology ofpostmodemism) set in for a while after
the mid 1990's and, believing at the time that Marxism's emphasis on class over
gender and ethnicity rendered it outdated, I found myselftuming in part towards
examining the possibilities that might still exist under the sign of empiricism. Two
26 'Better' here means better for the continuation of the discipline as an inclusive discourse,
as will be discussed inmore detail within the study.
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perspectives developed from this. The first was an empirical discovery of a
ubiquitous scepticism structurally associated with empiricism in the narratives of the
western intellectual tradition, but also, I realised that there was more in
poststructuralism than had been represented in the controversy thus far.
Poststructuralist perspectives do not necessarily entail nihilism. These realisations
mutually reinforced each other and it occurred to me that, in their different ways,
both sides in the controversy were carrying binary assumptions that prioritised
certain, objective knowledge over that of uncertainty - scepticism.
In the case of the traditionalists, their objectivism was sceptical on the margins (and
this is what made them so difficult a target for postmodern critiques). Conversely
the challengers (especially Ermarth and Jenkins), were demonstrating a degree of
certainty about their scepticism - ie. that it really was a problem, even though they
claimed it was one that they welcomed. I wondered what the result would be if their
prioritisations were reversed. What, for example, would mainstream empirical
history be like if it could function with a genuine, openly accepted sense of
uncertainty; and what would remain of the postmodern challenge (within the
controversy) if it were comfortable with the idea that scepticism was a normal,
functional part of the making of historical knowledge? At the same time my studies
of scepticism in the western historical tradition suggested to me that the theme was
capable of playing a heavier role in these discussions than had happened so far.27
From these speculations came a working concept of 'aporia and response' which,
when applied to the positions of both sides in this controversy, can be seen to
27 Hitherto, work in this area has been mostly confined to finding examples of scepticism in
the historical record and of showing its relevance to ideas within the historical context.
However Richard Popkin and Beverley Southgate have, in differing ways, begun to break out
from this pattern and this study has relied significantly on their work
(Popkin: 1963,1966,1979,1999,1992; Southgate:1981, 1987, 1989& 1995). The issue is
explored within Chapters Two and Three.
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produce something of a deconstruction of its claim to centrality." In short such an
analysis arguably points a way forward towards the kind of tentative,
methodologically reflexive historical practice that can already be found in the
accounts of the discipline of some poststructuralist and Marxist historians, as well as
in some empirical historiography. For all their differences, the core understanding of
the discipline that is being - or could be - carried by those participants in both the
broader debate and this particular controversy, is that historical knowledge is a
human construction which is capable of being understood and discussed like other
aspects of human intercourse.
To show this, the study compares how, in terms of this concept 'aporia and
response,' empirical and postmodem approaches to history - ie. the controversy -
relate to positions within the broader debate, specifically Marxism and
poststructuralism. The result is a somewhat unequal three-part structure. It is
unequal because the more difficult task is show the possibilities inherent in
scepticism, for a traditional empirical historiography. The theories of the broader
debate - those of Marxist and postmodemlpoststructuralist positions - already have
well developed usages of scepticism and the discussion of them can therefore
proceed more straightforwardly, in this project.
Thus after an initial chapter which develops some of the points raised within this
introduction, two chapters focus on the possibilities inherent in forms of empirical
historiography and which are exemplified in those historians of the broader debate.
A single chapter then notes the clear opportunities that exist within Marxism and
postmodemism, by drawing on aspects of poststructuralist thought. Finally the
21 Perhaps stretching the tolerance level ofiterability to its limit, the term 'deconstruction' is
being used here in the sense simply of exploring the way defmitions interact with each other,
as distinct from mounting a critique against an alleged inaccuracy of a previous definitional
pattern.
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conclusion brings together the threads of the research. showing how reflexive
practice can be thought to be the disciplinary glue which is able to bear the weight of
disparate practice within history.29
Three sections form Chapter One. In the first of these, examples from some of the
existing exchanges of the controversy are analysed, indicating aspects of the
weakness of present mainstream empirical practice. In particular a lack of concern
about the criteria it uses to handle facts about the past is noted and how it often
appears that neither side engages satisfactorily with the other. It is suggested that
these difficulties are associated with an undeveloped sense of scepticism by
empirical historians in the formation of their historical awareness. The Second
section considers the main thrust of four of the postmodern challengers. It
summaries how Elizabeth Ermarth (1983,1992,2001 a&b) and Keith Jenkins
(199 1,1995, I997a&b, I999,2000,&2003) in particular, but supported in part by Alun
Munslow (19978,2000&2003) and Beverley Southgate (1996b,2000& 2003) have
argued that empirical history has become impossibly dysfunctional in conditions of
postmodernity. Weaknesses of their own account of the discipline are identified,
including examples of incoherence, inconsistencies and historical inaccuracies/"
More importantly, the discussion moves on in a third section to argue that the
existence of historians who are continuing their practice - Marxists, poststructuralist
and empirical historians drawing on methodologies of other disciplines - is perhaps
29 To be clear, the term 'reflexivity' is used here to denote an awareness by historians of the
reciprocal nature of historical knowledge-making. This is that the understandings of the past,
that are made in the present, influence that present. They then go one to inform perspectives
which in tum condition further knowledge of the past. It is this process that is described in
this study as 'the construction' of history. Clearly, from any position that sees the process of
history as working in this way, the perspectival aspects of historical study are as important as
more traditional evidential considerations.
30 The term 'inaccuracies' is not intended to raise any historicaIly epistemological issues at
this stage. It refers merely to inaccuracies in relation to settled and accepted understandings
about the past. I certainly accept that any charge of inaccurate history is open to challenge
and I would want to distinguish the use made of it from that of broader, or more abstract and
all-encompassing accounts of the past that are, by their very breadth, less able to be judged
simply accurate or inaccurate.
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the clearest evidence that better explanations await those who would seek to rethink
historiography, beyond the blanket denunciation of these postmodernists and the
'business as usual' dismissal of traditionalists.
The second chapter defmes the terms central to this part of the study - especially
empiricism and scepticism - and it examines how traditional mainstream
historiography can make more effective use of the argued sceptical dimension to
human knowledge. It thus steps out of the discussion within historical practice and
establishes a methodology for focusing on the ubiquity of philosophical
openendedness in the western tradition. In brief, what it is important in studying
epistemology in history is not the existence of aporetic awareness, as argued by
postmodernists. Rather it is the response to it which has been made by different
people and groups, over time and place, that provides the historical dimension.
From this position the chapter focuses on the pre-modem period and in particular on
the ideas of the Sophists and Pyrrhonists. It offers evidence of a connection between
scepticism and empiricism drawn from the growing body of scholarship in this area
of the history of philosophical scepticism." It is argued that at different times in the
classical pre-medieval period, and in different places, response to an awareness of
human epistemological frailty has taken different forms of expression. Thus it may
well be that Ennarth, Jenkins et. al. can differentiate their approach to knowledge
from that of various historical forms of scepticism. It would indeed be surprising if
mass technological society ofthe Twenty First Century were to give rise to the same
kind of epistemological closure as that of classical Athens or the medical philosophy
of First Century Alexandria. The main point here is that there is evidence that
western societies have long had experience in dealing with the seemingly aporetic
31 It relies primarily on the work of Kerferd:1981; Stough:1987; Hookway:1992; Annas &
Barnes:I994; Forster:1989; Frede:1987; Hankinson:1995; Weintraub:1997 and Popkin:1999.
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nature of reality. This focus on the history of philosophy seems to have been
forgotten by the traditionalists in the controversy.
Chapter Three maintains the analysis, extending it into the modern world. It
examines the work of some major contributors to the enlightenment project, ego
David Hume's deployment of Pyrrhonian sceptical empiricism, the sceptical
positivism of Auguste Comte and the English empiricism of J. S. Mill. Finally it
brings the discussion into the presenr", arguing that outside of history, many
philosophers working in this tradition of empiricism are maintaining, or have
rediscovered, a sceptical awareness of aporia comparable with the sceptics of the
classical world.
Chapter Four returns to history as a practice and reflects on how it might be possible
for empirical historians to make use of this sceptical narrative of the western
tradition. To do this it establishes first that the empirical 'defenders' in this debate
can associate themselves with the western tradition of empiricism studied here. It
looks at several influences on the development of western empirical historiography
since the mid-nineteenth century, and argues that empiricism has not been affected in
any fundamental way by major influences on it; ie. by either Rankean metaphysics,
Butterfield's Christian approach to knowledge or Marxist science. Then, through a
case study by way of example, the discussion focuses in more closely on those
historians who are demonstrating the possibility of an alternative to the choices
within the controversy. Thus as a case study it looks at how historians working in
the Marxist tradition, and influenced by E. P. Thompson's controversy with Louis
Althusser in 1978 (1995), developed a methodology which has shown itself to be
32 This is a necessary but difficult task since the empirical tradition has fragmented in the
twentieth century under the same pressures that have produced the phenomenon of
postmodernism. Nevertheless an outline of a trajectory of ideas is attempted here, drawing
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compatible with both empiricism and with the more positive aspects of the
postmodern challenge.
The chapter continues this examination of alternatives by considering the potential
for history which, despite the difficulties of the current postmodern challenge, might
be thought to be available from poststructuralist writings. First, the discussion
clarifies the issues by considering how poststructuralism has been used by Keith
Jenkins in the pursuit of a negative, unconvincing account of knowledge. It then
points to ways in which some of the aims of the challengers (ie. their emphasis on
overtly self-aware closures) can be achieved by an alternative reading of
poststructuralism. It notes how, after Thompson, Marxist social historians -
specifically Patrick Joyce - have enabled Marxist historiography to benefit from the
assimilation of certain poststructuralist insights. From this it employs Hilary
Lawson's treatment of reflexivity to argue for a broad tentative response to the
insights of poststructuralism - one in which critical self-awareness and tolerance of
difference seem to be the most obvious conclusions to draw from the discourse.f
Finally, and in drawing together the issues here, the conclusion summarises how
empiricism, Marxism and poststructuralism are capable of coming into a coherence
to enable an inclusive discourse of history to develop. Of course, for this to happen,
a degree of pluralistic tolerance is necessary, but it will be seen by this stage perhaps
that such an aspiration is not simply naive optimism. It will be concluded that each
approach to knowledge has, through its nuanced relationship with aporia, a different
form of closure. For example empiricism relies on experience, the discussion of
which it regards as largely unnecessary. Marxism has narrowed the closure of
initially on Ayer: 1940, 1956, 1971, 1976; Bevir: 1994, 1999,2000: Bumyeat: 1980, 1979, 1983;
Habennas: 1984,1987; Quine: 1969; Russell: 1961 &Williams:2002.
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experience to a specifically identified aspect of it. which it deploys as a paradigm.
Poststructuralism, through its speculations upon the epistemological consequences of
language as a closure, finds itself able to close the possibility of endless regress its
concept of 'reflexivity.' Considered in this way, the similarities between these three
positions can be seen to be epistemological and thus fundamental, whereas their
differences are merely contingent and thus able to be accounted for, as well as
understood and at times hopefully resolved.
JJ Important here are Belsey:2002;Culler: 1983 ;Hahn:2002;Howells: 1999;Norris: 1987 and
Derrida himself: for example, Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness 200 I (although of course
after Barthes no special emphasis can be attributed to Derrida's own account ofbis writings).
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Chapter One: A Case for Historians to Answer? The Controversy and the Debate
The purpose of this chapter is to add detail to the general points made in the introduction
about the controversy and its position within the ongoing debate about the nature of
history. The discussion shows that there is a need for a better account of historical
knowledge than the one being struggled over in this present controversy; between, that is,
those who claim to speak for the discipline, in maintaining its traditional procedures, and
their postmodem challengers. J
The first section of the chapter picks up on aspects of the controversy itself, in particular
on some of the exchanges between Arthur Marwick and Hayden White, between Perez
Zagorin and Frank Ankersmit and more recently between Zagorin and Keith Jenkins.
Two things become immediately apparent from the selection brought to this section. The
first is that the controversy cannot be simply about whether or not traditional empirical
historiography demonstrates a correspondence theory of history that seeks for objective
truth because, repeatedly, upholders of traditionalism show that they, like the
postmodems, recognise a sceptical dimension in their accounts of historical knowledge.
It is not being argued here that empirical historians really are postmodems, or vice versa.
Nevertheless a recognition of what they share is a step in the process towards bringing
these, and other groups, into a single communicable focus.! At the same time even a
brief look at the way either side handle this scepticism shows that there is a sophistication
IThe descriptors 'postmodemist' and 'poststructuralist' will continue to be used interchangeably
to describe these historians. However, these terms will increasingly be refined and differentiated
from each other as the study progresses.
2 Such terms as 'communicable focus' are of course suggestive of Habennas's 'theory of
communicative action.' There are certainly similarities, but I do not mean to suggest the existence
any kind of Habennassean ideal type of communicative group being involved. What I am referring
to, by using this term, is simply a group of historians enjoying sufficient common ground between
them to enable fruitful discussions to take place.
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in postmodem approaches to interpretation. that is simply missing from mainstream
empirical practice and this would suggest that, at least at a prima-facie level, there is a
case for traditional historiography to answer.
The second section focuses more closely on the work of three of the more prominent
postmodern historians and challengers; that of Keith Jenkins, Alun Munslow and
Beverley Southgate. It suggests that whatever the merits of a postmodern approach to
history - and there are certainly some - there are problems with the way the issues are
treated by these theorists. A common factor in the work of these postmodems is the
negativity that they hold towards interpretative knowledge as though it were in some way
second class and comparable with an ideal certainty. This pessimistic approach to
epistemology has been perhaps the main obstacle to the achievement of a degree of
commonality between empirical and postmodem historiography. The intention in this
section is to note that the postmodem challengers offer no easy answer to the weakness in
mainstream practice demonstrated in the first section.
A third section then broadens the gaze and looks at other contributions to the 'nature of
history' debate and suggests that the existence of this broader discourse is clear evidence
of other possibilities beyond those of the controversy. It is argued in this section that
whether from issues of actual historical practice or from political perspectives more
overtly expressed than hitherto by the combatants, there are grounds for believing that the
danger of a fundamental split within history, along the lines of a postmodern versus
traditional empiricism, can be avoided.
Overall it will be suggested in this initial chapter that it is the unwillingness or incapacity
of traditional historians to handle its sceptical dimension as effectively as do either the
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postmodern challengers or these alternatives groups, that is the area that most needs to be
addressed in any attempt to construct an inclusive discourse of the discipline.'
Section I
From the many professional empirical historians, and other commentators, who engage
from time to time with others about the nature and methods of history' the 'defenders' in
this controversy have, in a sense, defined themselves by the prominence and in some
cases the vehemence of their response to the postmodern challenge. Thus Iam
identifying the empirical side of the controversy as being represented most prominently
by Geoffrey Elton, Richard Evans, Gertrude Himmelfarb (1987& 1992), Lawrence Stone,
Gabriel Spiegel (1990) John Vincent (1995) and Perez Zagorin (1990 &1999). On the
postmodern side, in addition to the historians mentioned already, are F. Ankersmit
(1989,1990,1995&2000) and Hayden White (1973: 1978 & 1995). This is a far from
exhaustive list but it perhaps gives a sense of the genus of historians taking part, from
which these indicative examples have been drawn.'
The first point to be made is that one of the more obvious features of the exchanges
between traditional and postmodern historians is that they seem often not to be directly
engaging with each other. Ankersmit, Jenkins and White appear not to recognise
Marwick and Zagorin'sjustifiabJe protestations that they, and those for whom they speak,
do not carry on the kind of historical practice attributed to them by postmodernists. At
the same time empirical historians such as Zagorin and Marwick tend to take as given, the
3 And that is the reason why this aspect of the project has been accorded a larger share of the study
space than that of either Marxism or poststructuralism.
4 For example Mary Abbott (1996), Jules Benjamin (2001), Peter Burke (1992), William Dray
(1980), Gordon Graham (1997) and Burnes & Rayment-Pickard (2000).
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criteria they use when making historical knowledge/' Despite this, empirical historians
are nevertheless working with the same constructional perspective as the postmodems,
rather than the realist/correspondence theory perspective, which postmodem historians
have attributed to them. Indeed it is possible to see a remarkable degree of agreement
between the antagonists, about their respective foundations for historical knowledge. But
the evidence seems to be ignored by both sides, with the result that the controversy
remains located unsatisfactorily on the terrain of philosophy and epistemology and the
implications of the exchanges, that is to say the values and politics, are left relatively
unexamined. Both sides accept that knowledge is, at root, a human construction, but their
debate is really not about whether empirical historiography carries philosophical
assumptions of nalve realism. The point at issue is not - or at least are not primarily -
about whether one or other side think there are unproblematic truths about the world,
existing complete with their linguistic descriptions, independently of knowers. Rather it
is about the attention paid by either side to the ways interpretation might be understood to
function.' In short what underlies their differences is politics, but both sides have
expressed their differences as epistemological.
In Arthur Marwick's polemical critique of postmodemism in the Journal of
Contemporary History (1995) he gave an interesting and unexpected explanation for his
oft-repeated assertion that history functions in a similar way to science; that is that
scientists
'There is inevitably to some extent an overlap between empirical 'defenders' of the discipline and
those who, it will be seen. who have engaged with Marxism. Stone and Spiegel are examples of
this.
6 See also Richard Evans's treatment of this matter, 1997b:147
7 Realism, like postmodemism and empiricism can be a slippery term, used variously. For
example in the exchange between Jenkins and Zagorin in 199912000, both of them used 'anti-
realism' to mean something akin to idealism. This would make realism little more than a not very
helpful catch-all term for any position other than idealism. In contrast to this, and more in keeping
with its general use within the debate 'realism' will be used to indicate the belief in a world
existing, complete with meanings, independently of human minds.
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write up their researches and in doing so control the machineries
they deploy, knowing their work will he subject to the scrutiny
of cold-eyed colleagues (1995:9).
He suggested that this mechanism operates as a form of professional control which
ensured that works of history
will be subject to the competition of the intellectual market
place; eventually a balanced well-substantiated much
scrutinised account will pass into our textbooks (1995:10).
This is an interesting comment made by Marwick because postmodemists have generally
regarded traditional historians to be believers in a correspondence theory of truth ie. in the
existence of an independently existing objective past, the uncovering of which, directly
and through the evidence, (in all its already existing nature before we as historians start to
work on knowing it) is the appointed task of historians (Munslow:2000:4 & 81). Indeed
it might be thought here that Marwick was claiming that the role of institutions is one in
which they legitimise particular theories of correspondence with reality. However, when
placed into a larger context of similar statements it becomes clear that here was potential
evidence of a constructivist account of knowledge. Marwick makes no claim to be able
to reach a 'reality' beyond those that historians make of the past.
This was not exactly how Hayden White saw it when he responded to Marwick's paper.
It is true that White could himself have made the above point about correspondence, but
in fact he did not. He appeared confused by Marwick's argument. In a context of sharp
exchanges in which Marwick had described postmodem historians as 'metaphysical
interlopers' and White called Marwick's ideas 'bizarre and uninformed', Marwick's
assumption of a potentially constructivist account of history became simply a weapon
with which he could be berated. Despite some preliminary, and rather grudgingly-given
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praise, saying that Marwick's point here was 'interesting' and 'potentially radical', White
quickly moved on to speak of it as an example ofMarwick's incoherence; it was 'at odds'
with his general position - 'a demon' which Marwick had imputed to postmodemists
(White: 1995:236). And all this was seemingly unconscious of the fact that, apart from a
slightly different emphasis on the political, what Marwick argued here bore a strong
similarity to what Jenkins had claimed constituted a postmodem definition of historical
knowledge. ie.
History is a shifting, problematic discourse, ... that is produced
by a group of present-minded workers (overwhelmingly in our
culture salaried historians) ... whose products, once in circulation,
are subject to a series of uses and abuses that are logically infinite
but which in actuality generally correspond to a range of power
bases that exist at any given moment and which structure and
distribute the meanings of histories along a dominant-marginal
spectrum (Jenkins: 1991 :26).
Having criticised Marwick for holding a postmodern-like constructivist position, White
then attributed to him a crude realist one, and criticised him for that too. White asserted
that
postmodernism tends to be sceptical of all notions of essences,
leery of the kind of authority that Marwick claims for historical
knowledge (White: 1995: 234).
The statement seems not to have recognised that Marwick's claim for historical
knowledge in fact argued for the very opposite of essentialism - that a piece of history
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does not form a single self-standing account. which is
automatically to be taken as an authoritative, all-encompassing
statement, a secure piece of knowledge. On the contrary, it is
merely a contribution to knowledge, immediately open to
scrutiny, analysis and criticism by fellow historians
(Marwick:1995: 23).
Similarly, White misread Marwick's account of the relationship between science and
history, claiming that Marwick has argued that history is an empirical science. Not
surprisingly White was able to show the weakness of such a claim. The difficulty for
White's case, on a less committed reading, is that although it is true that Marwick, in
company with many historians, considers history to be one of the social sciences, he was
careful to draw a line in relation to natural science. To this history is merely to be
compared, not conflated. Lest there should be any misunderstanding, he further
cautioned, 'I have no wish to overdo the parallels between history and the natural
sciences- there are enormous differences ... ' (1995:11).
For White it was as though this statement had not been made. White seems to have just
assumed that Marwick was working with a realist notion of science and because Marwick
had made comparisons between science and history, this imputed realism must apply to
history too. In fact. Marwick had tried to make it clear that his view of history is one in
which historical knowledge is not something complete and given, but rather it is one in
which the product is always open to further interpretation - interpretation based on
sources which are 'politically and conceptually loaded, biased and imperfect. in all sorts
of ways' (l995:29). Clearly history was, for Marwick, an open-ended project. It would
have been hard to understand how he could have made such a point were he really to have
held to a correspondence theory. Moreover, his account of it bore a remarkable similarity
to White's own; ie.: 'as I understand it postmodernism simply brings under question the
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authority of ''the past" as a font of social wisdom and moral propriety' (White: 1995:234).
Indeed, for all his criticism ofMarwick's position White does tacitly accept that his own
and Marwick's versions of historical practice do share a basic approach to knowledge. He
agreed, as did Marwick, that history is: 'a construction by historians, comprised out of the
data or evidence contained in the primary sources (White: 1995:243).
What is interesting is that this was no simple victory for Marwick, for at this point in his
critique White shifted the focus of his attack to what is the real difference between them
- and it is not one of realism against relativism or even of closed against open modes of
knowledge-making. Rather it relates to their differing concerns with how historical
interpretation should be controlled or handled - in other words the 'closure' (of the
logically never-ending chain of possible interpretations). White saw this as being the way
a historian's account of his or her subject is constrained by
the conventions of language, genre, mode (for example,
narrative), argument and a host of other cultural and social
contextual questions (1995:244).
This is certainly pertinent, for nowhere in Marwick's account of history is there a sense
in which he has shown any importance to achieving an understanding of the ways in
which interpretations are constructed intellectually. Indeed he seems to be inclined to shy
away from such discussion. Like Evans, his emphasis is always on the practical aspects
of interpretation; for example the handling of primary sources (1981: 144-146). His
discussion of a recognisably nineteenth century 'mental set by historians' (p21), shows
that he is not entirely oblivious to the idea that the historians' mental attitude, through
which the practicalities operate, is a constituent of the history produced. It is just that he
seems not to regard this as important and it has not therefore been factored into his
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explanation of history. The result of this in his exchange with Hayden White was that he
was not able to respond to White's compelling argument that history
is not merely a matter of telling the truth about the past, not
even the truth as seen from a specific perspective, or making
sure that one's facts are straight. It is much more a matter of
imagining both the real world from which one has launched
one's inquiry into the past and the world that comprises one's
object of interest (1995:241).
To this one might add that the recognition of such imagining occurs through, amongst
other things, an awareness of the constructing nature of the field of secondary sources
within which an historical perspective is developed. Marwick's historiography is the
weaker for this lacuna in his thought.
There are of course further areas for fruitful discussion here, which have not been touched
on by either Marwick or White. For example there is the question of whether the feature
of repeatability in science is suggestive of a correspondence theory of 'last instance'
there. Interestingly however neither party raised this issue, and that is perhaps further
evidence of their common epistemological base.! Similarly, nowhere in his article
'Response to Arthur Marwick' does White directly address the political issue - the point
that by not acknowledging ways in which 'the historian's language transforms the
"object" of study into a "subject" of a specifically historical discourse' (p.243) Marwick
et. al. are not acknowledging the constructive effect of values either. The point is made
• One need only recall, in geology, of the slow acceptance of the theory of plate tectonics, in the
face of the readily available evidence in its favour, to appreciate the importance of disciplinary
institutions in the construction of scientific knowledge, however repeatable is experimentation, in
practice.
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implicitly by White. It needs however to be made explicit (as it was in Marxist critiques)
if the difference between the positions is to be capable of being settled.
Similar assumptions about the grounds for historical knowledge become apparent through
a consideration of Perez Zagorin' s opposition to postmodernism as he has articulated it in
two major articles published in History and Theory. The frrst of these, 'Historiography
and Postmodernism; Reconsiderations', was published in 1990 and was a response to an
earlier paper in the same journal by F. Ankersmit. The second paper 'History, the
Referent and Narrative; Reflections on Postmodernism Now,' published in 1999, covered
remarkably similar ground although it involved a more wide-ranging critique of
postmodernism, focusing specifically upon the arguments Keith Jenkins has offered and
on those postmodem contributions to the debate which Jenkins collected in his The
Postmodern History Reader (1997b). Both articles have been responded to, by their
respective targets - indeed the exchanges continue - but the discussion here only lightly
touches on these responses, for the concern in this section is not with every twist and tum
of the debate itself so much as with the assumptions displayed by Zagorin,
Certainly Zagorin opposes postmodemism and this opposition can be seen in both of
these papers. He opens the first by pointing out that historians have been 'decidedly
critical of it' (1990:263) and he ends by commenting that Ankersmit's postmodem view
'seems woefully impoverished' (1990:274). Similarly in the 1999 paper he begins by
comparing - unfavourably - postmodemism with pragmatism (1999: 1&2) and closes
with the view that postmodemism is 'founded on a mistaken conception of the nature and
function of language.' However throughout both papers Zagorin has shown repeatedly
that, like Marwick, he holds an epistemologically open, constructivist, account of
knowledge. And to be clear what is taken here as constructivism is a position shared
with postmodernism (Munslow:2000:53) in which knowledge is characterised by the
view that it is the community of knowers which in some way (be it through language,
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concepts, methods, procedures or the focus of study etc.) validates or otherwise grounds
knowledge.
Nowhere is Zagorin's position more obvious than in the reason he gives for the basic
unacceptability ofpostmodernism as a methodology for history. Zagorin agrees with
Marwick that what is importantly wrong with postmodernism (apart from what he sees as
weaknesses in the philosophy of language, for example) is that its proponents have not
been able to convince sufficient numbers of working historians of its value to them. It
has, he says, failed to 'accord with some of the strongest intuitions and convictions that
historians bring to their work' (1999:24). Zagorin has repeatedly returned to this view
and clearly believes that it is appropriate to judge postmodernism by the extent to which it
has attracted support from working historians. This is consistent with his empirical stance
that since it could never be known whether any particular approach to knowledge was a
fully accurate means of making sense of the past, (because as all sides agree, it is not
possible to get back to the past to check) general acceptability and perceived utility
become crucial criteria. What is significant here is that it shows that Zagorin, like
Jenkins, is working with an assumption that history is a construction of historians - it is
what historians agree that it should be. After all Jenkins said himself in Rethinking
History, 'the past has gone and history is what historians make of it when they go to
work' (Jenkins:1991:6).
Clearly Zagorin and Marwick are in agreement with Jenkins's view here and are drawing
attention to the fact that some aspects (at least) of the account of knowledge, expressed by
White, Ankersmit or Jenkins has, for whatever reason, not been seen as convincing to
many historians. Obviously it is not what they want to take 'to work' as a description of
their approach to historical knowledge. There is no entailment for historians to accept
this postmodern critique, since both sides agree that there is no absolute true, right or
accurate way of doing history beyond that which seems sensible to the majority of
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practitioners at anyone time and in anyone place. This could not, arguably, be a more
unequivocal indication of Zagorin' s constructivist assumptions about the nature of the
discipline. It is indicative too of the need for a better, more persuasive, reason to be
brought to the debate, if traditional empirical historians are to be prepared to modernise
their practice.
Zagorin effectively side-steps a great deal of the postmodem challenge to traditional
historiography by simply accepting it and agreeing that: 'the point is not whether it is
possible to obtain a total conception of world history or the historical process, for it
almost certainly is not' (1990:273). What we take to be firm historical knowledge is for
him only ever a form of sedimented interpretation. For example;
If an historical interpretation comes to be widely accepted, it
may even cease to be the subject of debate and take its place
as an established part of our understanding of the past. Of
course this may not last. The subsequent emergence of
another interpretation may force it to undergo renewed challenges
which throw it into question and perhaps displace it (1990:269).
What is particularly interesting here is the closeness of this account to that of Stanley
Fish, whom Keith Jenkins includes in those postmodernists whose 'ample imaginaries'
will help us 'forget history'. (Jenkins: 1999: 12). For example:
Asserting the textuality of history and making specific historical
argument have nothing to do with each other. They are actions
in different practices, moves in different games .... The belief
that facts are constructed is a general one and is not held with
reference to any facts in particular; particular facts are firm or
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in question insofar as the perspective (of some enterprise or
discipline area of enquiry) within which they emerge is firmly
in place, settled; and should that perspective be dislodged
(always a possibility) the result will not be an indeterminacy
of fact, but a new shape of factual firmness (Fish: 1989:308).
Like Fish, Zagorin is happy with the idea that the question of whether objectivity is
possible is quite separate from the issue of whether it can be employed as an aim and in a
regulatory category. Zagorin regards history as being able to provide in 'some non-
absolute yet valid sense .... a true representation and understanding of the past' (1999: 11).
He spells out and lists exactly what is implied in his use of these terms. Thus history;
does not pretend to know or tell everything- is always a selective.
It is a reconstruction of the past, from a great manifold of
facts, a selection dictated by the subjects, problems and questions
the author proposes to deal with. It is written from a point of view.
In its statements is susceptible of disproof, embodies comments and
judgements relative to controverted questions. It does not profess
to be a mindless and mechanical transcript of reality, but an
attempt at understanding (1999: 12).
In rejecting Ankersmit's charge that empirical historians are antiquarians he stresses that
history is never for its own sake. It 'must, by implication be always to show, to
understand.' (1990:273).
Zagorin, importantly and unlike Marwick, has not argued for the primacy of primary
sources. He has made it clear on almost every page of both papers that he considered
history to be an interpretative discipline. Therefore there could be no possibility of
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historians acquiring knowledge of the past directly from the evidence of primary sources,
in any unmediated realist way. Rather he claimed that primary sources are a necessary
and important part of the business of making sense of the past and are not invalidated by
the need and existence of interpretation. What he argued - and this is not incompatible
with the generality of postmodem accounts - is that knowledge-claims must be able to be
justified; that common practice is such that 'historians know that they may be called upon
to justify the veridicality, adequacy, reliability of particular statements, interpretations
and even of their entire account' (1990:272). Thus although only implicitly made,
Zagorin's justification is, like that of Jenkins, ultimately a social and therefore a political
one; ie. that historians must ask what the foundation of history is and what purpose it
serves, or should serve, in culture and society (1990:273).
However, it is possible to see a weakness of explanation here, in Zagorin's empirical
approach, for it simply does not compare with the richness of Jenkins's earlier political
analysis (1991 :Ch.l), or the excitement of Ankersmit' s linguistic understanding of
interpretation. Zagorin's form of expression is bland. Compare for example Ankersmit's
argument that: 'the nature of the view of the past is defined exactly by the language used
by the historian in his or her historical work' (Ankersmit: 1989: 145) with Zagorin's
equivalent, ie. his mere statement of pluralism: 'history will always find differing
accounts and interpretations of the same subject' (1999:12). Given that Zagorin is no less
explicit in his acceptance of the interpretative dimension to history than say Marwick, it is
reasonable to begin to conclude that this blandness - this lack of self-awareness and of
sophistication in explanation - is a feature not just of Zagorin's work but of the empirical
mode in general, in so far as these two historians can be thought to exemplify it. Thus it
may be that quite apart from a mutual lack of understanding between their positions,
traditional empirical interpretation is simply less effective than that of postmodemism.
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A caveat is necessary here, for Alun Munslow - unlike White and Jenkins - has made a
distinction between different approaches within mainstream empirical historiography and
he does appear to accept the point being argued here. He separates out from his own
spectrum of mainstream historiography those historians who he regards as being
'representational' or realist from those he sees as constructionists (2000:5 & 6). In fact
he provides a useful discussion of constructivism (or as he has redescribed it,
'constructionism') within mainstream history (1995: Ch5) and this will be returned to
later in the study. Ultimately though, Munslow's distinction is a superficial one in that it
merely shifts to a slightly deeper level his assumption that what he calls representation or
realist, (ie. the belief in an real objectively existing world which stands apart from
interpreted knowledge and can be discovered by empirical methods) is fundamentally the
same as constructivism in that they are both really representational: ie. 'Both
reconstructionists and constructionists read the documents ... for the reality they reflect'
(2000:8).
It has been indicated here that an understanding of the differences between the opposing
sides in this debate can be found at a level of detail within the larger argument - that is to
say that the issue is about how there is an epistemological closure in the making of
historical knowledge rather than whether there is one. It does appear that mainstream
empirical historians downplay differences between practitioners which might have arisen
from differing intellectual assumptions of a value-laden nature. Whether they do this in
innocence of its political implications, or whether it is a deliberate strategy to avoid
having to explain their often privileged 'voice' is a difficult question to answer. The
point however is that, thanks to the Marxist and the broader postmodernlpoststructuralist
critiques of history, this strategy (or innocence) is no longer regarded by many historians
as acceptable and, as this study will show, it is not necessary either. At the same time
these historians are assiduous in insisting that historical explanation is an ongoing open-
ended enterprise, and they do seem genuinely surprised that their postmodem opponents
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do not recognise this. Postmodems, for their own part. (Jenkins's recent 'end of history'
argument apart) take it as given that the practice of history is ongoing etc., but in addition
to this they stress strongly that the intellectual context of knowledge-making in our time
implies new minimum standards of historical explanation. They vary somewhat on what
these might be from, for example, White's and Ankersmit's linguistics to Jenkins's
politics - but a common factor is that they must involve historians being able to account
for how and why they interpret particular pieces of evidence as they do. However,
despite the sophistication postmodems bring to their reading of the interpretative process,
their own lacuna is that they seem not to want to recognise that the nature of their
contribution to on-going changes in historical methodology is merely one of detail, rather
than of fundamental essence, as they claim. To put it simply, they overstate their case.
The constructivist facet of mainstream historiography can be seen, with greater or lesser
emphasis, across the gamut of methodological opinion. Although as postmodemists are
keen to point out, there are still residues of Rankean rhetoric to be heard on the defending
side of the debate, it is interesting that the arguments of either camp do not include
detailed accounts of whether those residues, those references that is to a knowable past,
amount to anything much more than simply working assumptions", In short, beyond
Christopher Lloyd's contribution to the MarwicklWhite exchange (Lloyd: 1996) there is
no theoretical realist account of history offered by empirical historians within the current
controversy and there is no proper critique of historical realism made by postmodems In
fact there is hardly a defender of empirical practice - however narrowly conceived - who
has not readily accepted that the debate has moved on since Ranke (eg. Elton: 1969: 167).
Realism is no longer - if it ever was - a live issue in the discussion about historical
epistemology.
9 Ranke's work is considered in more detail in Chapter Four.
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On the other side it is apparent that the postmodem position has a dimension to it which
mainstream historiography lacks: that is that it pays attention to the actual mechanics of
interpretation, whereas empirical historians appear to consider it enough merely to
explain what patterns they see in the past, leaving it to historians who follow them, to
modify or amend what has been claimed, as they think appropriate. In other words
empirical historians tend to conceive of open-endedness as a function of the ongoing
debate itself, while for postmodemists (at least for those who still think history worth
engaging in) this quality is achieved through the operation of a more thoroughgoing
epistemological self-awareness. This is expressed by Southgate as the importance of
historians 'knowing what they are doing and why' (1996b:135) and by Munslow as a
stress on 'the nature of representation, not the empirical research process as such'
(1997a: 178). This changing nature of the epistemological closure is the core of the
debate in history and it is a core which can be understood historically, and within this
culturally and politically, rather than as a philosophical issue as the postmodem
challengers have claimed.
Section II
Even within the confines of this controversy, the historians considered in this section-
Keith Jenkins, Alun Munslow and Beverley Southgate - do not represent the whole of the
postmodem challenge, as the introduction noted. They do however regularly contribute to
the growing body of work on the postmodem critique of mainstream practice and they are
therefore indicative of that genre'", It is argued in this section that it would be unwise for
historians to accept the critique of their discipline as it is currently expressed by these
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postmodemists for, welcome though their critical self-awareness is, there are difficulties
associated with their critiques.
Of the three postmodem critiques examined here, Keith Jenkins's argument for an ending
of the project of history, is very much the most important. It is a reading - a rather
pessimistic reading - of poststructuralism allied to an argued reliance on the pragmatist
postmodemism of Richard Rorty. The validity of this approach will be considered in
Chapter Four. I have mentioned already my earlier work with Jenkins. In terms of his
publications this collaboration extended up to his introductory account of postmodernism
in Rethinking History 1991.11 To put it simply, the problem I have with his critique is
that it has changed from being a welcome criticism of empirical historiography's lack of
self-awareness to being a substantially unworkable and unconvincing account of the
discipline.
In the first and third chapters of Rethinking History (1991) Jenkins offered a compelling
analysis of the practice of history and called upon historians to develop a more reflexive
methodology. Rethinking History is a primer aimed at A Level and first year
undergraduate students. It is also explicitly a polemic intended to provoke wider
discussion of a perceived need for a better understanding of the nature of the discipline.
His message was well received by the target group and their teachers throughout the
1990s and the book has been widely translated. What Jenkins did was to shift the debate
from a previously narrow emphasis on the technicalities of source handling to encompass
a wider criterion of historical knowledge; one which advocated an awareness by
10 Recent relevant work has included: Jenkins: 1991,1995,1997 a & b, 1999 & 2003;
Munslow: 1997a & b,20oo & 2003; Southgate: 1996 8 & b,2000 & 2003. See also Elizabeth
Ennarth's literary approach to 8 critique of history: 1983,1992,20018 & b.
II To be precise, apart from the historical narrative in Chapter Three, I accept what Jenkins argued
in that work - and indeed I played 8 part in its formulation (as he acknowledges in his preface).
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historians of the values which drive their own decisions and those of others in the
operation of the techniques of history making.
He was at that time optimistically positive about postmodernism in its relation to history,
maintaining that
a relativist perspective need not lead to despair but to the
beginning of a general recognition of how things seem to
operate. This is emancipating. Reflexively you too can make
histories. (1991 :25/26)
Sadly this seems to have been the high point of his own enthusiasm that postmodernism
has the ability to reform and modernise history, because from there onwards, through
several publications, Jenkins increasingly despaired ofpostmodernism's emancipating
possibilities for history until, ironically at the point when a new Routledge journal was
established to discuss the ideas inaugurated in Rethinking History, he wrote in its first
edition that perhaps we should just 'forget history; maybe we can now lead lives ... which
have no reference to a past tense.'(1997:57). Thus the relativism of history - that
emancipating factor of eight years before - had now become the actual cause of history's
demise - that 'it is now clear that "in and for itself' there is nothing definitive for us to get
out of it other than that which we have put into it' (1999:3).
At the heart of his reasons why we should abandon history is a 'some/all' confusion. The
evidence he produces against historical practice is made specifically against those of
nineteenth and twentieth century historiography, (those he calls 'upper' and 'lower case'
history) but his solution is to abandon history in its entirety (2000: I99i2 • It is as if -
12 It is tempting to read Jenkins as rejecting only certain objectivist versions of empiricism.
Unhappily his theory of the 'capsizal of the lower case' would seem to militate against such a
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ironically reminiscent of Geoffrey Elton (1969: Ch.l) - he will not recognise any practice
from before the nineteenth century as history and therefore cannot conceive of any new
historical practice worth undertaking, beyond that which is already in the orbit of current,
nineteenth and twentieth century, thought. Curiously, Jenkins's position has recently
moved yet again. In Refiguring History (2003) he appears to have withdrawn slightly
from the historical nihilism of 1999, but on close reading it becomes clear that this
withdrawal is more apparent than real; the grounds for his position are simply changed.
Nevertheless the argument of both positions - 1997-9 and 2003 - is worthy of closer
examination than is possible in this initial chapter and I shall be returning to it in the
context of the discussion on alternative readings ofpoststructuralism in Chapter Four.
In holding back from Jenkins's more extreme position Alun Munslow and Beverley
Southgate's work is more immediately amenable to mainstream historians and certainly
they both make productive contributions to the controversy, putting emphasis on
potentially significant issues which Jenkins has not addressed. Two examples are focused
on here: that of constructivism in mainstream historiography in the case of Munslow and
of the western tradition of scepticism, in Southgate's work. In their treatment of these
. h diff I' id 13Issues, owever, some I ICUties are eVI ent.
Munslow's handling of constructivism in historical methodology (what he calls
'constructionism') has some initial similarity with the points made in the first chapter.
For example he accepts that the mainstream empirical historian Lawrence Stone has
convenient reading (I997:Introduction), On the other hand, since he has muddied the waters
somewhat in his Refiguring History (2003) it is always possible that in the future he may claim to
have been speaking rhetorically, If that should prove to be the case, it would be a welcome
development. In the meantime his account should not be conflated with Fukuyama's The end of
History and the Last man (1992) where the emphasis is on history in a Hegelian sense rather than
as disciplinary practice.
13 In making these points I do not wish them to become a polemic with Munslow and Southgate, I
consider that they are making valid and useful contributions to the ongoing debate about the nature
of history, My criticism is merely that there are, arguably, more effective forms of expression to
be found in exploring similarities between these approaches to history, rather than by going over
yet again differences which have already been thoroughly explored within the debate.
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argued that 'the truth is unknowable' (Munslow:1997: 90) and that Appleby, Hunt and
Jacob - also from the empiricaJ/postmodem middle ground - see truth coming from 'the
conflict of ideas "among diverse groups of truth-seekers" (1997: 94).14Munslow also
draws on what is no doubt common ground with all historians of ideas, namely that, in
our age - the turn of the century - it is possible to look back to a lengthy period in which
there was a good deal less critical self-awareness evident in knowledge-making than there
is now (1997:40). It is however in his delineation of constructionism from both
deconstructionism and reconstructionism that Munslow's account is different from the
position of this study. Broadly, and for the purposes of this chapter, we can regard
Munslow's use of the term 'deconstructionism' as the equivalent ofpostmodemism and
of 'reconstructionism' as philosophical realism. Munslow quite rightly notes that, despite
their constructivist assumptions, mainstream empirical historians do not generally accept
the epistemological primacy accorded by postmodemists to linguistics - the so-called
linguistic turn - and he assumes from this that constructionism must be therefore be a
covert form of reconstructionism. Constructionists (from here on I shall use the more
widely accepted term, 'constructivism' except for quotes) are, he says, really 'practical
realists' who
while acknowledging the culturally provided nature of knowledge,
still insist on the sanctity of the source (evidence) as offering
an adequate correspondence to what actually happened in
the past (1997:99).
It is strange that Munslow should make this claim because the evidence he provides in its
support - from C. Behan, McCullagh, Appleby et. al., Marwick and Geoffrey Elton
(l997:Ch.3) - shows the clear opposite. These historians, at least in the extracts chosen
14 He notes too that A.J.P. Taylor holds the view, 'along with Karl Marx, that when historians
write history, "our version, being set into words, is itself false.' (1997:92)
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by Munslow, do not believe in the existence of a 'true' and 'objective' world if these
terms mean a world in which meaning is 'given' to humans in a singular and unmediated
manner (significantly Munslow does not clarify his own use of these terms), To consider
briefly in tum each of the examples which Munslow ofTers; he accepts that for
McCullagh what passes conventionally as truth is really simply the view of 'the majority
of educated speakers of the language in which it is written' (1997:37). This view,
famously shared with Marx's concept of superstructures, hardly constitutes a charge of
'conservatism' (1997:44). Munslow's own quotes from Appleby, Hunt and Jacob include
the admission that historians 'happily concede "the tentativeness"' (1997:38) of historical
knowledge. Had Munslow extended his analysis of Appleby et.at. to a few more
paragraphs following the point from which he drew his quote he would have noted that
these historians went on to argue that their definition of what they term 'practical realism'
'never denies that the very act of representing the past makes the historian (values, warts,
and all) an agent who moulds how the past is to be seen' (Applebyet.al: 1994:249). It is
really difficult to see how Munslow can sensibly suggest that such a view of historical
knowledge can be described as 'correspondence theory' (1997:99). Marwick's
constructivism has already been discussed but, apparently supportive of the reading
argued for in this chapter, Munslow makes him say that: 'history is a human activity
carried out by an organised corps offalIible human beings [acting] in accordance with
strict methods and principles' (1997:39). He thus shows the very opposite of what he
c1aims.l~
The point here is that Munslow does not seem to realise that, far from providing evidence
of philosophical realism as it is generally understood (ie. as positing the existence of a
real independently existing world to which human knowledge corresponds), he is actually
showing that the works of these central figures of the mainstream empirical historical
J5 Munslow treats Geoffrey Elton in the same way, Munslow:1997:42.
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community are clearly carrying evidence of constructivist assumptions in their approach
to explaining historical thought. 16 They may not have very 'good' constructivist
accounts. There may be much that might be said against them and they may well carry
various - perhaps unwelcome - political significance. Moreover these may be more or
less overtly held, but for all that, these mainstream professional historians do all see
knowledge as being a human construction of one sort or another. Their closures may not
carry the same social or cultural significance as that of the linguistic tum, and admittedly
many may carry elitist conceptions of their professionalism. But even from the evidence
Munslow deploys, these historians can be seen to share with postmodemists (or with
Munslow's deconstructionists) the same epistemology, in the sense that they all accept
that knowledge is not given to humans as singular, true or unmediated, by a real world.
In his latest work, The New History (2003), Munslow has softened his earlier strident
tone and he focuses now more firmly on change, arguing that, rather than empiricism
being simply wrong, it is merely outdated. The title of his book is indicative of a more
formative approach being taken and, indeed, in parts his argument has become closer to
the position being advanced here. The difference however is that his underlying
conception of empiricism (or the empirical-analytical, as he terms it) is still one that sees
mainstream historiography as realist. Certainly a resolution of this difference remains a
task to be addressed before a 'New History' is likely to gain general acceptance within
the historical community.
As David Andress rightly points out, Beverley Southgate's work represents an
improvement on that of his fellow postmodems in that Southgate sees that the current
(supposedly postmodemist) problem of knowledge 'was ever thus' (Andress: 1997:320).
In fact Southgate is one of the few historians working within a postmodem framework
16 And this is entirely independent of whether they are aware of it, or prepared to acknowledge it,
in their writings.
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who recognises that the evidence of widespread philosophical scepticism in the western
tradition can be thought of as significant in a resolution of the postmodern challenge. He
is also more positive about the prospects for the future of the discipline
(Southgate: 1996b: 125). In identifying the prevalence of sceptical thought in western
societies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Southgate provides valuable
secondary evidence (1981: 1987: 1996a).17
Southgate's work provides historians with the possibility that there might be an
alternative postmodern explanation for the present propensity towards interpretation,
without the necessity of accepting Jenkins's claim that the discipline of history is facing
epistemological meltdown. His strength is that he joins the growing number of other,
non-postmodern, scholars who, in recent years, have begun to question the ubiquity of
objectivity in the western tradition and who have seen scepticism as an historical factor in
the West's intellectual development.l'' The problem with Southgate's contribution is that
his view of the western tradition as being thoroughly sceptical does not cohere with his
optimism for the future of the discipline, for his understanding of scepticism is, unlike
that of Annas & Barnes et. al., a thoroughly negative one in that he sees it simply as
evidence of a postmodemity to come.
Southgate shares the postmodern conception of empirical, scientific, approaches to
knowledge as being in 'crisis' and that this situation is connected with a 'wider
intellectual anarchy' resulting from changing ideas in 'linguistics and philosophy'
(1996b:4). From the outset, in History: What & Why? (1996b) he demonstrates the
'either/or' mind set characteristic of the other postmodern historians discussed here. Thus
for him adherents to what he calls 'science's outmoded structure' (presumably he refers
17 This will be examined in Chapter Three.
18 These include Southgate:1981,1987, 1989; Annas & Bames:1994; Hankinson: 1995;
SbarpJese:1996; Frede: 1987; and Popkin: 1999.
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here to empiricists: he does not say) are to be regarded as 'old fashioned ancients' and are
posited against others (presumably postmodernists) who 'have more fashionably
conceded defeat and surrendered any hope of reaching "truth"'. Elsewhere in the same
work he adopts Munslow's position of assuming that empirical history is a version of
philosophical realism: that the only question is
whether there is assumed to be a correspondence with a past
reality, or whether what is presented is just an internally consistent
system constituted from and for a specific point of view (1996b:8).
This reading of a present which can be understood only as a choice between realism or
epistemological anarchy is carried into an historical account of scepticism as being
incipient postmodernism. Thus, for Southgate, Francis Bacon's seventeenth century
critique of scholastic learning is indicative, not of a re-emergent empiricism in post
medieval Europe, but of a proto-postmodernism (l996b:8) and his use of the word 'just'
in the above quote follows from his not having seen that scepticism can be as easily
linked with empiricism as with postmodernism (as indeed the next chapter of this study
will show). Were he able to form a more broad understanding of scepticism in the
western tradition he would have seen that a case can be made for knowledge as always
having been essentially an 'internally consistent system', but not 'just' one, as though
something more were possible. As it is, his account is not itself internally consistent, for
it is juxtaposed with another, rather more conventionally postmodern one, in which
postmodernity is seen as something new, able to confront a 'long history' of realism in
philosophy and in history (l996b:12-13). Unfortunately the evidence he brings forward to
support the existence of such a history is, like that of Jenkins and Munslow, open to
serious question.
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For example, in a breathtaking sweep through the western tradition, he refers to historians
as far apart, chronologically, as Lucien ofSamosata of the second century BeE and J.H.
Plumb and ex-HMI John Slater, in the present, as evidence that a correspondence (realist)
theory is endemic in historical methodology (p 13). Each of these examples is
problematic. It is true, as he says, that Lucien is recorded as having maintained that
historians' writings should be free of distortion, false colouring and mis-representation,
but he is also said to have argued that historians needed 'insights from life experience'
and that although 'they may well have a touch of poetry, (they) must "not resemble
highly seasoned sauces'" (Breisach: 1994:73), which presents somewhat less than obvious
evidence of philosophical realism. In the case of Plumb, his acceptance of Ranke's then
widespread influence (ie, 'what really happened') is indeed evident in the introduction to
his The Death of the Past (1969), and Plumb returns to the point in his conclusion, but it
would be a mistake to conflate references to a history which should be meaningful to the
historian and his/her contemporaries, with a realist one, in the way it has been defined
here, for elsewhere in his work Plumb makes it admirably clear that for him 'history is
not the past': that an understanding of the past which is not self-conscious, is 'always a
created ideology with a purpose' (1969). A fully self-conscious history is 'an inherent
destructive force for all dogmatic assertions' (Plumb: 1969: 104) he maintains, reminiscent
of Jenkins's own treatment of the same theme in Rethinking History (1991). More
significant is Southgate's use of John Slater, for although the latter certainly did write the
words referred to by Southgate, Slater was making the point that he disagreed with that
view! His whole position was, and is, antithetical to that view, as even a cursory study of
his writings and lecture transcripts easily shows (Slater: 1989, Lee et.al.: 1992): for
example, 'our views of the past, what we select to study and teach, and our interpretations
of it, are profoundly, if not wholly, affected by our circumstances' (1989:10).
Interestingly, like Alun Munslow, Southgate has become noticeably more upbeat about
postmodernism and history in his latest work, Postmodernism in History: Fear or
56
Freedom (2003). In his conclusion to that work he sounds positively modernist,"
approvingly quoting Mary Midgley, arguing that historians should act 'as if' the external
world were real (2003: 170-1). Whatever we call it, and however welcome a development
in his thought it is, such sentiments rest uneasily on other perspectives that he offers, in
the book. For example, he applauds Keith Jenkins's 'end of history' argument as 'tough-
minded postmodernism' which is not taken up by the profession because
It's unrealistic to expect everyone to have the capacity to
become Nietzschean supermen, who are able to live without
the escapes and refuges that others find so necessary.
(2003:56).
Southgate does not make clear who he thinks is the superman, whether it is the theorist
who supposedly alone realises the epistemological sublimity of the world, or whether it is
the principal figures in the discipline who perhaps set the tone and trends for their lessor
colleagues. Either way the impression is given that for most, the role of the historian is
akin to that ofa 'walk-on' extra.
Fortunately, the striking certainty of these postmodernist historians - their 'either/or'
conceptions of the world, that is 'either objective truth or crisis' - and their attendant
pessimism, is not reflected in the broader debate, and it is to some examples of this that I
now turn.
Section III
As attention is lifted from the narrow confines of this controversy, the futility of the
polemics between Marwick, Evans, Zagorin et. al. and Jenkins, Munslow and Southgate
19Or we could. with Anthony Giddens, call it high modernist (1991).
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becomes more evident. The wider debate is constituted by a vast array of contributions
and this brief survey hardly does justice to its richness and diversity. Nevertheless the
extent of this debate does not necessarily imply that it is without shape (or unable to be
structured). What I want to point to here is that aspects of it - whether from the borders
of the discipline, from Marxism, from other usages of poststructuralism or from the
historical writings of the contenders in the controversy - are able to be seen in terms of
two common factors. These are, first, a positive attitude towards the idea that history is a
construction and second, the existence of varying degrees of critical self-awareness. It is
these features that have been important in my coming to believe that the argued centrality
of this controversy, with its acrimonious and potentially schismatic disputes, is capable of
being supervened.
The first point to be made - a simple, stipulative, point - is that the way the discipline is
organised, ie. in terms of what counts with historians as an appropriate approach or a
valid type of source, is the result of human decision-making and thus even before
individual historians start work, they are part of a cultural and political 'construction'. It
is possible to see from this that the resultant form that history takes in terms of its practice
and content, can be thought to be as value-laden as any other social formation. In other
words, what looks like a technical matter, in making sense of the past, can be understood
on closer examination to be political and normative, to some degree at least. This is self
evident but it has significance in the way we may understand changes that have taken
place in historiography in recent years, and which can be seen as the context in which
current changes are taking place.
For example, In recent years there has been an expansion of the descriptions that are
attached to 'history'. The word 'history' is no longer sufficient without the addition of a
qualifying term. So instead of just history, there is now social and economic history,
military history, world history, local history, history that understands the past through the
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use of film and so on. In each case the descriptors effectively act as selecting mechanisms
to define what is to be focused on in examining the past. We are so used to the existence
of these varieties of history that we do not think of them as 'interpretations' of the past.
Often these 'branches' of the discipline call for specialised skills and knowledge and
draw on new types of sources, some of them originating in other disciplines. Thus
computer programmes, films and videos, balance sheets, literary works etc. join more
traditional sources as part of the stock of history. It has been argued - and I think rightly-
that historical sources should in general be thought of as distinct from the evidence that is
built upon them (eg. Jenkins: 1991:47/8). At the same time, change in the kinds of
sources accepted by communities of historians cannot be wholly a technical matter, for
there must also be a normative dimension. This is because changes in sources used are
likely to be evidence also of change in ideas about the ways that groups of historians
think it appropriate for the past to be understood, in the present. After all, questions about
'scarce resources' are an ever-present reality in any human endeavour, and history is no
exception.
Broad tacit agreement on this point can be found in Tosh's sociological treatment of 'the
raw materials' (1991:Ch2) and in Marwick's recognition of the social and political
context of the increasing range of primary sources in the twentieth century (1970:Ch3).
More to the point, interestingly similar evidence for the general acceptance of the
political nature of changing methodologies of history can be seen in the gentle irony in
which John Arnold pointed out recently in a newspaper book review, that Jonathan
Clarke had given as an example of a 'dangerous postmodern book', Hobsbawm and
Ranger's reader, The Invention of Tradition (1983). 20 Given an increasing
20 The Times Higher January 23 2004, page 29. To this example could be added John Vincent's
analysis of the historiographical debate as reaching its culmination with the 'radicalism' (as he
sees it) of the Annales School (1995:111-116) and Gertrude Himmelfarb's depiction of the 'new'
history as being social and economic - as though that branch of history had not been the subject of
undergraduate programmes in Britain since the turn of the twentieth century and in the mainstream
of practice since at least the 19305 (Himmelfarb:1987& Tosh 1991:92).
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democratisation of historical knowledge-making in conditions of widening education and
communications, and given also that changes are generally made because people think
they constitute improvements, it is reasonable to suppose that the expansion of sources
and approaches to the study of the past, might have led and be leading to the potential for
strengthened social emancipation. Even if this does not occur, the possibility may well be
anticipated with distaste, or even feared by some. In this sense then it is quite
understandable that conservative historians (with either a large or small 'c') may cavil at
changes to historical interests and methodologies in the same way that they may also, and
often do, object to social changes and to developments in patterns of social support for
weaker members of communities.
This might seem all rather obvious and banal, but the point for this section is that by
adding descriptors such as 'Annales,' 'cultural,' 'mentalities,' 'international,' 'local,'
'women's,' or 'economic & social' to programmes of history, traditional approaches to
the discipline are thereby narrowed, refined and brought into different, more appropriate,
foci. These branches of history, so-called, can be thought to be functioning, at a macro
level, as reflexive means of 'doing' history. It is not to be wondered at that then, that
conservative historians have associated these disciplinary developments with
postmodernism and have generally opposed them. In doing so they can be thought to be
guarding history against importations from other, perhaps less well 'policed' disciplines,
or other branches of history than their own. Peter Burke's reader New Perspectives on
Historical Writing (1992) offers a useful introductory survey of those disciplinary,
borderline, approaches, referred to here and Lynn Hunt (1989) does something similar
for cultural history. WulfKansteine discusses the importance of historians and others
bridging the gap between academic history and its use by the media (1996). Likewise
Louise White offers an important perspective on how, within oral history, memory itself
legitimates a version of events, and in so doing transcends traditional concepts of truth
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and falsity (2000: 13&I8)_21 So, with or without the recognition or acquiescence of
traditional empirical historians it is possible to see that the condition of the discipline - in
what its practitioners accept as history - is a methodologically overt, if regrettably not
often a self-aware, statement of its current interpretative stance towards the past. I think
this is an indication too that an aim of promoting reflexivity as an organising principal in
making historical knowledge is not a naive aspiration. In a sense it exists already.
If then what is needed within history within a micro level, is a reflexive model of
knowledge to match the political nature of the discipline as a whole, perhaps it is
unnecessary to go further than a consideration of historians who are working in the
general area of class, and especially those influenced in their work by a Marxist tradition
of history. This genre of explanation already functions as a self-consciously aware - to a
degree a reflexive - approach to the past. These historians may not necessarily 'flag up'
their selective principles specifically as reflexivity, or even as Marxism, but what defines
them for the purpose of this section is that they make clear by a variety of means their
criteria for selection in making sense of the past. To use the term 'Marxism' is not of
course to assume that all historians working with the concept of class are Marxist or this
group is a fixed, unchanging, entity. Despite, for example, widespread beliefs that
western, Gramscian, Marxist historiography would disappear from the academic scene
along with the failure of Eastern European communism, the upbeat tone of Harvey J.
Kaye's summary narrative of British Marxist historians (2000) is thoroughly justified.
As Kaye says, this tradition of history has changed, in that it has developed an
appreciation of:
21 See also here Helena Pohlandt-McCorrnick's discussion of the politics alongside the
epistemological issues of oral history from 'below' (2000) and also Alice Kessler-Harris on
American Studies (2001). Paul Smith's The Historian and Film (1976) especially Jerry Kuehl's
chapter, 'History on the public screen II' is useful innoting the extent that conceptions relating to
other disciplines can be regarded as more important than traditional historical working
assumptions, in these 'borderline' histories.
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the common people in history not simply as economic agents,
that is, as labourers and material providers, not simply as political
agents, that is, as rebels and insurgents, but also as cultural
agents, that is, as valuers and visionaries. In short, peasants,
artisans and workers - not only philosophers and theorists -
have contributed to the making of our modem conceptions,
relations and practices of liberty. equality and democracy.
(2000:288)
There is no doubt that Marxist historiography within social history has altered over the
past forty or so years. This is not the place to chart this change except to note that since
the exchanges between E. P. Thompson and Louis Althusser in the 1970s, one particular
shift has been towards a more cultural form of analysis of class. Chapter Four examines
the consequences of Thompson's seminal intervention against Althusserian Marxism in
this respect and will address at the same time some of the more important theoretical
positions that have been taken up from this genre in relation to postrnodemlsm.f Marxist
historians and those working with the category of class, have not in the main treated
postmodem themes with the pessimism that is characteristic of the challengers in the
controversy, even though they share postmodernists' recognition of the uncertainty
principle in the making of historical knowledger', On the contrary. notwithstanding
postmodem worries about the functioning of history in postrnodernity, the discipline has
flourished in areas relating to culture and 'history from below,' In this section some of the
principle historians involved here can be seen examples of how the problems of the
controversy can perhaps be avoided. In short the solution will be seen to be that by
valorising reflexive practice and respecting aporia, historians have no need of notions of
22 Iinclude here especially the, for me, rather inspirational contribution of Patrick Joyce
(1995,1998,2001& 2002). But see also Alex Callinicos (1976 & 1989) and of course Fredric
Jameson (1993).
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absolute objectivity in order to make historical knowledge and no need of pessimism
either.
Thus Robert Gray's work on 'the languages of factory reform in Britain c.1830-1860'
examines interconnections between work, culture and community within the period, in
relation to 'the constituent role oflanguage' (1987: 145). Similarly, and illustrative of
'modern' Marxist social history, is David Feldman and Gareth Stedman Jones's view that
to study class at the close of the Twentieth century was to do so
without a settled sense of a hierarchy of determinations ... for
experience, class or social determination ... each of these notions
is capable of yielding strong but partial illumination. But they
cannot be employed, straightforwardly as organising principles,
in the way which many historians once believed. (1989:6)
This change in the genre is evident, and will be discussed in Chapter Four, in relation to
several works of Patrick Joyce and to his stance towards postmodernism
(1980,1987&2001). The notion that methodological uncertainty necessarily weakens
historical explanation can be seen, through Joyce's work, to be now a thoroughly
problematic view. Similarly, and as an example of this positive approach, the subtlety of
Donna Loftus's treatment of the free market is testament to a less objectivist approach to
the past in this historiographical area (Loftus:2000&2002). These comments barely
scratch the surface of changes which have, in their turn, sustained the more active
learning, student centred, approaches to pedagogy that have been growing since the
1980s. Importantly resonating with those pedagogic developments has been the
interactivity of community history projects such as that of Kenneth Lunn and Ann Day
23 I realise of course that this is a controversial point, but the issue too will be addressed inChapter
Four.
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(1999) allied to the more general thrust of 'history from below' such as the History
Workshop movement." In the same way, the permeation of interactive principles of
empowerment as core concepts in museum management has become so extensive it has
passed from the seminar room into the regular practices of museum management.f
Common to these examples of how knowledge is handled is an optimistic practical stance
towards issues of subjectivity and the partiality of knowledge.
Broadening the gaze somewhat, there is abundant evidence that many historians are
working with epistemologically open-ended assumptions about the nature of history. For
example, at the level of the undergraduate primer, although there has been some virulent
opposition to postmodem issues (eg. Black & MacRaild:2000), along with some damning
with 'faint praise' (egoWarren: 1998) and some historians who have ignored the
phenomenon entirely (eg. Abbot: 1996) there have also been some outstanding examples
of how historians are not unsettled by arguments about the partiality of knowledge. Thus
John Tosh (1991), working within an empirical framework and LudmiJIa Jordanova
(2000), a Marxist, have shown how through reflexive practice the insights of
poststructuralism can begin to be integrated into mainstream practice. And at a more
theoretical level there are several historians currently working in these areas, showing the
irrelevance of the struggles within the controversy. Adrian Wilson (1993) for example
offers a workable, practical means of achieving methodological awareness building, as he
says, on E.P.Thompson's argument for historical logic. Joyce Appleby et.al. similarly
work towards the same ends, arguing that
we see no reason to conclude that because there is a gap between
24 This was founded in 1967 by the socialist historian Raphael Samuel.
2$ See for example Hooper-Greenhill's Museums and the shaping of knowledge (1997, but also
'The space of the museum' 1990) and S.E. Weil's 'Rethinking the museum and other meditations'
(1990 via Awoniyi:2001). Typical of current usages ofinteractivity are Richard Sandell's
'Museums as social institutions' (1998) and Richard Prentice's 'Experiential cultural tourism:
musems and the marketing of the new romanticism of evoked authenticity' (200 I).
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reality and its narration (its representation), the narration in some
fundamentals sense is inherently invalid. Just because narratives
are human creations does not make them all equally fictitious
or mythical. (1994:235).
Of course 'fictitious' can carry several meanings but what one concludes from a closer
reading of Appleby et.al depends on how their account of 'Practical Realism' is regarded
(1994:247); that is, whether the emphasis is seen as laying on the terms 'practical' or
'realism', For now it is necessary only to note that this is yet another example of
historians refusing to either dismiss postmodem-Iike accounts entirely or to succumb to
the pessimism that has often accompanied them."
In the teaching of history, school history for example, the model of knowledge deployed
in history lessons has been transformed in recent years. I believe largely due to the
National Curriculum, which has changed the way historian teachers talk about their
subject, the prevalence of the arguably problematic skills approach to the teaching of
history has given way to more nuanced means of expressing and handling sceptical issues
with children,27 Examples of these abound in school teachers' own accounts of their
teaching strategies and are supported by, for example, teacher educators such as James
Arthur and Robert Phillips (Arthur &Phillips:2000; Phillips: 1998).28 Phillips draws on
26 For further modified versions of realism, see also Christopher Lorenz's work, (1994,1998
&2000). Along the same lines, although perhaps closer to the defenders' position within the
controversy, is Roy Lowe's argument that postmodemism obliges 'us' to work through more
clearly how we assume that certain pieces of evidence from the past translate into historical
interpretation (Lowe: 1996).
27 It has to be said here that valuing changes resulting from the National Curriculum for History is
not an argument for that curriculum's introduction or continuation. A broader view may lay quite
different consequences • of motivation, of creativity. at its door.
21 Evidence for this can be found in almost any edition of Teaching History. A good example is
the work of Andrew Wrenn whose pedagogy encourages pupils to think out historical solutions
and explanations for themselves before they are exposed to historians' accounts. In this way
children come to see the explanations in text books, not as given facts, but as other accounts of the
past to be considered and weighed against their own, even if, (as is obviously highly likely) in the
end they have to accept the historians' accounts as more authoritative etc. The point is that the
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Henry Giroux's politically charged reflexivity as a basis for enabling students to see
outside the dominant interpretations of text books; to enable them to think in alternative
terms (Giroux: 1992). For Phillips, as for Giroux, the partiality of knowledge is no
impediment to history, for the element that enables it to function is in fact 'position' or
the value-laden nature of the historians' gaze."
Moving away from direct issues of pedagogy, a number of historians can be seen to have
put to use different insights drawn from poststructuralism - specifically from Foucault,
Derrida, from Lyotard or Rorty - but who have not drawn the negative conclusions of
these postmodern challengers, and significantly have not held the same confrontational
stance towards mainstream historiography either. For example Mark Poster sets out
avowedly to 'lower the level of polemics' and simply to argue that 'a more open attitude
to recent cultural trends might benefit the discipline' (Poster: 1997:41). He usefully
(although controversially) chides Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, who he regards as wishing to
hold on to truth claims, that poststructuralism is not destructive of meaning. Rather, he
suggests, it represent a positive move in terms of understanding ie.
the strategic hermeneutics of Foucault and Derrida are not
designed to discredit discursive truth but to fortify it by
removing legitimising, foundational gestures that undermine
its credibility. (1997:58)
Similarly Kerwin Klein uses the distinction between the notion of master and local
narratives to stress the importance of the latter against the former, arguing that there is
more to this distinction than the articulation ofa principle, denying the veracity of the
'master' and dismissing its 'local' other as subaltern. 'Master narratives' he points out,
result aimed for is an awareness that all historical knowledge is created in the present and, in
principle at least, capable of being critiqued (eg. Wrenn:1998:). See also Brickley (1994).
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are simply those that hold positions of dominance. The distinctions
between local and metanarratives are contingent rather than
axiomatic .... No special way of telling can guarantee that today's
local narrative will not become tomorrow's narrative master.
Virtually overnight, the chanting of subaltern protest may
modulate into the crack of the historical Whip.
(Klein: 1995:297)
Thus the pessimism which moves from Lyotard's defining gesture of scepticisnr'" into the
forbidding of 'large stories' in postmodernity, 'threatens to burden our new tales with the
bad, old metaphysics we claim to have escaped' (Klein:1995:277). David Shaw too has
read poststructuralism in an enabling manner. He sees agency as being enhanced rather
than denied by considerations of language in history. For example he argues that to speak
of discourse does not militate against agency for it is important to take 'seriously the
space between a word or phrase and using it.' This is because, he says, however much
speech is fitted into wider systems of meaning (discursive formations) those meanings are
not arbitrary. 'Rather they are contingent, developed historically and constantly, through
the mediation of people as speech agents' (2001:6/7).
I do not wish to give the impression that I see these historians as just managing as it were,
to keep the project of history going at all costs in the face of a sceptical postmodern
challenge. On the contrary it is possible to see in the deployment of postructural insights,
some of the conceptual excitement that has long been basic to other disciplines. For
example David Andress, John Arnold and David Carr speak of the possibility of the same
critical engagement between the past and the present (no longer merely E.H.Carr's
29 See also Malcolm Cbase's similar work in Studies in the Education of Adults (2000).
30 I refer bere of course to bis famous statement of 'incredulity' (Lyotard: 1984:xxiv)
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'dialogue'} that in art history is experienced between the observer and the painting. I am
referring here to the sense that the positioning of the observer by the artist's use of
perspective and picture plane, determine how the painting impinges on the observer, and
this affects their perspective which in tum produces further meaning in the picture and so
on, in a dynamic way." It seems to me that something quite similar is being expressed by
David Andress in the use he makes of the concept 'a sense of ethical engagement'
between historians in the present and the world that they seek to understand (1998:242)
and indeed that David Carr is saying the same thing in terms of 'a structural conflict of
realities' (2001:167). Likewise John Arnold points to what is perhaps an unnecessary
concern at the inevitable silences of the past, where in fact
instead of filling those historical gaps with our own busy
concerns, might we not let those medieval silences infect
our present discourse? Might we, in fact, invite the dead
to interrogate us? (2001:229)
Elsewhere, in a discussion of horror films he stresses the importance of the effect of the
historicised past on the present, (1998:42) concluding thus that 'the past is a dangerous
place' where it is perhaps less that we consume it as we are consumed by it (1998:46/7).
David Lowenthal similarly has argued that far from being a problem, and one that is
corrosive of historical knowledge, the lack of a fixed past is a boon, for it enables a
continual interaction which 'fuses past with present." He went on to say that through our
interpretations of the past 'we change ourselves as well; the revised past alters our own
identity (1985:410/411).
31 Charles Harrison's art history primer provides a good explanation of this sense that 'the true
complexity and fascination of art - when it is exercised at the highest level at least -lies not in the
quantity or lifelikeness of its detail. It lies in the inventive use of its form and composition. It is
this that solicits the imaginative collaboration of the spectator (Harrison:1997:45).
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Encouraging too for those who would seek a dialogue that unites the controversy with the
debate, is the way that such a dialogue is already beginning to take place. For example,
Geoffrey Roberts and Frank Ankersmit - clearly on opposing sides in the controversy -
are both to be seen in dialogue with, or within the influence of, Mark Bevir's
constructionist account of the discipline (Ankersmit:2000; Bevir: 1994, 1999&2000a&b;
Bevir & Ankersmit:2000 & Roberts: 1997:251). For Roberts and Ankersmit, in their view
it is the very purposefulness of the historians' selections among the openness of the past
that represents the conditions of possibility for historical practice."
Finally, in moving away from these encouraging examples of the broader debate, towards
a conclusion of this initial chapter, I should like to glance briefly on the practical work-
the historical writing - of some of the combatants to the controversy for it can be seen
here that the things are not entirely as one might expect. It is reasonable to think that the
writings of the postmodem challengers would be models of reflexive self-awareness, with
traditional empirical historians' work more factual and with little awareness of
perspective. Interestingly the reality is not quite as tidy as that.
Alun Munslow's approach to his Discourse and Culture, The Creation of America 1870-
1920 (1992) is exactly as one might have expected. It opens with a clear statement of his
view of history as 'a cultural and literary artefact' and the first chapter makes clear
Munslow's awareness of position. Moreover this is carried over into the main body of the
book, a series of biographical essays, such that the reader is conscious of the
methodology being an integral part of the history itself. Keith Jenkins, by contrast, has
written little beyond snippets of history linked with his philosophical and
32 As part of this phenomenon. and as illustrative that Ankersmit's stance is not simply an
aberration within the postmodem challenge, see also the unmistakable optimism of the postmodem
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historiographical focus, but then, given his stated account of the utility of history, this can
hardly be a cause for criticism.33 However. surprisingly, Beverley Southgate's approach
to historical writing is little different from that of Arthur Marwick.
It is true that much of Southgate'S work preceded his active involvement in questions of
epistemology by quite some years. Articles written in 1981 and 1987, perhaps
unsurprisingly show little awareness of methodological issues of an epistemological
nature beyond a general acceptance of pluralism. Later, in 1995, in his essay 'Pyrrhonian
Postmodemism: Ancient Roots of an Historiographical Crisis,' he offers a position that is
more methodologically self-aware. Southgate opens with a useful discussion of historical
scepticism, but after the first three pages it slides into an account of what he considers
'happened.' Unlike Munslow, Southgate demonstrates no further awareness of the
constructedness of his text. I do not wish to suggest that there is anything especially
lacking in such a methodology; it would be good if all historians were as reflexive. The
point however is that Marwick does the same. In his A History of the Modern British
Isles, 1914 - 1999 (2000) Marwick, like Southgate, opens his work with a statement of
his - pluralistic - epistemological position and then gets on, like Southgate, with the
business of telling his readers what happened. With such concert in their practice the
intensity of their putative difference in theory, is both surprising and ultimately
unconvincing.
Remarkable, too, is Richard Evans's work, for the reflexivity in his practice outdistances
both Marwick and Southgate. True, this does not apply to his earlier writing which, like
that of Southgate is fairly unambiguous, but this changes over time. In his essay 'The
German Bourgeoisie', within the collection he edited with D. B1ackboum (1991), he uses
the kind of tentative language that is suggestive of an acceptance of 'belief on the part of
historians whose work he and Hans Kellner have gathered in their reader A New Philosophy of
History( 1995).
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the historian. as integral to historical knowledge. More overtly in 1997, in Re-reading
German History From Unification to Re-unification 1800 - 1996 Evans is as reflexive as
any of the postmodem challengers. For example he starts by deliberately choosing an
ambiguous title for the work. He goes on to explain that the bulk of the material is an
extended examination of historiography of the subject, not the subject directly (p.vii). He
then accounts for his approach by acknowledging the crucial importance of perspective in
historical knowledge, ie:
It is precisely this interplay between the objective constraints
of history, the disciplinary and methodological contexts of
writing and research, and the political beliefs and perceptions
of the historian living in a particular present-day context,
which makes the study of how historians have dealt with
the German past during the period of reunification so fascinating.
( 1997b:viii-ix)34
My purpose in drawing on these few examples of the historical writings of the main
players in the controversy is to make the point that a successful outcome of this study
cannot simply be to mediate between one or other side's actual practice. It is not as
simple as that. Although my interest in the subject was awoken by practical concerns, it
has become apparent to me that the discussion is as little about practice as were the
exchanges between Carr and Elton, or Carr and Issaiah Berlin or AJ.P.Taylor
II Certainly it does not merit the kind of censure received from Arthur Marwick (2001:257).
34 There really are no shortages of examples to illustrate Evan's reflexive practice. It would be
possible to compare Evans and Munslow's respective treatment ofE.H. Carr's work, for example,
for they have both recently written review articles in this area. Astonishingly, it is Munslow,
whose analysis woodenly sits upon an array of barely explained 'historical facts' about the nature
of the postwar period. many of which appears to be derivative ofJenkins's On What is History
From Carr and Elton to White and Rorty (1995), while Evans's analysis maintains throughout, an
historical scenario as a possible explanatory context to Carr's work (Munslow: 1997;Evans:2001).
Similarly Evans's propensity to respond to his critics in 'follow-on' publications makes for a lively
environment that arguably emphasises the constructed nature of the discipline. An example of this
is his response to the criticisms made of In Defence of History (1997).
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(Evans:2001:xix-xxiv). It really is, primarily at least, about 'the nature' of the discipline.
It is about, for example, what historians and others might think about it, and how it relates
to changing generic notions of knowledge. It is only as an outcome of this, that practice
is important It will indeed be concluded that there are some implications for practice,
especially for pedagogy, but those arguments are subordinate to these broader issues
about the nature of history.
The question that remains now, is how this examination should proceed in seeking its end
of identifying a common conception of historicity across the debate as a whole. There are
three areas that need discussing. First the issue of whether mainstream empirical practice
genuinely does incorporate an epistemological open-endedness, is important. Second, in
the face of some postmodem dismissals of Marxist history as unconvincing metaphysical
belief (Jenkins: 1997), it is necessary to examine its continued theoretical relevance and
third, the apparent colonisation ofpostructural insights by the pessimism of this
postmodern challenge requires assaying. I am turning first to looking at empiricism, as
constitutive of mainstream traditional historiography, partly because this is the more
difficult task but also because it has the more serious problem. Indeed whenever the
postmodern challenge is simply dismissed rather than engaged with, by empirical
historians (eg. O'Brien: 1999 or Croll:2003) the discipline - as a form of knowledge - is
weakened, the debate as a whole is further dichotomised and more subtle contributions on
both sides (eg. Haskell:1998 & Tucker:200l) pass unnoticed." Thus in the next chapter I
examine the relationship between empiricism in general and philosophical scepticism.
3S I do realise that Tucker defends a position other than what he himself regards as empiricism but
with the definition of that term outlined in Chapter Two, Tucker's position can be comfortably
counted as empirical.
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Chapter Two: Scepticism and Knowledge in Pre-Modernity
The discussion of this study now broadens its compass by temporarily leaving the
'What is History?' question and focusing on the generic empirical approach to
knowledge that is embodied within traditional historiography. In this chapter and the
next, an account is given of the importance of philosophical scepticism in the western
tradition, as an intellectual resource that is available to both traditional empirical
historians, and to their postmodern challengers. I It is shown here that the
epistemological uncertainty which in their unequal ways empirical and postmodem
historians both claim for their practice, is not an isolated phenomenon. Rather,
empiricism has been closely associated with sceptical approaches to knowledge to the
extent that the kind of aporetic awareness evident in the historiographical controversy
has long been a central constituent of western empirical knowledge.
In taking a serious interest in scepticism, this study is not alone. As long ago as the mid
1980's, Charlotte Stough noted the existence of 'an increasing number of scholarly
works on the discipline of scepticism of late' (Stough: 1987; 217) and indeed since that
time it is possible to see a marked interest by historians in histories of philosophical
I The use of the tenn 'western tradition' here, and elsewhere in the study, is being used to
indicate a broad swathe of understanding about the past - largely a European past - which,
although constantly in a state of contestation and change, can nevertheless be identified as
something approximating a literary canon. However, to go further and regard it as co-terminus
with Lyotard's 'meta-narrative' (1984:xxiv) would be to underestimate the degree of
interpretative flux constitutive of the concept
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scepticism? Similarly Annas and Barnes opened the introduction to their translation of
Sextus Empiricus, the second century AD sceptic, by observing that
It is only recently, after a time in which Plato and Aristotle have
dominated the study of ancient philosophy, that we have returned
to the former perspective, a perspective both wider and more just,
in which Scepticism and the other philosophical movements which
flourished after Aristotle have regained their salience (Annas &
Barnes: 1994:ix).
Richard Popkin too makes it clear that he sees his work as contributing to a trend in
which much of the history of philosophy is now being recast by historians of
philosophy in terms of its relation to sceptical ideas (Popkin: 1999: xix).3 But at the
same time this is not an argument in support of the sceptical position as such. To do so
would be to begin to slip back towards one or other of the entrenched standpoints of the
postmodern controversy. To consider scepticism as it has been, and still is, treated
outside of the controversy - ie. by philosophers and historians of philosophy - is to see
that it is possible to discuss such issues without the polemics that have characterised the
historical controversy so far. It becomes clear that what is important is the existence of
a widespread concern and debate about sceptical issues, and how they might be thought
to have affected the construction of knowledge. The more these ideas are explored, the
less relevant seems the 'either/or' certainties of both the traditional historians and the
postmodern challengers.'
2 For example Annas and Barnes (1984,1987), Michael Frede (1987), G. B. Kerferd (1981),
Beverley Southgate (1981, 1989, 1996,2000), Richard Popkin (1966,1979,1999) and R. W.
Sharples (1996).
3 I am not suggesting that this scholarly work has yet had much direct influence on modem
historiography nor, apart from Beverley Southgate's work, on the postmodern challenge. It is a
lack which I hope this study will begin to help remedy.
..Examples of the treatment of scepticism by analytical philosopher include: Alcoff:1998;Audi:
1998; Bruechner:2003;Hammersley:2003;McArthur:2003;MarshaU:2003;Mayal-
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Although there is no doubt that there are outright opponents of the sceptical position
who see it as a mistaken and aberrant account of knowledge (for example,
Grayling: 1985, Hookway: 1992 and to a lesser extent Weintraub: 1997), invariably
studies of either side end in conclusions that are so hedged around and qualified that in
practice it appears that the debate seems simply not to be securely capable of
resolution in terms of the 'true/false' or 'right/wrong' categories in which the
postmodernlempirical history controversy has been cast by both sides. I start this
chapter with the belief that historians can benefit from a glance at how philosophers and
historians of philosophy have handled the same issue - of uncertainty in knowledge.
Thus, in this chapter it is argued that scepticism has long been integral to conscious,
rational knowledge, and especially to different historical forms of empiricism, rather
than a phenomenon that can be posited against it.
Of these two chapters, the first sets up the narrative through a discussion of definitions
of relevant terms and by an empirical analysis of how a sceptical awareness can be
thought to have lain at the core of philosophical thought in the classical, pre-medieval
world. The second then builds on this position by focusing on several important
empirical figures whose work developed from enlightenment humanism and it goes on
to examine how their contributions have affected recent and continuing empirical
thought.
Within this present chapter the first section discusses how the expressions 'empiricism'
and 'scepticism' are used here and considers some of the implications of this use for the
model of knowledge being deployed in this part of the study. The following four
sections draw upon some of the more well known philosophies of the western tradition,
Sharrock:2003;Moore:1998;Potter:2003; Pritchard:2002; Rameakers:2002;Rosenbaum:2003;
Stawson:1998;Wong:2003& Unger:1998.
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from sophism in fifth century Athens to pyrrhonism in the second century CE, and I
argue that scepticism can be understood as being integral to these philosophies to the
extent that empiricism is concomitant with scepticism as an account of the possibility of
human knowledge. In two senses these chapters are central to a critique of the two
main positions in the postmodern history controversy. The first of these is that they
question the radical nature of any postmodern challenge to history that relies solely on a
discovery of a sceptical core to historical knowledge. The second is that the ubiquity of
sceptical themes in the western tradition prompts the use of a model of knowledge that
focuses on the responses that philosophers have made to epistemological open-
endedness rather than solely on the open-endedness itself. It arguably follows from this
that a way forward by traditional historians faced with a sceptical postmodern challenge
to empirical practice is to look again at the very considerable resources available to it
from scepticism. It may well be that empiricism can never equal the sophistication of
poststructuralism in the handling of these issues. Nevertheless, a better awareness of
the available evidence of how empiricism might be thought to have connected with
scepticism, over time, may go some way to bridge the gap and to provide a basis for
useful debate between empiricism, marxism and poststructuralism.
Section I
As with many debates in both philosophy and history, much turns on definitions and
here is no exception. To consider just several of the more accepted accounts of the term
'empiricism'; it could be used as a form oflogical positivism where nothing is
considered to be knowledge unless it is capable of being verified. Or it would be
possible to go further, as does for example John Cottingham in his study on rationalism,
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to restrict empiricism to the claim that 'knowledge derives ultimately from sensory
experience' and that this can be differentiated from rationalism, which by contrast
stresses 'the role played by reason' (Cottingham: 1984: 6). The difficulty with the first
of these positions, ie. positivistic empiricism, is that with the abandonment of the
analytic/synthetic distinction in the post war period verification has become
problematic. The weakness of the second, the strict 'sensory experience' criterion, is
that, if an emphasis is laid on 'sensation' rather than 'experience' it becomes too easy to
show that such empiricism has little explanatory power. For example Cottingham
justifies his claim by saying:
Some rationalists condemn the senses as an inherently suspect
and unreliable basis for knowledge claims; others, while conceding
that sensory experience is in some sense necessary for the
development of human knowledge, nevertheless insist that it can
never be sufficient by itself (1984:6).
Cottingham does concede however that: 'It is probably fair to say that the average
"intelligent layman", particularly in the English-speaking world, has whether
consciously or subconsciously, absorbed a strongly empiricist outlook concerning
human knowledge' (1984:7). This seems a sensible point and a possible way forward
and it accords broadly with R. S. Woolhouse's approach in his 1983 work, The
Empiricists, that the 'inclusion of certain philosophers as "empiricists" is to a
considerable degree, a matter of convention' (p.3). This is taken here as a starting point
in the use of the term. Thus it is reasonable to include as empiricists in this account,
philosophers who have been so considered in the western tradition, as well as those who
have regarded themselves as employing an empiricist stance.'
5 For the purposes of this study Iam disregarding the now barely still relevant account of
empiricism and rationalism as being dichotomously opposed, pace Cottingham,. Iregard that
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Narrowing down this rather broad definition, I have used John Locke's emphasis on
experience, as distinct from sensation, as the active factor that prevents the theoretical
possibility of a never-ending process of empirical interpretation. This enables the
inclusion of a dimension to models of knowledge-making which the singularity and
individuality of an emphasis on 'sensation' does not capture. It works by allowing that
the experiences of others, and those of previous investigations, do count in any
particular act of knowing. Similarly multiple experiences can interact through, for
example, compression into languages, concepts, perspectives or pre-dispositions.
There is also a role for the a priori in the understanding of empiricism employed in this
chapter, but not in the sense that Cottingham makes of it. I take it to mean that previous
knowledge, perspectives and dispositions etc. do themselves act apriori upon received
experience in the process of making new knowledge. On this account therefore
empirical knowledge cannot be wholly objective, neutral or innocent, for it is always
'already' positioned or otherwise implicated in the process of selection that has given
rise to the knowledge in question - it is always, as it is popularly termed, 'vaJue Jaden'.
This understanding of the apriori is not one based upon 'given' metaphysical entities,
or notions of a 'real' world which correspond with the sensations received and it is an
understanding which is clearly antithetical to positions reliant upon revealed religion.
A better analogy is that ofWittgenstein's use of 'hinge propositions' that reflect the
need or operational beliefs, around which knowledge is formed (Moyal-
Sharrock:2003: 128/9).6
formulation as no longer helpful and I accept Richard Popkin's position that 'other paradigms
are offered that may be more helpful or useful for our present-day philosophising and concerns'
(Popkin: 1999: xix). In holding to this I rest to some extent also on Giorgio Tonelli who has
argued that 'rationalism and empiricism are not mutually antagonistic categories and neither
were they for much of early modernity (Tonelli: 1971).
6 Moyal Sharrock argues that Wittgenstein's position here is better described as 'logical
pragmatism' (2003: 128) and that it implies that foundations do not have to be metaphysical
(p.127). More broadly Thomas Kuhn (1970) makes a similar point by his use of the concept
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The second area of uncertainty relates to the need for clarity about exactly what the
sceptic is expressing doubt about. R. J. Hankinson illustrates how the closer one looks
at a philosophy such as scepticism. the more complex is the process of defmition. He
argues that several different types of scepticism can be identified. There is a strong
version, he argues, that can be regarded as 'realist of sorts' (Hankinson:2003: 15). On
the other hand pyrrhonian scepticism - that exemplified by Sextus Empiricus' Outlines
of Pyrrhonism in the second century CE is less a position or a philosophy than a
description of an intellectual condition which seems to follow from a particular line of
open-ended thinking. This line is a reductive one that notes that for every possible
statement made about the world there can be posited an equal and opposite statement
such that it can seemingly never be known whether there are foundational criteria and
thus objective truth, or not. Of course it would be perfectly reasonable to call this line
of reasoning a philosophy - and indeed it is regarded as a philosophy in this study - but
the point that Hankinson is making is that pyrrhonists would not think it appropriate to
argue for it or to advocate it as a position," It is simply a description of what
pyrrhonists think happens when knowledge statements are attempted. Were they to
attempt to argue that their position was true and that others should adopt it, they would
of course have fallen into the kind of dogmatic certainty they were concerned to escape
from; it thus makes no sense to argue that there is no certainty in knowledge.i
Hankinson uses the following nomenclature to differentiate types of doubt that can be
found embedded within philosophies. What he calls 'E' (epistemological) Scepticism,
'paradigm.' I use the expression a priori (with a lower case 'a') to indicate this kind of
necessary, stipulative, starting point in the creation of empirical knowledge.
7 This is a point that Michael Frede made - convincingly - in 1987. Charlotte Stough has
similarly supported Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes in their reading of Sextus Empriricus as
being able to 'follow his impressions without holding any beliefs, because he takes no position
about the reality of things' (Stough: I987:220).
• I use the expression 'performative contradiction' to describe this paradox.
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relates to scepticism resulting from statements saying simply that there is no evidence
for a particular claim or statement about the nature of something. It is, in Hankinson's
usage, a form of tough-minded ness or resistance to gullibility. This is an everyday
usage of the term scepticism and this discussion is not really concerned with that. More
importantly he uses the expression '0' (ontological) Scepticism for a stronger case; 'an
attitude in which one refuses to affirm, but (crucially) does not yet deny, the existence
of something or the truth of some proposition' (p 15). This structural uncertainty results
from Sextus's reductive reasoning noted above and it is broadly the kind of scepticism
with which the discussion of this chapter is concerned. Finally, Hankinson regards as
negative dogmatism, a kind of sceptical argument which insists that there really is no
truth to be found; a form of reversed realism (Hankinson:199S:13-16).9
Summarising somewhat from the multiplicity of possibilities raised, Hankinson offers a
definition ofpyrrhonist scepticism which he draws out from a point made by Sextus
Empiricus himself, namely: 'the natural result of any search for something is that the
searchers either find it, or they deny that it can be found and profess it unable to be
grasped, or they keep on searching' (Hankinson: 1995: 13). In terms of epistemology
the first situation would occur with dogmatic objectivists. The second would result
from dogmatic (reverse-realist) sceptics and the third, from pryrrhonists. Thus Sextan
scepticism has at its heart a degree of neutrality about its own doctrine. It would keep
on searching because it could never accept that there were grounds to say finally either
that it (truth) was found or could never be so. It professes neither that this is a good
thing nor bad, neither certain that knowledge is possible, nor uncertain. In this it is very
different from the postmodernism of the history controversy, which is certain that
knowledge of the past is compromised by scepticism, and it differs too from modem
traditional empirical historiography which in its normal operations ignores the issue
9 I take this to be the kind of certainty about scepticism that Richard Evans has noted inKeith
Jenkins's work (Evans:1997a:13).
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almost entirely. What is clear is that if Sextan thought can be shown to be important to
empiricism within the western tradition, an awareness of an epistemological horizon to
human knowledge will not imply, as an entailment, the kind of problematic stance
towards knowledge that suggests the impossibility of the historical project.
This importance that Hankinson places on uncertainty in the articulation of scepticism
is supported by a number of scholars by, for example, the distinction made by David
Macarthur between 'disjunctive' scepticism and what he regards as the more traditional
'argument from illusion'. Macarthur argues that the former (which equates with
Hankinson's Sextan scepticism) does not imply any lack of human rationality whereas
the latter (broadly a redefinition of the stronger 'realist' scepticism) assumes that
irrationality is the inevitable consequence of epistemological uncertainty (2003: 179).
Alan Marshall provides a similar account of scepticism (2003), as had Michael Frede
as well as Charlotte Stough, in 1987, some years before Hankinson's project.
Similarly, ample evidence exists in Sextus's own writings for such a reading, as is
discussed in Section V of this chapter."
Hankinson's categorisation is useful but in itself it does not wholly capture the
complexities associated with the concept. For example there are issues of definition
relating to the way that scepticism can be thought to have changed over time. In his
work, Hegel and Scepticism Michael Forster draws on the support of Hegel's
observations on the history of thought to argue that pre-Christian (sextan) scepticism
became, in the post-renaissance modem world, much more closely associated with a
worry about a lack of foundation for the human condition than it had in earlier times.
10 See also Jonathan Bames's highly critical review of Alan Bailey's argument that Sextus
Empiricus should be read as having promoted irrationality (Bames:2004). It has to be admitted
that Bailey is not alone in reading Sextus in this way. Stefan Ramaekers's otherwise helpful
article on scepticism (2002) also takes no account of the work of Frede, of Annas & Barnes or of
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Richard Popkin has offered a plausible explanation for such an historical shift. This is
that the use of classical scepticism 'in the religious debates of the time became a way of
undermining each side's claim to having a certain and adequate criterion of religious
knowledge' (Popkin: I999:330). Thus the existence ofa supposed 'certain' form of
knowledge, ie. religion, became perhaps a yardstick against which secular thought was
felt to have to compete. I I
The method upon which the historical analysis of this chapter rests is substantially
indebted to the extensive and sustained study of scepticism by Richard Popkin. He
recognised in 1992 that in thirty years of writing on the subject he had come to see that
there was still much more work to be undertaken in this area - that, for example,
eighteenth century scepticism was 'far more complicated than I previously thought'
(1992:280). What he meant by this was that there were many more sceptics in that
period, and more strands of scepticism, than he had previously realised when in 1963 he
wrote that Hume's was almost a lone voice in that approach to knowledge (1963:
1321).12 It is within that same trajectory that this chapter is located; that is, that there is
more to scepticism than has been generally recognised; specifically there is more than
simply the identification of sceptics. Indeed it is this identifying of sceptics in the
western tradition which now enables a slightly different conception of scepticism to be
formulated; one which enables us to see how sceptical thought has interacted with other
approaches to knowledge.
Stough, nor indeed of the powerful evidence of Sextus himself. As a result, Ramaekers
concludes, like Bailey, that Sextan scepticism is a form of irrationalism.
11 As Tonelli has pointed out, rational thought in early modernity was concerned with the
investigation of the limits of knowledge, which project was inextricably concerned with the
sceptical outlook (1971:218).
12 What makes Popkin so useful here is not just his experience (he is associated with some 30
book length works in the history of philosophy), nor his many collaborations, nor indeed the
testimonies to his work (eg. Watson:1988& Rosenbaum:2002) so much as the fact that even his
critics acknowledge his work to have 'significantly altered our understanding of the history of
philosophy' (Kenshur:1994:99). Helpfully - in the sense that it provides a element of common
ground- Beverly Southgate concurs with this view, that thanks to Popkin 'we can now no more
ignore scepticism than, for example, Hermeticism or the rise of science; and (that) any study of
scepticism is bound to build on Popkin's foundations' (Southgate:1981:357).
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The problem which Popkin, Tonelli and others have found is that the more one looks,
the more scepticism one finds. The discussion of this chapter supports that contention
by focusing on the work of the sophists, Plato and Aristotle and on the pyrrhonists.
Moreover by looking at Plato and Aristotle, philosophers noted for their hostility to
scepticism, it is possible to see that a form of scepticism functions within their accounts
of knowledge too - despite their seeming antipathy towards it. What a sceptically
sensitive approach to western thought makes it possible to see is that there has been an
enduring awareness by many philosophers in the western tradition that, outside of
revealed religion, the understanding of adequate grounds for the possibility of
knowledge was something that had to be worked at - constructed even - rather than
simply received passively or found, objectively, in the world. It is one in which it is the
response to sceptical aporetic awareness which is important, not the scepticism itself.
This brings the discussion to the fourth and perhaps most important point to be made.
This is that scepticism may be thought to exist in two distinguishable yet connected
ways; first as a philosophy or approach to knowledge and second, as awareness of
aporia 13 _ ie. as an awareness of a sense of uncertainty about what is certain in human
knowledge. It can be seen that in several philosophies; even in those patterns of
thought not conventionally associated with scepticism, it is possible to detect an
awareness on the part of the philosophers that, unaided by any supra-human entity,
knowledge which is both certain and objective, appears to be unachievable by humans.
Further, that such an awareness is followed by some positing by philosophers of how
aporia might be handled in practice.
13 Until this point in the study was reached, when it has become appropriate to discuss 'aporia,'
the term 'openededness' has mainly been used in its stead. The vagueness of this expression has
been helpful in that it is not associated with any particular philosophy and has not therefore
skewed the discussion in terms of yet another philosophical expression that has then to be
explained in relation to the generic sublimitywhich is captured by 'aporia'.
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The constructions which philosophers have made in response to aporia have been many
and various; at one end of a spectrum those theorists we generally call sceptics
(sophists, pyrrhonists etc.) have been quite happy to live day to day with it. That is
their response. At another end others have resisted what they have seen as the
implications of aporia, and theirs is a more complex form of response. It is difficult to
know in any detail the reasons behind such resistance. It could be because it is believed
that good order and discipline in communal life is possible only if humans are able to
reach some form of certainty. It may be simply a psychological linkage being made
between uncertainty and insecurity. These are questions of a general nature which are
peripheral to the main argument here, that is for whatever the reason, the common
element at this certaintistic end of the spectrum is a clear recognition of aporia, a
rejection too of the sceptic's response to it and the positing of further categories of
understanding, almost as epistemological 'repair patches'. These responses have
included tautologies, deities in the case of Christianity or practical grounding-type
concepts such as platonic forms. Throughout the rest of this study the term
'metaphysics' will be used to describe responses to aporia of this kind.
It is worth noting here that in the same way that aporia can be seen in accounts of
knowledge not ordinarily associated with scepticism, so too can epistemological
certainty (ie. this version of metaphysics) be seen in sceptical arguments. For example
the concept of aporia and response goes some way to explaining the epistemological
negativity that can be seen in the present work of Keith Jenkins, and other postmoderns.
Some clarification is needed here because 'metaphysics' is a term so widely used, so
often attributed to a writer's opponents, that it can sometimes be thought to be in
practice a pejorative term. No such meaning is intended here. It means simply that
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these postmodems appear (somewhat unexpectedly) share aspects of the metaphysical
response to aporia as described here.
It is true that they do not employ grounding concepts as 'repair patches' like those who
resist the implications of aporia. And certainly they are likely to agree with sceptics
such as sophists, pyrrhonists and empiricists that grounding concepts, or any kind of
epistemological strategies, can never really bridge the abyss of aporia. However, unlike
those at, or towards, the 'easy acceptance' end of the spectrum of possible responses to
aporia, this kind ofpostmodem thought cannot seem to let go of the idea that notions
such as certainty, absolutism or objectivity are important. They therefore conclude that
there exists a serious epistemological problem in the modem, or as they regard it, the
postmodem world where personal and group perspectives are more in evidence within
many disciplines," Their response to aporia is the claim that there is a crisis of
knowledge - such a crisis, in the case of Jenkins, that history as a form of knowledge is
no longer worth attempting. Empiricism, by contrast, can be thought in this model to be
located towards the more 'accepting' end of the spectrum. This is the reason why
present day empirical historical practice can be seen as epistemologically open-ended
and therefore remains largely untouched by the postmodem announcement that
objective knowledge is impossible to achieve. Empiricism, in relying on sense
experience modified by reason, can be thought to be a response to aporetic awareness,
whether or not empiricists acknowledge it and indeed, whether they even realise it
But, however satisfying it might be in showing how the concept of aporia and response
can produce insights that appear to be coherent and useful; in terms of the aim of this
study, these speculations are just that - speculations that cannot be proven and are
essentially circumstantial. Jenkins's argument for the end of history has been mounted
14 'Group' here refers of course to perspectival allegiances such as class, gender, age or
ethnicity.
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upon robust argument drawn from poststructuralism and it is on that ground that it
needs to be engaged with. This issue is addressed in Chapter Four.
In the meantime, it is now possible to see why it may be that postmodern attempts to
explain, warn or otherwise critique the empirical response has so far met with little
success. This is in part because postmoderns have generally not recognised what they
share with empiricists, namely aporetic awareness. They have therefore misdirected
their critique (in history at least) towards announcing aporia rather than in addressing
traditional historians' tardiness in admitting that empirical methods are merely a
particular response to aporia. For its part, traditional empirical historical practice
appears to have 'forgotten' its structural connection with aporia. The rest of this
chapter, and the next, narrates an historical account of empiricism that can be used to
make good that lack.
Finally in clarifying the terms used here, three more points need to be made. First the
expression 'closure' is useful. It is deployed here to indicate that what is important in
understanding the relationship between sceptical and non-sceptical positions is not
whether the philosophers concerned do or do not believe in the possibility of objective
truth, but what their response is to the very wide acceptance that it is not seemingly
possible to reach objective truth in any obvious manner. Thus 'closure' refers to
'response' rather than to an attempt to 'ground' a view into an absolute or objective
certainty. Some closures may involve claims to objectivity but the term itselfrefers to
the process of handling aporia, not to the content of that process. Second, the term
'sceptic' is usually reserved for those for whom that response is accepting of the
problem of knowledge implied by the use of the concept 'aporia' and 'aporia' itself
more strictly relates to the awareness of open-endedness rather than its consequent
cognate response. Finally, the cautionary point needs to be made that aporia is difficult
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to talk about with any degree of precision, for in so far as it is thought to be an
epistemic horizon, if its precise nature were known, it would no longer be aporia.
Indeed that has been exactly the problem with the postmodern challenge, and which has
been responsible for some muddying of the waters, ie. that the postmoderns have
assured the historical community that they understand precisely what is implied in an
awareness of aporia and what without any doubt, should be done in response to it. All
that can sensibly be said is that a sense of aporia, or an aporetic element of some sort,
appears to be a position common to many philosophic explorations" whereas responses
to it vary across time and place.
Put like that, it might be thought that this method of approaching scepticism in history
amounts to very little - and indeed that may be the case, for this area of debate would
seem by its apparent nature to be tentative and rather speculative. Although that might
seem a fair point, 'all or nothing' patterns of thought are insidious; because it is an area
of human experience that is uncertain, this does not carry an implication that nothing
can usefully be said, only that it needs to be said in a tentative manner. Moreover, and
with this caution very much in mind, I believe that the overt acknowledgement of initial
aporia by knowledge-makers across a range of philosophies, provides sufficient
common ground for the enterprise of 'the response' to be seen as an aspect of human
endeavour that can be understood in terms of its specificity, ie. historically. In this
sense philosophies in the western tradition" can be seen as providing a succession of
responses to awareness of aporia. To repeat this crucial point; to the extent that they
can be thought to be simply human responses ie. not able to be proven in any absolutely
certain way, their nature as human 'constructions,' is suggestive of a need for them to
be discussed sensitively, tentatively and with tolerance. They are after all, by this
I' I am not here arguing that this is a universal phenomenon, for to do so would need an
examination going well beyond the aims and therefore scope of this study.
16 Nothing beyond the need to contain the discussion to a manageable proportion is implied in
the use of the term 'western tradition' at this point.
87
model of knowledge, all attempting to do the same thing - to make sense of a
seemingly aporetic world.
Section n
It is not only the postmodernists who have taken for granted the principle that the
philosophy of the western tradition has been understood as a history of objectivity.
Some historians of ideas have done the same. John Gray's view that 'the central
intellectual tradition of Western culture was and remains foundationalist and
representationalist' against which 'scepticism is best thought of as a variation'
(Gray: 1997: 160) is not untypical. 17 To such historians the suggestion that the
philosophies of classical Athens can be seen to be as much about relativism as
objectivism might seem an uncomfortable one." There is however clear evidence that
during the celebrated 'golden age' of Athens an awareness of aporia was widespread
among philosophers. Moreover it can be seen that some of the more important of the
debates between them were not simply arguments about whether humans could reach
truth or not, but were more concerned to establish an appropriate response to that
seemingly inescapable condition - aporia.
17 Similar sentiments, especially about scepticism's assumed lack of validity, can be found, for
example, in Hugh Tredennick (1959:7/8), Alistair MacIntyre (1967:18) and C.C.W. Taylor
(2000:72).
18 This is not to say that the idea of sophists being relativistic has gone without challenge either,
even from historians more sympathetic to the sceptical argument. Richard Bett has argued that
of the sophists, only Protagorus can fairly be regarded as a relativist and that sophism in general
is simply scepticism (Bett:1989:151). His argument should be treated with some caution
however. It is a somewhatmarginal account; one that posits relativism as a form of reverse
dogmatism (in the style of Hankinson's taxonomy) but also as oppositional to 'scepticism'
which he sees as being a position without closure. Despite this, he does somewhat contrarily
accept Jonathan Bames's conclusion (althoughwithout Bames's thoroughjustiflcation) that
what ultimately unites the sophists was a sense of empiricism (Bett:1989:169; Bames:1971:47).
A more moderate account of differences between, say Gorgias and Protagorus, (although one
still relying on Bett) is given by Paul Woodruff; see below.
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It is of course likely that scepticism did not start with the Greeks. Protagoras's early
education was undertaken in Persia and he appears to have already worked out his
sceptical position long before arriving in Athens (Forster: 1989:75 & Russell:1961:93).19
Traditionally however Athenian sophism is the quintessential scepticism of the western
tradition, and the first in that narrative. Their humanistic open-endedness is legendary
and as the field of scholarship indicates, the issues raised by the sophists remain
important to forms of present day thought/" But what is not quite so obvious is that
there are several different versions of sophism; it was no tight philosophical school.
For example Gorgias's position was by far the most dogmatically sceptical of the
sophists ie. '(i) that there is nothing, (ii) that even if there were something it would be
unknowable and (iii) that if it were knowable it could not be made evident to others
(Woodruff: 1999:305) whereas, with his famous claim that 'man is the measure of all
things,' Protagoras' s thought shows a definite constructivist tum of mind
(Long: 1999: 12). What also has been less obvious to historians is that the traditional
view of the sophists as merely promoters of 'argumentative trickery' (Taylor:2000:72)
requires for its cogency a discounting of the ample evidence that their sceptical position
was not an ivory-tower epistemology developed at a distance from everyday life, but
rather the reverse. Even a brief examination of the context of sophistic thought enables
a case to be made that their scepticism was integral to their knowledge of the world and
to an active participation in civic life.21
19 It has also been argued that a degree of scepticism existed in eleatic philosophy
(Kefferd:1981:94). W.K.C. Guthrie on the other hand, has placed greater emphasis on
'contemporary Ionian scientists' and the natural philosophy ofDemocritus as formative
influences on the sophists. (Guthrie:1971:47&8).
20 This point is made by Richard Bett:1989, David Corey:2002, Carlo Frierio:1998, Michael
Gagarin: 2001. Similarly G.B.Kerferd explains the 'the modernity of the range of problems
formulated and discussed by the sophists in their teaching is indeed startling... the degree to
which sense-perceptions are to be regarded as infallible and incorrigible, and the problems that
result ifsuch is the case' (Kerferd:1981:1&2).
21 Paul Woodruff's paper, 'Rhetoric and relativism: Protagorus and Gorgias' in A.A.Long's
reader (1999) is a helpful discussion of the philosophical differences between these sophists and
between sophism in general and Plato's view of them. It highlights that what is important for
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It is this integrated use of scepticism that makes sophism important for this chapter for
it is possible to see Athenian sophism as providing an epistemological foundation for a
secular civic life; one which is really quite familiar to us in the twenty-first century. A
study of their responses to aporia provides a sharp and effective corrective to present-
day empiricists' timidity in asserting their aporetic awareness or to those postmodems
who conflate, as Barnes puts it, 'no reason to believe P' with 'not p'. 22
Most importantly the sophists were comfortable with the idea that whatever truth was, it
was not something that could be discovered once and for all. This stance is evident not
only in their attitude to knowledge but also to the way they lived their lives. The
sophists were methodological and saw the teaching of rhetoric and other skills of
argument as important. True, such teaching was also lucrative, as many have pointed
out, but their emphasis on argumentation also cohered with their epistemological
position. If there is no truth to be discovered outside of the human condition, and ifall
we have in the end is knowledge which is a construction made by humans in the form
of argument aided by rhetoric, then it is arguably important to know how that
knowledge is constructed. But their interest in the application of aporetic awareness
was not limited to rhetoric, as has sometimes been assumed by historians such as
Tredennick or Taylor. Paul Woodruff for example argues that it was Plato himself who
narrowed the understanding of sophism into merely an association with rhetoric and
relativism. Woodruff makes the point that:
this is misleading, for among the subjects taught by sophists
were oratory, ethics, political theory, law, history, mnemonics,
literature, mathematics and astronomy ... as well as metaphysics
this section of the chapter is not the 'correctness' or otherwise. of the accounts expressed - that
is to say, the philosophy of sophism - so much as the utility of sophism inAthenian society.
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and epistemology. Their message that progress came through
technological and political developments advanced their
frankly self-serving claim that education was among the
greatest public goods. (Woodruff: 1999:291)
Clearly the epistemological open-endedness of sophism did not lead to a debilitating
passivity. Protagoras for example was quite prepared to argue that one opinion can be
better than another even if it were not possible to establish that one was more true
(Russell: 1961 :94). And it has been pointed out that sophists began using the so-called
socratic method of debate to arrive at conclusions, however tentatively they were held,
well before Socrates (Kerferd: 1981 :33).
Finally, but importantly for this discussion, one response of sophism to aporia was a
deep engagement with the civic life of the polis. Sophists were for example close
associates of Pericles during the period in which democracy flourished in Athens
(Coleman:2000:45-6) and Protagoras was active in politics. He is said to have written
the laws of Thurii in 444/3BC (Russell: 1961:93).23 It is easy to see the reason for this
interest in matters of constitution and democracy. If 'man' really is the measure of all
things then it might be thought to follow that men and women's views should be the
basis ofpolitical actions, for from where else might come the knowledge of how people
should live together in communities? Thus to the idea that Sophism was the first
empirical humanism in the western tradition (Guthrie:1971:9; Tamas: I996:29) could be
added the possibility that it has also been the theoretical face of democracy.i"
22 This is a position that Jonathan Barnes describes as 'puerile'. For a more thorough, and less
polemic, discussion of some of the main possibilities and options which the Athenians thought
followed aporetic awareness, see Woodfuff:1999:Ch.14.
23 For more recent confirmation of the reliability of Russell on this point, see also
Corey:2002: 193.
24 For clarity of explanation I am leaving a consideration of the naturalistic aspects of
empiricism, and thus of scepticism, to Chapter Three where it is more pertinent. Similarly the
intention here has been to avoid straying into a discussion of Ancient historiography. I am
therefore not following up on interesting, although potentially controversial, references in the
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There is however a problem in simply accepting sophism as a model for the deployment
of scepticism. To understand effectively its means of handling aporia, it is necessary to
take some account of the opposition that was ranged against it. Plato's critique of
sophism is, along with Aristotle's, perhaps the most important of these for Plato held
the view that the sophists' individualism was corrosive of democracy's ability to take
the longer or broader view in politics and in morality generally. This clearly has
implications for any approach to knowledge, such as history, that rests on an acceptance
of aporia.
Section III
Given the centrality of Plato's work for subsequent philosophy - and not least the
influence it had on the formation of Christian thought - it is hardly surprising that there
are differences in the way he is understood. There is space here for only a brief
comment on a subject which has generated a notable profusion of literature from many
disciplines. Nevertheless whatever one thinks about the success or otherwise of his
account of knowledge, or its possible political implications, a case can be made that
aporia is integral to Plato's position rather than, as is so often assumed, crudely contrary
to it.
scholarship of this period; for example, to the connections between Herodotus's moral
scepticism and the sophist position, in relation to the nomos and physis debates
(Woodruff: 1999:301) or the lack of epistemological causation (as distinct from discovery of
'hidden motivation' of the courtroom kind) in Thucydides's work (Vagetti:1999:278).
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A starting point in making sense of Plato's engagement with scepticism would be to say
that he found himself unable to accept the sophists' easy acceptance of aporia and that
he countered it with a response which relied on a notion of truth. What is entailed by
that concept of truth is however problematic. Cottingham for example regards it as the
basis of what he takes to be the rationalist project in western culture
(Cottingham: 1984: 16/17). Rather similarly C. C. Taylor reads Plato's Socrates as
refuting Protagoras' 'hollow' and 'unfounded' view of knowledge with his own, which
is 'the true conception of the task of philosophy'; the replacement of genuine
philosophy for its counterfeit (Taylor:2000:76 & 71). Hugh Tredennick regarded Plato
quite simply as 'a prophet' and his doctrine of forms, the intellectual equivalents of
'facts' (Tredennick:19S9:9 & 15).Perhaps because of the use made of Plato by
neoplatonism, Christianity and other (often elitist) movements, this rather fixed or even
mechanistic understanding of knowledge, in evidence by Cottingham, Tredennick and
Taylor, is by no means a rarity in the western tradition. Unfortunately neither is the
associated assumption that ifthere is not absolute certainty in knowledge then a
debilitating scepticism is the only possible altematlve." Against such readings of
classical philosophy it is possible to see in Plato's work evidence ofan attempt to come
to terms with aporia and to improve on what he saw as a demonstrable weakness of
sophism, ie. its self-interested individualism.
Plato's aporetic core is not difficult to see. The whole thrust of his work is consistently
towards an attempt to cope with the obvious inability of humans to be able to reach
certainty of knowledge from the phenomena of the world and from normal human
2S For a clear example of this position in present day scholarship see Carlo Frigerio 1998.
Frigerio's account is interesting in that he makes no distinction between aporetic awareness and
its response. Moreover, his account of scepticism in the western tradition does not include
pyrrhonism. Thus he fails to connect empiricism with scepticism, ie. empiricism as a response
to aporia. For him as for Plato, the question is between an absolutely objective truth or a hapless
relativism. Thus he shares Plato's distrust of the sophists and he similarly regards postmoderns,
and poststructuralists as redivivus sophists (p.8). On the other hand because he can see the
impossibility of certainty and therefore the need for some degree of grounding, he belatedly
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discourse. Were there to be any doubt about this, it is dispelled by Plato's own words,
in the Phaedo, where he makes it clear that he, as much as the sophists, recognises the
aporetic nature of the human condition, viz.
And above all those who spend their time dealing with antinomies
[Iogoi antilogikoi] end as you well know by thinking that they have
become the wisest of men and that they are the only ones who have
come to understand that there is nothing sound or secure at all
either in facts or in arguments. (Cited by:Kerferd: 1981 :66)
Kerferd notes - rightly - that the full significance of this passage 'has not always been
understood by scholars'. The importance of it is, he says, that:
... both Plato and the practitioners of anti logic (the sophists) are
agreed on this one point, the anti logic character of phenomena. The
only fundamental point on which Plato is going to take issue with
them is their failure to understand that the flux of phenomena is not
the end of the story - one must look elsewhere for the truth which
is the object of the true knowledge (Kerferd:1981:67).26
We have seen that the sophists did not themselves regard the flux of phenomena as the
end of the story for it had implications for their attitude to life as well as knowledge.
The point here is that Plato disagreed, not about the existence of aporia, but about what
should be an appropriate response to it?'
turns to empirical science ... seemingly unaware that this strategy has been around, and much
employed, for many centuries.
26 Certainly Plato is no sophist, and no sceptic in the sense that he was 'accepting' of aporia, but
his awareness of it as a phenomenon, is unmistakable.
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Similarly, on the perennial question about the relationship between the ideas of Plato
and Socrates (that is the 'real' Socrates not the literary one), there is a sense of cogency
in W.K.C. Guthrie's explanation that Socrates' own aporetic awareness was likely to
have been passed on to Plato. Thus in the early literary works of Plato the literary
Socrates was made to thrash around with little in the way of a response to aporia
different from the sophists until the later dialogues (of which Meno is perhaps the first)
when Plato developed his own ideas. That is, when he worked out his response - ie. the
Forms and re-incarnation, and these were then attributed back to the later (literary)
Socrates,"
In attempting to understand what Plato meant by his own response - the doctrine of
Forms (or Ideas) - the question which seems immediately to impose itself is why should
Plato object so strongly to the sophistic solution to aporia.29 The quick answer - that it
was a political one - although not unreasonable, is insufficient in itself. The 'political'
account goes thus; that Plato, as an aristocrat, objected to the sophist political response
of democracy and especially the sophistic practice of selling (teaching) political skills
of rhetoric and argument for cash. Here, as Janet Coleman points out, it is possible to
imagine an aristocratic response to be one which deplores the belief that the kind of
excellence that merits high office should be able to be taught in isolation from more
fundamental questions about the possession of personal qualities (Coleman:2000:46).30
It is true that historians have long seen links between education and democracy
(Breisach:1994:Ch.2) and have posited the possibility of tension between old (character
based) and new (intellectual) approaches to education in Athens at this time
27 See also Jane O'Grady (l997:xvii) who makes a similar point.
28 The difficulty of knowing the historical Socrates as distinct from the literary one has been so
widely discussed that little may be gained by returning over this old ground, except to add Robin
Waterfield's frank acceptance that his own work on Xenophon does not really help since
Xenophon was as prejudiced in his treatment of Socrates as was Plato (Waterfield:I990:22).
29 Plato's antipathy to sophism is fairly well established, but Jonathan Barnes provides ample
evidence of it (Barnes:1979:146n).
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(Hare: 1982:30). But the weakness in leaving the analysis at this point is that it was far
from obvious that the aristocracy was in principle opposed to democracy. Plato
himself is said to have had 'the deepest distrust of what today would be called the
profit-motive and of the political influence of private wealth' (Lee: 1987: xxv). Also as
Bertrand Russell pointed out in the 1960s, unlike in our modem world in the west,
political democracy itself 'was associated with cultural conservatism, while those who
were cultural innovators tended to be political reactionaries' (Russell: 1961:91). It
seems likely that there was a deeper reason for Plato's position than simply an
aristocratic distaste for democracy. A more fruitful area for investigation is to think
that he saw weaknesses in the sophistic response to aporia.
In fact there is evidence of a serious problem with Sophism. The same individualism
which tended towards the establishment of democracy also militated against it, and not
simply because it unsettled existing practices. There was seen to be a larger difficulty,
as MacIntyre has described, and of course as Rousseau's 'general will' sought to avoid.
This is that the easy sophist acceptance of aporia could be thought to provide no criteria
to guide individual people in developing their own ideas to be different from the norms
of their community. MacIntyre points out that if knowledge was simply whatever an
individual or a group of individuals thought at anyone time, what would stop political
insight and wisdom from degenerating to the lowest level of rhetorical immediacy?
(Macintyre: 1967: 16). Worse than this, it has been thought that sophism gave rise in
practice to anti-democratic ideas as well as to democratic ones, a point that was
recognised by historians of the period (Mayor: 1912:27). Critias and Alcibiades for
example - both students of Socrates and both avowed sophists - were seriously
opposed to democracy on the grounds that if there is no certainty, then there should be
nothing to prevent the taking of power by the strongest. Indeed this is a view not
30 On the other hand, in his recent paper 'The case against teaching virtue for pay: Socrates and
the sophists' (2002: 197)David Corey points out that Xenophon has suggested that Socrates did
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unlike that expressed in a later age by Nietzsche. Critias was an important figure in the
life of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian war, becoming the leading member of the
oligarchical government; the so-called Thirty Tyrants. In his introduction to Plato's
Gorgias Walter Hamilton summarises a fairly general view of Plato's career at this time
and provides a likely insight into his motivation. Thus Plato's
innocent expectation of a period of pure rule under the oligarchy
of the Thirty, some of whom were his friends and relatives, quickly
turned to horror at the wickedness of their proceedings, and, though
he had again contemplated entering politics at the restoration of the
democracy in 403, his disillusion became complete and permanent
when the restored democrats condemned and executed Socrates
(Hamilton: 1960: 15).
In such circumstances - and bearing in mind the scepticism of Socrates in the early
dialogues - it is easy to see how Plato's own response to aporia developed as it
gradually did, away from that of the sophists.i' In making sense for ourselves of what
Plato offered his contemporaries it is possible to see that he was perhaps trying to
express ideas which we now, in the twenty-first century, take for granted. It is this
aspect of his work that has significance for an understanding of scepticism in the
period.
not accept pay for his teaching, because he wanted to maintain his personal liberty.
31 In attempting to peel away likely motivations for Plato it must be accepted here that this
alleged 'problem' with sophism is as likely to have been a further justification constructed by
Plato to mask his undeniably elitist politics, as much as it could have been genuine. For
example, Barnes has argued that Critias's credentials as a sophist, in the Protagorus and Gorgias
mould, are in some historical doubt. He was, Barnes points out, Plato's uncle and 'a man of
black fame... cruel, cynical and overbearing' and, evidenced by a fragment of his play Sisyphus,
he was an advocate of what has become associated with Nietsche ie. a view oflaws and religion
as being simply props for the weak (Barnes:1979:149).
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Jane O'Grady is right to caution us not to fall into the misconception that Plato's Forms
were simply concepts, for as she rightly says, he intended them to be 'objective,
existing irrespectively of whether we exist' (O'Grady: 1997:xviii). Obvious though this
point is, what precisely is meant by it is however open to some discussion. Certainly
there is no evidence that Plato had available to him the concept of 'concept' and it is
possible to sense this as a lack (by our own standards, of course) when in his
explanation of his idea offonns he struggles with, for example; 'it is the beautiful that
makes all beautiful things beautiful' or 'by bigness big things are big, and bigger things
bigger' (O'Grady: xix). As MacIntyre comments, 'to say .•. "Height is high" is clearly
not to speak with a clear meaning' (Macintyre: 1967:43). Nevertheless it is possible to
make the case that Plato's approach to knowledge has integrated within it the aporia
about which he is so famously circumspect. It may be uncomfortable (and perhaps
unduly speculative) to go further and attribute to Plato's method descriptions more
suitable for the Twenty-first Century, ie. that he can be understood as a constructivist.
However, O'Grady's point that in the Phaedo, that 'Plato argues that what same-named
things had in common was outside of themselves' (p.xviii) is certainly suggestive of
that kind of approach to knowledge. It may simply be however that the objectivity of
which Plato speaks is intended to mean objective in relation to the individuality of the
sophist approach.
In fact historians have noticed that Plato's position is not entirely one in which truth
comes before everything. MacIntyre suggests that his account of knowledge carries a
confusion in that he conflates geometry (which he employs as an epistemological
standard) with matters of conduct, ego 'to treat justice and good as the names ofFonns
is to miss at once one central feature of justice and goodness - namely, that they
characterise not what is, but what ought to be' (MacIntyre: 1967:50). In other words
truth is subservient to what Plato thinks is desirable in a community.
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Janet Coleman provides an example of this when she says that Plato's political
programme of the Republic is embodiment of what that 'desirable' community- ie. the
truth - should look like. She points out that in this later work he had moved on from his
earlier more openly aporetic position - expressed by the Socrates of the early dialogues
- where Socrates sought knowledge 'insisting that he had none' (2000: 72). In the
Republic, she says, Plato makes a case for a more elaborate epistemology and therefore
includes 'a philosophy of education, a philosophy of science, a philosophy of language,
a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of art' (p 72). Here, Coleman argues that for
the mature Plato, what is important (and what constitutes the true good, as distinct from
the sophist's narrow self-interest) is that:
Reason will therefore be shown to have a new function, to take
the emotions seriously and to keep desire in its proper place, in
order to ensure, both in the individual and in the polis, psychological
and, therefore, political order. Reason and those capable of it
now must have the kind of political power that governs a
collectivity of selves in the interests of each and all' (p73).
Clearly the political turmoil which accompanied the defeat of Athens to Sparta had left
its mark on Plato's thought. This predominance of 'the political' is important because it
underlines the further point that in Plato's response to aporia, contrary to his
protestations, 'the good' really is not supremely independent of the everyday world; it is
allied to 'the better' and is to a considerable extent - an unexpectedly considerable
extent - rooted in the needs and doings of humans. It is not 'elsewhere' as one might
expect in, for example, a realist epistemology. Plato's Forms do not refer to a 'real'
world which can be described an accounted for, such as the ideal worlds of Berkeley or
Hegel. On the contrary, the common feature of the Forms, as even Aristotle found, was
that there was no adequate explanation of what precisely they were in terms of entities
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being objective and transcendental. Certainly they were intellectual but that description
cannot be a final one. MacIntyre notes how Plato himself saw that there were radical
problems in his theory of Forms which, as MacIntyre discusses, Plato never brought to
a conclusion (MacIntyre: 1967:53/54). However, with the benefit of both distance and
hindsight, and mindful of the considerable debate that there is on the subject, it is
perhaps nevertheless possible to make sense of Plato's position by seeing in it some
quite distinctly humanistic associations. That is to say that truth for him is not so much
a construction of the Gods as of the human mind, but not of anyone's mind; only of
those who by a mixture of learning and experience can be trusted to produce a truth
which is likely to be good - as he Plato would see it - for the community as a whole.
Hare for example has noticed how there is a development in Plato's work, evident in
Timaeus and The Laws in which 'mind had a place in explaining how the world works'
and that this grows in prominence (Hare: 1982: 14). O'Grady puts flesh on that point by
focusing on what she sees as a slippage of logic by Plato. She suggests that his own
explanation of the Forms follows the same 'sleight of hand' as can be seen in the
ontological argument for the proof of God, ie. that 'since our idea of God is that of an
all-perfect being, and since to exist is more perfect than not to exist, God must
necessarily exist'. In Plato's argument she sees it as being essentially the same ie. that
'just as the ontological argument "proves" that our concept of God necessitates his
existence, so our ability to use a general term for many particular things necessitates a
reality of which those particulars partake' (O'Grady: 1997: xviii). In both cases there is
a subtle and logically unwarranted shift from the 'human' to the 'abstract'.
Indeed, even in the simile of the cave, (even though it is a simile) the seeing of the
world as it 'really' is, is carried out by a human - that is a human who develops the
interpretation (as we would term it) that it is the sun that 'is responsible for everything
that he and his fellow prisoners used to see' (Book vii 516c in Lee: 1987:255-264).
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Here again Plato is respectful of the same human condition of aporia as were the
sophists, when he says, 'that at any rate is my interpretation .... the truth of the matter is,
after all, known only to God' (51Th).
Thus it would seem that although it might be hasty to go on from this to think that Plato
was reaching for something which today we would call perspectivism - that is an
account of knowledge which draws for part of its veracity on the strength of established
views of things - there has been enough evidence here to substantiate a lesser claim that
were it not for Plato's recognition of aporia he would not have needed, nor been able to,
have organised his position as he did. Far from being the cause of an end of scepticism
in the western tradition, Plato is better understood as simply offering a response to
aporia which is different from that of the sophists and through which he attempted to
address problems he thought were ignored by them. In this sense - and leaving to one
side the political implications of his clearly conservative, elitist position - it is possible
to conclude with Janet Coleman that he offered a conception of knowledge which was
more inclusive than the alleged individualism of sophism in the sense that it has at its
heart an attempt at a collective dimension (Coleman:2000:82-83).32
Section IV
Whatever the validity of Whitehead's famous comment that the western tradition is but
a series of footnotes to Plato, there is no doubt that this emphasis on a conception of
knowledge as being something more than simply individual opinion, once gained
through the dissension of the sophists and Plato in their competing response to aporia,
32 This is not of course to have to agree with Plato's own view of which groups should constitute
that collective.
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has become an enduring component of the west's understanding of its own intellectual
history and, in relation to Aristotle, to the development of what has come to be regarded
as empiricism. For many years this empiricism has been associated with historically
with Aristotelianism, but as Annas & Barnes have argued (I 994:Intro.) current
sensitivity to sceptical issues has now made for a broader focus, one which places
Sextus Empiricus on a par with Aristotle as a co-originator of empiricism. Despite this
argued shift from undisputed pre-eminence Aristotle's thought remains essential to an
understanding of one of the primary forms of empiricism. This section expresses that
form in terms of 'aporia and response' to enable it to be comparatively discussed not
only with sophism and pyrrhonism but also with Plato's thought.
From such a viewpoint, and on first impression, Aristotle's response to aporia may be
thought to be a clear improvement on that of both the sophists and Plato. His
repudiation of the more arcane aspects of Plato's Forms is a defining feature of his
work.33 Certainly historians have noted that despite his overt opposition to the sophists
- an opposition which consisted more of dismissal than argument (Barnes: 1996:60) -
Aristotle's own response to aporia bore a marked similarity to their approach to
knowledge (Press: 1999:72-74), namely that knowledge was reliant on sensory
experience. Janet Coleman takes the view too that Aristotle's differences from Plato
outweigh the similarities (Coleman:2000: 115) and Jonathan Barnes draws on evidence
from Nichomachean Ethics to suggest that the notion of truth to be found there bears
some similarity with a humanistic model. He points out that Aristotle's account of truth
is that it is accumulative and that 'no one can attain it in a wholly satisfactory way'
(1996: 17) and moreover that he, Aristotle, had in practice regarded knowledge as being
what is left of reputable opinion after due examination (P16). Similarly, Barnes
comments that there is something to be said for the now widely accepted view that
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Aristotle was himself never a system builder in any real sense; that in his own
modelling of knowledge, his thought was 'tentative, flexible, changing', such that his
philosophy could be described as 'essentially aporetic' (Barnes: I996:36-7).
In particular it is possible to see in Aristotle's thought that his empirical methodology
could be a practical response to aporia. The danger of reductive individualism, which
Plato deplored in the sophists, is handled by Aristotle - with the syllogism in mind one
might say 'inventively' through the use oflogic. It is not necessary to share his claim
that logic led to universalism to see that logic is a means through which common
understandings between communicants can be reached. What is often ignored in
current critiques, or deconstructions, of Aristotle (for example,Goodheart: 1991: 113) is
that for all his talk of universals Aristotle was no realist," Although for him new
knowledge is empirically achieved by means of sensations, he accepted that sensation is
not in itself knowledge and cannot function without the addition of human experience
(Coleman:2000: 120, Barnes: 1996:58-9). This is important for when that point is
factored in, allied with the use of logic, it is possible to see how empiricism can be both
effectively open-ended and yet in practice also be closed, ie. capable of producing
knowledge in the sense of shared meaning. Thus whatever else Aristotle's idea of
knowledge was, or claimed by him to be, it is clearly capable of being read in the
present as having included within it an element of constructivism.
Having said this, there is nevertheless a problem in regarding Aristotle as providing the
whole of the model of practical knowledge - specifically of science - on which our
33 For a current example of how Plato's 'forms', as a response to aporia, are thought to be
compared with Aristotle's emphasis on observation; ego'the genus absolutely does not exist
~art from the species ofa genus' see Marcos:2004:2.
E. Paparazzo's investigationofdifTerent approaches to concepts of 'surface' within the ancient
world (in his study of philosophical bases for electron spectroscopies) indicates the extent to
which Aristotle's thought was non-realist. He notes for example how Aristotle regarded planes
or surfaces as existing in part theoretically, rather than physically as real substances.
(Paparazzo:2004:1-5).
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modem empirical methods are based. In arguing for that pre-eminence, Barnes'
enthusiasm for Aristotle's achievement points the way to a repudiation. Barnes claims
that 'our modem notion of scientific method is thoroughly Aristotelian' and he goes on
to claim that: 'the point needs emphasising, if only because Aristotle's most celebrated
critics Francis Bacon and John Locke, were both staunch empiricists who thought that
they were thereby breaking with the Aristotelian tradition' (Bames: 1996: 86). It would
seem that the 'historical record' is not quite as unambiguous as Barnes thinks, for
Woolhouse has noted how our model of science is descended 'also from the newer
conception of "natural philosophy", which people like Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi and
Locke, developed in reaction to the Aristotelians' (Woolhouse: 1988:6). Richard Popkin
provides evidence to support the point, which is that this 'newer conception' was the
result of the growing knowledge and influence of the work of the pyrrhonist thinker
Sextus Empiricus. Bacon, for example, studied the writings of the pyrrhonist sceptic
Michel de Montaigne to reach a version of pyrrhonist empiricism (Popkin: 1999:330)
and Locke's education at Christ Church, Oxford in the 1650s, under the tutorship of its
Dean John Owen, was steeped in the philosophy of Bacon (Copenhaver: 1999:282).35
This is not to attempt a denial of the magnitude of Aristotle's achievement so much as
to recognise the strength of opinion by historians that perhaps ultimately his approach
to empiricism can be viewed as another version of Plato's response to aporia, ie. that it
rests on an abstraction, albeit only in the last instance. Russell's conclusion is typical.
This is that 'the change that Aristotle makes in Plato's metaphysics is, it would seem,
less than he represents it as being' (Russell: 1961: 179). Press, and Barnes both make
similar cases along the lines that Aristotle's insistence that knowledge is knowledge of
causes and that these are guaranteed by the concept of an unmoved mover. This, they
3~For the purposes of this study it is unnecessary to argue for the primacy of the pyrrhonists
against Aristotle, in a reconfigured empirical tradition. It suffices simply to establish that the
work of Sextus Empiricus had an influence on its development This is treated in more detail in
the next chapter.
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point out, necessitates Aristotle's God as being 'the explanatory principle ofa world of
eternal species of moved movers' (Press: 1999:73). Certainly, for us anyway, the
practical side of empiricism seems to work without the universalist dimension and it is
tempting to think that Aristotle, like Plato, was expressing in terms available to him (in
Aristotle's case in terms partly deriving from Plato) the kind of communal, but not
universal, epistemological closure to aporia with which we today customarily employ in
our knowledge-making.
Section V
What has generally come to be regarded as pyrrhonism, that is largely the extant
writings of the Alexandrian medical philosopher Sextus Empiricus of the first/second
century AD, is a development of sophism in direct descent from the renewal of interest
in scepticism of the hellenic period. Difficult though it is to be certain about intellectual
lineages as Charlotte Stough's discussion of the issues shows (Annas:t987:217), Haren,
Sharples, Hankinson, and Mayor in earlier years, have charted how pyrrhonism was
formed in dialogue with the dogmatic scepticism of the third and fourth academy," In
seeking avenues of influence upon Pyrrho, Richard Hankinson connects him with
sophism by noting commonalties in the logical structure of sophism and Pyrrho's
position (and those of Sextus Empiricus some five hundred years later). But he also
draws upon the - admittedly sometimes questionable - evidence of Diogenes Laertius
(as does Long: 1999:74-91) to suggest that the characteristics of pyrrhonism originated
36 It would be possible - although perhaps unnecessary - to locate pyrrhonism more widely in a
discourse deriviving from Aenesidemus's revival ofa loose tradition stretching back via the
works ofCarneades (214-129BC), Arcesilaus (316-242BC) to Pyrrho of Ellis (C320BC). See
also Haren: 1992: 29, Sharples: 1996: 9-10 & 29-30, Hankinson:1995:52,59,117,123,143/4 &
Mayer: 1912: 146.
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from Pyrrho's travels with Alexander in India." For the purpose of this study then,
pyrrhonism can be seen as an historical - and an improved - version of sophistic
scepticism.
Through much of the period between the death of Aristotle and the eclipsing of
scepticism by Christianity, scepticism (that is 'scepticism' in the sense that its response
to aporia was an accepting one) had to distinguish its position from the then more
dominant 'philosophies of consolation' (Popkin & Stroll: 1993: 18, Russell: 1961 :268) ie.
epicureanism, cynicism and stoicism. These philosophies had an aporetic awareness in
the sense that they believed - in their various ways - that the human condition was
incapable of providing knowledge of how happiness and the good life could be secured
- not least in what historians uniformly describe as being 'troubled times'. The
responses, which that awareness brought forth, respectively, were those of hedonism,
the renunciation of wealth and the general disregarding of material conditions.
Pyrrhonism shared some of these values in that its conception of 'the good' resembled,
for example, the epicurean and stoic (and perhaps Indian in origin) value, or aim in life,
of quietness, tranquillity and unperturbedness (ataraxia) (Hookway: 1992:5).
What marks out pyrrhonism from other forms of scepticism of the classical world,
including that of sophism, is the nature of its aporetic awareness. Not only did
pyrrhonists (whether of the original Pyrrho or that of Sextus Empiricus) believe that
humans were unable to gain any certain knowledge of the world or of the human
condition but they also believed that even this statement - that truth was not possible-
was uncertain (Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism: Bk. I 13/14] via Annas &
Barnes: 1994: 6). This left them in an interesting position. It might be thought that they
were in an entirely untenable situation - if one can know nothing, what then can be
37 A discussion of the Indian connection is beyond the scope of this study but an interesting
comparison between the approaches to scepticism of Sextus Empiricus and Zhuangzi, a Chinese
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said? In practice, it has to be answered, that quite a lot is possible. First, pyrrhonism
carved a space for itself distinguishable from the 'dogmatic' scepticism of what was
also then called 'academic scepticism', that is the scepticism of Philo of Larissa c. 160
-83BC). This was regarded by pyrrhonists as a form of 'metaphysical realism'
(Hankinson: 1995: 116/117) and it is interesting that from a pyrrhonist standpoint,
sophism can be thought to be susceptible to this charge. The second thing that
pyrrhonism did through its particular articulation of aporia was to render itself immune
to the accusation of incoherence, which is so often levelled at sceptics. It is arguably
only 'dogmatic' versions of scepticism which can be charged with this, ie. with both
asserting and denying the possibility of knowledge at the same time. Pyrrhonism
avoids the problem by asserting nothing - by not engaging in beliefs of any kind.
Charlotte Stough makes the point clearly.
The pyrrhonist's position is that even the most obvious things
one assents to, propositions that both Stoics and their Academic
critics would call 'evident', tum out on analysis to be non-evident,
since they embody theoretical presuppositions to which one
is committed in believing them (Stough: 1987:220).38
The recognition of this, and that for every possible statement about the world there can
be an opposing one is not the same as nihilism, as Christopher Hookway notes.
daoist from the late fourth century BCE, can be had from Paul Kjellburg's paper 1994.
38 Stough's insight can be relied upon. Despite the lack of complete unanimity in the matter ( I
have already mentioned this lacuna in the work ofBaiJey and Rameakers) Stough is supported
by Frede, Barnes and Annas, as previously noted. It would be possible to add several more
references to this point (Algra:2003:74& Flathman:2000, for example) for it is crucial to an
adequate understandingof the intellectual resources available within the discourse of scepticism.
There is the unfortunate case of Carlo Frigerio, whose analysis ofpoststructuralists as modern
sophists is set within a whiggish history of scepticism that moves directly from Protagorus to
Derrida. His account ends with a late need to recreate inpresent day science, empiricism as an
epistemic closure. In effect he is having to return and recreate the western empirical tradition.
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The consequences of this is 'epoche': ie. suspension of judgement.
It does not lead to the negative dogmatism of asserting that the
question has no answer or even of claiming that truth is forever
hidden. The Pyrrhonist continues to enquire, admitting only that
the question is still open and that we do not yet know how to
answer it (Hookway:1992:5).39
Several points immediately follow this thorough aporetic awareness. The first of these
is that belief may have been repudiated, but that is not the same as saying that
knowledge is not possible and this point has been accepted by many historians who
have worked on pyrrhonist writings (eg: Michael Frede: 1987: 209,253 - 260, Annas &
Barnes' translation of Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Scepticism: 1994: 9, 69, 205,
Hankinson: 1995: 252-3,277,281,299-300,304, Long: 1999:74-9 I, Russell: 1961:
247/8). Second, the sceptic, like any other person must live in the world and be
affected by what goes on there. As Sextus himself put it 'we Jive in accordance with
everyday observances' (via Annas & Barnes: p. 9). Third, both Frede and Hankinson
have noted how the position of the medical empiricists, on behalf of which Sextus
appears to be an advocate, was put into centrality in pyrrhonism. Frede sums it up well:
'to put the matter in a nutshell: the Pyrrhonian follows what appears to him to be the
case without committing himself to the view that what appears to him to be the case
actually is the case' (Frede: p252).
Sextus makes this possibility of a moderately held empiricism; what Hankinson call
'etiolated belief" (1995:277) abundantly clear. For example:
This exists as a clear example of the difficulties of that can result in ignoring pyrrhonism or
misreading its influence on empirical approaches to knowledge.
39 Keimpe Algra again, makes the same point (Algra:2003:74). It has to be accepted that
Hookway takes a rather critical view of epoche as a principle for living one's life, but that is of
course another matter. The point is that he recognises the phenomenon (Hookway:1992:Chs.
1&2)
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A sceptic is not. I think, barred from having thoughts, if they
arise from things which give him a passive impression and
appear evidently to him and do not at all imply the reality of
what is being thought of - for we can think, as they say, not
only of real things but also of unreal things
(via Annas & Barnes: p. 69).
Appearances are, as Long says, the criterion for action, rather than a criterion of truth
(1999:89/90) and although evidence for it is vague, there seems to be no reason why
pyrrhonists should not employ logic, though of course they would do so without the
accompanying claims of universalism made by Aristotle. It is thus arguably possible, in
this secular, non-foundationalist epistemology, to see elements of what is claimed for
postmodemism ie. awareness of aporia, but also to see that pyrrhonism's response is
recognisable in our own age; that is, in the easy acceptance of an open-ended empirical
approach to knowledge which informs the generality of disciplinary methodologies in
the modem world." It is understandable that historians of ancient philosophy, in the
enlightenment as much as in the present. should have valued pyrrhonism as a possible
model of empirical knowledge, for when placed alongside the competing claims of
Aristotle, it can be thought to have an advantage. For example Aristotle brought
together, not simply sophism and platonism, but two different. and essentially
incompatible, types of closure; ie. that of a constructivist empiricism and of an
essentialist universalism. The work of Sextus Empiricus elegantly avoids this
inconsistency. The vigour of this philosophical discourse is evidence of the continuing
40 This is not however to say that Sextus Empiricus necessarily saw himself as an empiricist in
the modem sense, nor would he have been likely to have recognised his work as approximating
to any of the varieties of postmodemism. That degree of congruence is not a requirement of this
discussion.
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importance of scepticism to philosophical debate and of pyrrhonism within the
discourse of epistemology."
It is also the case that the particular stance towards aporia of pyrrhonism is different
from dogmatic scepticism and is less likely to fall prey to the problems of performative
contradiction (Williams: 1999: 142/3) - indeed as Robert Fogelin comments 'any sceptic
with his wits about him avoids negative dogmatism' (Fogelin:1999:171).42 It is not
difficult to see the attraction of analytical philosophy as a means of responding to the
historical controversy, for the depth and sophistication of its treatment of these issues
contrasts with the comparatively simplistic comments of both sides in the controversy.
However I do not intend to take the path of philosophy as such. My purpose here is
different. For the philosopher, the nature of possible responses to aporia are important
- paramount even. To consider and discuss competing claims is precisely (in the sense
of arguably) the business of philosophy. Historians generally have different interests.
This is not the place to get into a discussion about the merits of Ranke's famous dictum
about judgements on the past, but changing patterns of responses to aporia are clearly
what the historian of ideas are concerned with, and that is the intended direction here.
Thus ultimately the aim is to enable a broadened debate in historiography to be enriched
by additional responses rather than narrowed by arguments for one response against
another as it so often has been hitherto.
So, stepping back from the detail now, the discussion of this chapter shows that by
taking as a starting point, not arguments for aporia itself, but responses to it - ie.
historical conditions for the possibility of knowledge - it is possible to see how
previously-considered disparate approaches to thought can be brought into broad
41See Michael Williams 1999 and some of the debate consequent on Gettier's famous short
paper' Is justified True belief Knowledge?' 1963 [orig.] here 2000; for example Zagzebski:1994
& Greene & Balmert:1997.
42See also Richard Foley's discussion of this aspect of scepticism, 2000:182/3.
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coherence. In this chapter such a method has enabled platonic forms and two versions
of empiricism to be discussed in terms of their historical commonality - that is in terms
of their epistemological closures rather than in terms of right or wrong. This is not
however to reduce all philosophy to epistemology, nor to conflate or obliviate
differences of political significance (although these have not been explored in this part
of the study). But the method enables a softer, more flexible and a more tentative way
of understanding the sceptical basis of modernity. This may be a fresh approach to
discussions about truth in history within the controversy - indeed even within the
debate - but as it has been shown here, a model of knowledge as 'response to aporia' is
by no means unknown within analytical debate.
It is necessary now, within Chapter Three, to carry this approach to knowledge-making
on into an analysis of several of the more important strands which have been associated
with the development of modern empiricism. The aporetic nature of philosophies can
be seen in historical modernity and as such, continues to provide opportunities and
examples through which aporia might be handled intellectually in the present.
III
Chapter Three: Scepticism and Knowledge in Modernity
This chapter continues into modernity the focus on empirical thinkers, and it argues that the
structural connection between scepticism and empiricism that was discernible in the
ancient world, can be seen too in this period.
However, this is not to say that is Chapter Two with different content. The closer
proximity to the present of the works being examined, has produced several differences.
Specifically it has been necessary to consider whether to include within the scope of this
focus, relevant contributions from the German intellectual tradition.' I have decided
against doing so. This is not because that tradition is unimportant. On the contrary, the
German tradition of thought is central to an historical understanding of continental
philosophy from which much poststructuralism is considered to have originated.
However this is not a general history of western traditions of thought, nor of scepticism,
nor even of the origins of postmodernism. My aim of working towards a discursive bridge
within and between the historical controversy and broader debate is not supported here by
broadening the discussion into those areas so much as by demonstrating the ubiquity of
scepticism within modem accounts of empiricism. That is therefore the primary focus in
this chapter.
Another difference from the last chapter is that, as the analysis shifts closer to the present,
and despite apparent evidence to the contrary, it is possible to detect a greater acceptance of
scepticism in the closures of these strands of thought. Two features of the field of
scholarship appear to be associated with this.
1 Iam referring here to the genre of thought known variously as continental philosophy
(Critchley:2001&West:I996), the Kantian sub-tradition (Cottingham:I984;Dent:1934&
Politis:1993), the western idealist tradition (Brubner:1997& Rosen:1995) and the romantic tradition
(Beck:1996& Berlin:2000).
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First there has been less overt discussion of aporetic issues within empiricism until very
recently, as the influence on empiricism of American Pragmatism has come to be felt. The
subject appears to have been taken somewhat for granted, especially during the nineteenth
century. There can be any number of reasons for this 'forgetfulness' and political
expediency is an obvious possibility that has already been noted. Whatever the reasons,
the existence of an aporetic core within theoretical accounts of modem empiricism can
readily be seen. A re-emphasis on aporia and the responses that can be seen to it, enable
the differences between versions of empiricism to be seen as contingent rather than
fundamental. For example there would appear to be an unbridgeable gulf between logical
positivism and postmodemism, and indeed between the former and empiricism, without the
common ground of aporia, through which their responses can be brought into a
comparative focus as contingent responses. As responses it is clear that there can be no
final once and for all arbitration about their relative merits, for any such attempts are likely
to fail against an aporetic 'centre'. This therefore conditions - ie. softens - the kind of
discourse that it is appropriate to have about their differences from each other.
The second feature is that when some contemporary empirical thought is viewed in this
way - ie. through the model of aporia and response, it does appear that a case can be made
for a structural connection between empiricism and some forms of postmodemism,
stronger than has been argued for in this study so far. To be clear, I am not suggesting that
they are the same. To do so would need - at least - to ignore their very obvious differences
in the degree of optimism or otherwise in which each considered the possibility of
knowledge, in the light of aporia. However, some readings of both empiricism and
postmodemism (not necessarily those of either side in the controversy) do demonstrate
some striking similarities.
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The analysis of this chapter is based upon the work of the increasing number of scholars
who are studying the sceptical themes evident in Europe from the late sixteenth century to
the early eighteenth. In brief their focus has shown how pyrrhonist thought re-emerged in
western Europe at this time.' They have demonstrated how pyrrhonian scepticism - first
re-published in early modernity in 1536 - was used in the struggles of the reformation and
that out of it came a modified, or 'mitigated', sense of scepticism (Popkin: 1999:332).
Popkin for example argues that it was the ideas of Sextus Empiricus that informed the view
of a wide cross-section of early modern thinkers that the kind of thorough but non-
dogmatic scepticism of pyrrhonism was capable of providing sufficient certainty for human
knowledge to take place. For example, he points out that the Jesuit Father Marin
Mersenne, who attended the college at La Fleche where Rene Descartes later studied,
argued as early as 1625 that scepticism could not be refuted but that 'it did not prevent
people from having adequate ways of dealing with problems' (Popkin: 1999:332). Popkin
shows how this mitigated scepticism had developed through the ideas of Montaigne, Bacon
and La Vayer and later through Gassendi, Galileo and the association of the theosophist Jan
Amos Commenious with Descartes, until it became thoroughly suffused within early
modern assumptions about the world (pp329-336) •
It is important to note here that what is implied is that it was not - or at least not wholly -
the Aristotelian model of knowledge (with its underlying metaphysical assumptions) that
structured modern thinking but, also the thoroughly sceptical position of Sextus Empiricus.
Ironically it was the 'extremism' of the pyrrhonist argument which allowed for the
possibility of mitigated scepticism. It is pyrrhonism's thorough-going non-dogmatism
which logically permits knowledge to be held, as long as it is held tentatively, because as
2 See Richard Popkin's study of scepticism from Erasmus to Spinosa (1979) and his Pimlico
History of Western Philosophy (1999) See also Schmitt:1988) which includes work by Beverley
Southgate. It should be said here that despite the criticisms made of Southgate's explorations of
postmodemism, his contribution to the knowledge of scepticism in this period (esp. 1981, 1987,
1989 & 1995) is central to an understandingof the influence ofpyrrhonism in the modem world.
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Sextus Empiricus argued (and as was noted in the last chapter) it can never be known
whether what one thinks is true really is true and therefore it is perfectly feasible to simply
believe it to be so until proven otherwise. That position is not open to those theorists whose
epistemology requires the existence ofa deity, nor of sceptics, or indeed those of the
postmodemists, who argue that aporia implies that knowledge is not possible. It is on this
subtle but crucial distinction that the conditions for the possibility of modem empiricism
has rested.
Beverley Southgate summarises the assimilation of pre-Christian scepticism during the
early modem period by pointing out that:
..by the mid-seventeenth century there is considerable evidence for
such scepticism having profoundly affected the status of natural
philosophy, or science. Instead of providing a revelation of 'truth'
about the essence of the natural world, science is thenceforth seen
rather as offering a hypothetical explanation for observed
phenomena (Southgate: I996a:78).
Southgate goes on to note how this account of science was accepted by practising scientists
such as Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton. It is possible thus to see that, at least for
Southgate as well as for Popkin, the intellectual climate which pre-figured some of the
philosophy of the enlightenment was one in which the recognition of aporetic awareness
was held to a greater or lesser extent consciously, and that early modernity can be
Also important is Christopher Hookway (1992), Brian Copenhaver (1992), Elizabeth de Fontenay
(1982) and Robert Mandrouon the growth of criticism in the renaissance (1978).
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characterised by a growth of new responses to it.3 If this general claim can be seen to be
supported through the work of some of the main architects of modem empiricism (for
example, David Hume, Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill) then it can be argued that, in
its 'mitigated' form scepticism has been essential part of modem empiricism. The ground
is thereby laid to argue further that by adopting conscious awareness of this, present day
empirical historians are able to connect with a long tradition of thought in which the
empirical method itself - of relying on the senses and the sense that can be made of it - can
be seen as a rational response to a perception of aporia.
A caution is necessary here for there is something of a contradiction in Southgate's work.
Although at times he can be shown. as here, providing historical evidence for scepticism to
be thought integral to empiricism, Southgate does not himself go on to see aporia as a
component of ph ilosophies other than postmodernism, and especially not of empiricism. In
fact often his explanation of scepticism in the seventeenth century is that it is not a
constituent of knowledge at all, whether 'mitigated' or not. It is then seen by him as merely
an 'antecedent of our own millennial postmodernism' (200:104). Nevertheless, his
evidence of sceptical thought in early modernity is helpful to the analysis of this chapter.
The enlightenment then is the starting point for this discussion and within it Section I
focuses on the work of David Hume. Hurne's use ofpyrrhonism is the central formative
influence on later versions of empiricism and thus on our present patterns of thinking. The
subsequent sections of the chapter follow up on this influence by looking at the aporetic
3 See Southgate:1981,1987,1988,1989,1995&1996a;Popkin;1963&1992;Laursen& Popkin:1998;
MacDonald:2003&Tonelli:1871.
s The bulk of this account of'Hume's thought rests upon his work An Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding published in 1748after it became clear (in Hume's eyes at least) that his principle
work A Treatise of Human Nature published in 1739-40had been a failure; 'it had' he said fallen
'deadbom from the press' (Hume:1776 via Hendel, C.W. [Ed.] 1955 1977 impr. :p4). I am aware of
course of the competing merits of A Treatise againstAn Inquiry and that an interesting discussion of
this has surfaced from time to time (Huxley:I879:Chl , Mossner: 1969:22,Gaskin:1993:xv,
Flew:1997:Chl). Nevertheless I have been guided here by Hume's own consistently held view that
A Treatise was a work of immaturity in that he had 'gone to the press too early' (1977:5) and that An
Inquiry expressed more adequately his philosophy (Flew:1997:1).
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core of Comtean positivism, together with English (that is Millsian) empiricism, and these
are then contextualised with later empirical philosophy.
Section I
As an influential philosopher of the enlightenment David Hume has few competitors.
Solomon and Higgins's conclusion is typical- that he was 'the clearest example of solid,
self-scrutinising enlightenment thinking .... (his work being) a thoroughgoing skepticism,
the likes of which had not been seen since the ancients' (1996: 196-7). It is perhaps
Hume's atheism which makes his contribution to the enlightenment so central. As Frank
Kermode says, the power of the church remained lethal in the eighteenth century
(Kermode: 2002: 19) and it is sensible to suppose that not all atheists permitted their
position to be known. Indeed Gaskin points out that Hume himself was ambivalent about
being labelled an atheist despite having thoroughly undercut religious belief in his own
work (Gaskin: 1993:xiii). Whatever his real view, it is his public face - his published work
- with which this study is concerned and there is no doubt that Hume's writings were
atheistic. What is important is that as a consequence of such a stance he did not have
available to him the concept of an omnipotent God as an epistemological closure, as had
his predecessors Descartes, Locke and Berkeley. Thus Hume's account of knowledge
required a more explicitly secular closure. In the event it was one that formed the
paradigm model for empirical thought, and which has relevance still in the present.
There is an initial problem in regarding his work as being located within the prevailing
pyrrhonian version of sceptical thought. Despite the tenor of the times and despite also
Hume's widespread reputation as a sceptic, he himself made it clear that far from abjuring
knowledge, as the pyrrhonists are generally thought to have done, he was on the side of
science and in particular in favour of bringing science to the study of societies.' Moreover
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he directly criticised Sextus Empiricus's pyrrhonian thought in favour of the rival- so-
called - academic philosophy associated with Cameades (Hume: 1955:54 & 168-70).
Strangely though, Hume accompanied this criticism of pyrrhonism by using Sextus
Empiricus's insights himself in arguing his case, a case which would not have been open to
him were he really to have been an 'academic' sceptic (Hume: 1955: Section XII Pt. II
pp 164 - 169). The obvious explanation here - that he was simply mistaken about the
nature of ancient scepticism - is barely credible given the extent of scholarship on
pyrrhonism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Neither is it likely of course that
Hume deliberately misused the writings of Sextus Empiricus to enhance his own account,
although it has to be said that as long ago as 1879 Thomas Huxley noticed that in
developing his own version of mitigated scepticism ( ie. his own response to aporia). Hume
deployed 'a caricature of Cartesian doubt' (Huxley: 1879:Part II Ch I).
Whatever the answer to this puzzle - and to a degree Hume's motives are unimportant to
the purpose of this chapter - what needs to be seen is that his empiricism, which will be
shown to be the basis of our modem empirical outlook, had incorporated within it a
workable version of the scepticism of antiquity. Ifwe look beyond the surface ofHume's
distortion of pyrrhonism we can see that his account of knowledge works in almost exactly
the same way as that of Sextus's. It is in Section N of An Inquiry (Parts [& II) that Hume
lays out his awareness of aporia. At first he expresses himself in language reminiscent of
the sophists and the academic sceptics. Thus he speaks with some certitude about a human
inability to discover ultimate cause(s): 'these ultimate springs and principles are totally shut
up from human curiosity and inquiry' (1955:45). Here Hume appears to differ from
Sextus's ubiquitous doubting, But such difference is more apparent than real, for in the
detail ofHume's account can be seen another view of knowledge, and it is one which is
distinctly pyrrhonian.
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For example they both deploy infinite regressions to argue that certainty in knowledge
appears not to be possible. Sextus uses it in relation to his core observation - his 'chief
constitutive principle' - that 'to every account an equal account is opposed' (Outlines of
Scepticism BK.I, Section xi, para. 12 via Annas & Barnes: 1994:6). To choose between
these statements a further claim needs to be made which in turn can be countered by
another account equal etc and so on. Thus in Sextus's view any definitive statement about
the world can be made only because the claimant has stopped reasoning too soon. What is
so important about this approach is that it is not only an argument for scepticism but is, at
the very same time, a theory of how knowledge can be thought to take place. That is, that
in our everyday life we do stop the reasoning before infinity; we do it every minute of the
day - indeed we have no real choice in the matter - and the realisation that we could if we
wished press the questioning for ever, does not stop us from making interim, ie. tentative,
empirical, statements (ie, knowledge) all the time.
Hume argues in a remarkably similar manner. Like Sextus he is concerned only with broad
claims about the nature of the world, especially the notion of foundations or ultimate
causes. In Part I of Chapter IV of An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (Hume
via Hendel [Ed.]: 1955:pp 40 - 53) Hume shows through a discussion of moving billiard
balls that effects of causes seem not to be discoverable from the causes. Moreover a
multitude of causes can give rise to anyone effect and therefore it makes no sense to
isolate one cause above others, for if asked to justify this isolation, the question would
simply start off another isolation of a further cause, and so on. Hume concludes that it is
the circumstances ie. experience, rather than any real knowledge of causes, which gives
rise to the isolation of particular causes. What he means here is that what counts as a cause
ie. the particular factors that the 'knower' isolates, or selects from the total available
factors, is dependant on circumstances.' He explores this further in Part II of the chapter,
5 A well known example of this in relation to history might be that a historian will necessarily focus
(consciously or otherwise) on certain of the multitude of facts that are available in any view of the
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posing the question of what might be the foundation for experience. Hume concludes,
Sextan fashion, that each solution to this question gives rise to a further question as equally
difficult to answer as the first such that ultimate causes or foundations just seem
unknowable.
In their response to this aporetic awareness, both philosophers again offer the same form of
closure. Sextus's approach is to accept that believing one has certainty in knowledge
results from the establishment ofa 'too early' settlement of the regression question and that
this becomes embedded into what he calls 'everyday observances'. He identifies four of
these, viz:
... guidance by nature, necessitation of feelings, handing
down of laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of
expertise. By nature's guidance we are naturally capable of
perceiving and thinking. By the necessitation of feelings,
hunger forces us to food and thirst to drink. By handing
down of customs and laws, we accept, from an everyday
point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By
teaching of kinds of expertise we are not inactive in those we
accept (via Annas & Barnes:p9).
Clearly Sextus could live his life alongside dogmatists without too much interference from
his sceptical theories. For Hume it is exactly the same. In Chapter V of An Enquiry,
'Skeptical Solution of these doubts,' Hume makes the same point as Sextus.
past to construct his or her explanation. This selective process may take the form of the choice of
words (and therefore concepts) used It is not difficult to see that different historians, at different
times and places, and for different purposes, or indeed in different disciplinary or academic settings,
may weII focus on different of the available factors and thus produce different 'causes'. Since it not
possible to see a cause in the past, historians have no ultimate means of knowing whether their
particular reading of the past is the 'real' one, history is, as almost all historians agree - with Hume
_ that history is a discursive practice. Indeed it is this sceptical core that permits the possibility of
human knowledge, of the past or the present.
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Nor need we fear that this philosophy, while it endeavours to
limit our inquiries to common life6, should ever undermine the
reasonings of common life and carry its doubts so far as to
destroy all action as well as speculation. Nature will always
maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract
reasoning whatsoever (1955: 55).7
By whatever terms Hume's position is understood, whether as scientific naturalism
(Flew: 1997:205) or as mitigated scepticism (Popkin: 1999:332) its awareness of aporia is,
like Sextus's, an understanding of how knowledge might be thought to be obtained. Hume
then goes on in Chapter V of An Enquiry to offer his famous argument - his response to
this aporia - that experience is known through the observance of custom and constant
conjunctions. Thus for him we intuit a cause by observing the same constant, ie.
consistent, effects flowing from it. In other words the whole of our world - that is both
natural and human society - is known in the same way, through empirical experience
moderated by human intellectual speculation. 'Knowing' here means, as in pyrrhonism,
holding tentatively to particular understandings of experience until, or in case, something
better (more suitable) becomes apparent.
6 As distinct from metaphysics.
7 John Wright has made much of Hume's reference to nature, arguing for example that it betrays
realist assumptions (Wright: 1983). I see no advantage in becoming embroiled in this
projectionism/realism controversy. This is because it seems to me that Hume's use of 'nature' refers
to knowledge found empirically and that it is similar to the sense of 'natural law' that Sara
MacDonald argues originated with the sophists (MacDonald:2003). Also, I accept Daniel
Robinson's view that Hume's scepticism thoroughly swamps any realist assumptions he may have
had (ie. there might be a real world but we appear not to be sure etc.) (Robinson: 1998:67). For a
comprehensive discussion of this issue, see Kai1:2001. The term 'projection ism' is being taken here
to be much the same as 'constructivism' in the sense that a theorist's beliefs, position etc is
'projected' on to the raw data, to produce knowldege.
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A measure can now be taken of the intellectual distance between Sextus Empiricus and
Hume on the one hand and our present day overt emphasis on interpretation (or
perspectivism or epistemological pluralism, however we conceive it), on the other. Neither
pyrrhonism nor Humean empiricism appears to have travelled what now seems to us to be
an obvious 'extra mile' to take account of how the idea of 'the appearances of things', on
which they both so strongly rely, might strike different people differently in different
circumstances. A theoretical provision for it certainly exists in their responses to aporia but
it remains in outline only! It is not difficult with hindsight to critique Hume. He was of
course a theorist of his time and class," The point for this study is not to judge the
appropriateness ofHume's response to aporia but to register the fact, that like the major
philosophers of the ancient world, his work was aporetically aware.
Section II
It is known from Hume's autobiographical essay My own life (1776) that he suffered from
a recurring concern with what he feared was a lack of public interest in his work (1955:pp3
- 11). Both Gaskin and Rude agree that his influence on religious thought or on
philosophy in those early years was not great (Gaskin:1993:ix, Rude:1972:216) and
Popkin has noted that it was only after he had been attacked by Reid and Kant that this
began to change (Popkin: 1999:461). Although his influence might have been slow to start,
there is ample evidence that once it took effect it was extensive. to These next two sections
look at scepticism after Hume by focusing on two of the more important strands of
empirical thought in the western tradition: Comtean positivism and English (Millsian)
• This of course was Kant's point of departure with Hume.
9 For example see Jeffrey McDonough's discussion of Hume's account of memory
(McDonough:2002).
IOHume was famous for not responding to critics as James Somerville has pointed out
(SomervilIe:1998). It would be useful, although beyond the scope of this study, to speculate about
the significance of this in assessing the early influence of Hume's position.
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empiricism. These have structured - and indeed they still structure - our broadly empirical
western notions of how knowledge is gained. In each case it can be seen that at the heart of
these varieties of empiricism lies the same awareness of aporia which we have seen earlier
in the western tradition. It can also be seen that the practical response to aporia which
these approaches deploy - their closures - mirror closely the pyrrhonianlHumean position.
Their responses rely on non-foundational human experience as a means of controlling the
logically endless potential for interpretation which is implied in an awareness of aporia.
Comte's thought seems to be out of favour with historians at present. This is unfortunate
because although his account of knowledge may not be as persuasive as it once was,
Comtean positivism remains relevant for an understanding of the twentieth century and the
present. This is partly because of its structural connection with mainstream empiricism and
pragmatism but also because of the common ground Comtean positivism has shared with
Marxism (Fletcher: I974:246-249). Certainly an engagement with sceptical issues in
Comte's work is central to the needs of this study and it will be argued here that he can be
seen to have held an essentially Humean approach to knowledge. It is true that he spent
little time discussing the epistemological doubts with which Hume and Sextus Empiricus
were concerned. This may be one of the reasons why so many historians of this period
have apparently misread his position, but whatever Comte's apparent lack of interest in
epistemology, he has thoroughly accepted the philosophical stance of empiricism. It is as
though for Comte the issues of the enlightenment no longer needed to be discussed simply
because he, along with Mill (and also subsequently most western empiricists), was working
. hi f h 11WIt ID an acceptance 0 t em.
IIThis is a well established position (eg. Andreski:1974:IO,Fletcher:I974:7& Ferre':1988:viii).
Comte may have denied his intellectual debt to Saint Simon (Andreski:7) but as he himself made
clear, his work was substantially rooted in the enlightenment project (Comte via Fletcher:1974:99,
183 &198).
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There has been a considerable degree of contention - potential and actual - arising from
Comte's work. From within the controversy, Munslow thinks that Comte believed
knowledge to have been formed entirely from observation without the mediation of
selecting, cohering or organising thought on the part of the knower (what Munslow calls
'impositionalism') (Munslow:2000:54 & 187). Similarly Beverley Southgate, in company
with Richard Rorty, makes Comte believe that 'objective truth' was wholly possible
(Southgate:1996b:23 & Rorty:1999:30-31).12 More broadly, the view of him as a
correspondence theory realist is depressingly widespread (eg. Bhaskar: 1979: 167 & 204,
Cahoone: 1996:7 & Oakeshott via Grant: 1990: 113). This is particularly to be regretted
because the evidence against such a view of Comte is substantial and readily available.
Even in historians from widely differing perspectives (such as Collingwood: 1961:126-7 &
222-3 and Crowell: 1999:668-9) similar generalisations can be found. The more
mendacious of these have tended to exaggerate the shortcomings in some areas ofComte's
work making the whole of his contribution seem worthless (Berlin: 1974:168) or even
vaguely sinister (Sartre: 1985:265 in Cahoone: 1996). More thorough, primary, scholarship
however offers a different, more convincing perspective.
Even without Comte's own acknowledgement of the importance of Hume's work, (in
'Philosophical considerations on the sciences and savants' via Fletcher: 1974: 183) his
position was self evidently Humean. Like Hume he abjured all metaphysical abstractions.
He was an atheist and fiercely empirical. He went beyond Hume in justifying his position,
not by reference directly to traditional sceptical argument as Hume had done, but by a
historical account of knowledge (Comte's famous stages) which sought to valorise
empirically the enlightenment period, of which he saw himself still a part (in 'A brief
appraisal of modem history' via Fletcher: 1974:99). Where Hume had called for a science
of human society, to account for the multifaceted appearances that is reality, Comte can be
12 Several further examples can be added here. (Appleby et.al. 1994:67, Murphy:1997:190 &
Gray: 1995 :65)
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regarded as having answered that call and to have provided some of the detail about how it
might actually work. In so doing he is widely regarded as having begun the modem
discipline of sociology. Thus, were there to be no further evidence brought forward, it
would still be possible to suggest that intellectual institutions of modernity have imbibed
the scepticism of antiquity through Comte and Hume.
Comtean scholars generally accept that it is necessary to be selective in judging which parts
of his writings have value, for as Andreski acknowledges, Comte was inclined to
'pontificate on all kinds of specific issues on which he was hopelessly wrong'
(Andreski: 1974: 10). Nevertheless, Comte's aporetic credentials are widely recognised.
Fletcher is typical when he argues that in no sense can Comte be regarded as a determinist,
or that he promulgated a reductive account of science (Fletcher:1974:21). He was first and
foremost an empiricist, a relativist and speaker for his own, rather than for all, time
(Fletcher: 1974: 20 & 24). Early in his philosophical career Comte made it plain that his
writing should be understood to be rhetorical; that his use for example of terms such as
'perfection' did not imply that he thought that 'absolute excellence' was possible (in
'Considerations of the spiritual power' via Fletcher: 1974:232).
In his major work Cours de philosophie positive 1830 -1842 (drawn on here in
Ferre: 1988, henceforth 'Cours') Comte is unmistakable in showing his awareness of
aporia. From the outset, the importance he attached to history ie. 'no idea can be properly
understood apart from its history' is suggestive of a relativistic approach to knowledge
(Cours:1). More particularly, and again at the outset of his argument, he explains that in
what he calls 'the positive state' (the historical period he calls positivism ie. his present)
there is no longer a search for complete truth:
recognising the impossibility of obtaining absolute truth, [it]
gives up the search after the origin and hidden causes of the
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universe and a knowledge of the final causes of phenomena. It
[the search] endeavours now only to discover, by a well-
combined use of reasoning and observation, the actual laws of
phenomena - that is to say, their invariable relations of
succession and likeness (Cours 2).
A similarity here with postmodern statements is discernible, but so too is the reference to
'relations of .. .Iikeness' clearly an antecedent of Ferdinand de Saussure's relational
linguistics of the tum of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Comte wanted there to be
no misunderstanding about his account of knowledge and he repeated his statement of
aporia immediately after the above passage. 'The explanation of facts, thus reduced to its
real terms, consists henceforth only in the connection established between different
particular phenomena and some general facts' (Cours 2).
Thus he shows that human knowledge can never simply correspond with notions of an
extra-human objective 'reality'. Knowledge of scientific laws is for Comte, as it was for
Hume before him and for empiricists after him, the result of empirically-known regularities
upon which some reliance might be thought to be had. On the question of the objectivity of
science Comte was equally clear.
Everybody, indeed, knows that in our positive explanations, even
when they are most complete, we do not pretend to explain the real
causes of phenomena, as this would merely throw the problem further
back; we try only to analyse correctly the circumstances of their
production, and to connect them by normal relations of succession and
similarity (Cours:8).
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The similarity between Hume's criterion of closure of 'constant conjunction' and Comte's
'normal relations of succession and similarity' is clear. In the example he used to illustrate
this point - the Newtonian law of gravitation - he shows that for him scientific laws
explain the phenomena of the world only 'as far as they can' (Cours:8). Questions about
the nature of causes should, he said, be rightly abandoned 'to the imagination of the
theologians or the subtleties of the metaphysicians' (Cours:9).13 Ifwe should be in any
doubt that Comte was a sceptical empiricist of the Humean kind, this must be dispelled by
his naturalistic account of human (social) science, which regarded as an illusion the idea
that the human mind could ever achieve 'direct contemplation of itself (Cours:20).
Ironically he sounds remarkably like a present day postmodemist when he argued that:
the thinking individual cannot cut himself in two - one of the parts
reasoning, while the other is looking on. Since in this case the organ
observed and the observing organ are identical, how could any
observation be made? (Cours:21).
Comte's methodology follows from this sceptical view. Although it is clear from the
quotations used here already that his was an empirical stance; it was not a naive realist one.
As Fletcher says, 'Comte thought of positive science as a questing, imaginative,
hypothetical study exactly as modem philosophers of science do. Indeed, they say little - if
anything - more than he' (Fletcher: 1974:25).
13 There is a good deal more to this issue than this discussion has space or direct need for. Chris
McClellan offers a useful treatment of the subject, showing the similarities between Comte's
empiricism and that of the early 19th century French scientist Georges Cuvier (2001: 1-29). It would
be an interesting line to follow since it illustrates one of the precise points at which Aristotelian
notions of final causes were purged fromWestern European empirical science, and it goes someway
to explaining too, Comte's abiding interest in connections between sceptical empirical epistemology
and its application by practising scientists.
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On the crucial question (certainly for historians) of whether facts speak for themselves
Comte is clear that his empiricism is one in which there is an interconnection between facts
and the perspective which gives rise to their selection. He says:
If it is true that every theory must be based upon observed facts,
it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the
guidance of some theory. Without such guidance, our facts
would be desultory and fruitless; we could not retain them; for
the most part we could not even perceive them
(Fletcher: 1974:25).
In practice this means, for Comte, having an awareness of one's starting point. Without this
'neither inductive nor deductive procedures would help us ... even in regard to the simplest
phenomena, if we did not begin by anticipating the results, by making a provisional
supposition' (Fletcher: 1974:25). So far it is hard to see how Comte could be criticised as a
theorist of the enlightenment. His response to aporia is the epitome of a modem critically
aware empiricist. But of course there is more to Comte than this and some of it is indeed,
at least superficially, hard to reconcile with the idea ofComte as a sceptical empiricist.
One of these areas of difficulty is his use of history. The point has already been made that
it is indicative of a relativistic frame of mind, since in a historicist account of knowledge
(ie. one which sees historical time as moving through stages) truth or certainty tends to be
judged relative to the age in which it occurs. However a corollary of this might be that in
holding a firm position about the nature of reality, Comte could have laid himself open to a
charge that he was demonstrating doctrinaire or metaphysical assumptions. But such a
response would have to contend with several counterpoints.
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First, the exact same charge could be levelled at any theorist, since no starting positions can
be proven, and if it could it would still be necessary to justify that choice of proof and so
on. Second, as Andreski points out there is nothing very special or very radically new
about Comte's sense of history. 'The law of three stages boils down to the idea of progress
from superstition to science, upheld by all enlightenment writers of the eighteenth century'
(Andreski: 1974: 12). Third, Fletcher takes the view that Comte never believed in 'clear-
cut,' distinct, historical stages for he saw each of his historical systems co-exist 'in the
heart of society'(Fletcher: 1974:29). And, fourth, these stages can also be thought to be
simply the starting hypotheses which we have already seen that Comte (along with non-
foundationalists in general) believes to be necessary for the production of knowledge.
Another possible problem with Comte's sceptical credentials was his repeated use of terms
such as 'necessary' and 'laws' which could give rise to charges that he had metaphysical
assumptions. It is clear however from his explanations of how he saw knowledge work, ie.
from the extracts quoted above, that the closures to which he was referring were simply
empirical regularities.
Probably the most difficult of his closures for historians to come to terms with is his
recommendation that the control of knowledge should be lodged in the hands of a body of
secular priests managing a system of 'spiritual humanity' (in 'Considerations on the
spiritual powers' via Fletcher: 1974:220). It is easy to dismiss this part of his philosophy
as being a decline into incoherence as a result of ill health, late in life. By re-editing
Comte's early essays Fletcher has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that the positivist
use of religion was conceived and justified early in Comte's writing career and it must
therefore be engaged with, in any effective understanding of his work."
14And not least because there is some evidence that Mill supported Comte's ideas here, at least in
principle. (Hamburger:1998:73).
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In fact there is little substance to this problem once the importance of intellectual control is
addressed. It will be recalled that an almost a defining feature of ideas in England and
France during the early years of the nineteenth century was a fear (at least by the
bourgeoisie and monied classes) of a repetition or spread of revolution. It was a fear that
regarded the relative, if limited, freedoms of enlightenment thought as having contributed
to what was seen as the tragedy of the French Revolution and that unrest was brought on by
'negative and critical principles' causing 'the collapse of traditional modes of authority and
the organic nature of the social bonds' (Swingewood: 1984:33). Here Comte was very
much a man of his time and although his constructivism was never in any doubt, Comte
was by no means sanguine about who should do the constructing. He was clear that it
should be those with education and experience of the world. As he said himself, spiritual
humanity was urgently needed to avoid intellectual anarchy and to promote public morality
(Fletcher: 1974: 220-221 ).15
From Comte's position of atheistic empiricism, it was not open to him to support the
communitarian processes of social bonding or control offered by Christianity, but it was
not entirely without sense to attempt to achieve comparable ends by borrowing its organs
and bending them to a secularised version of religion. There is considerable support in the
secondary literature for such an account ofComte's use of religion. Niall Ferguson has
noted how Ilerbert Butterfield had argued - albeit somewhat disapprovingly since he was
himself fiercely Christian - that:
much enlightenment thought was merely "lapsed Christianity"
with "nature" "reason" and other nebulous entities simply
taking the place of God. Doctrines of progress were clearly
U Similarly Hamburger quotes him as arguing that 'philosophical action must prevail today over
political action,' that those with 'superior minds must. ..reserve themselves for philosophic analysis
•..on which the forward march of the ultimate regeneration of the human elite depends' (1998:73).
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secularised adaptations of Christian doctrines though
supposedly based on empirical foundation (Ferguson: 1998:26).
Similarly, Francois Asouvi uses Destutt de Tracy's work of 179616 to point to the changes
which had occurred in philosophising in the post-enlightenment period. Whereas
previously debate had taken the form of speculation about causes and origins - that is,
concepts of Aristotelian and Christian thinking - it now began to give way to a new type of
philosophy, which Destutt de Tracy had called ideologie. By this term, Azouvi tells us,
Destutt de Tracy meant that it replaced old religious metaphysics:
Ideology is the discipline concerned with the formation of our
ideas on the basis of sensations, their formation,
transformations, and application to the moral, political, legal
spheres. . ... the new philosophy examines phenomena with the
aim of demonstrating how they generate each other
(Azouvi: 1999:568).
Destutt de Tracy was able to see this happening as early as the end of the eighteenth
century and in this kind of context it is hardly to be wondered at that Comte and others in
his circle of Saint-Simonian politics thought that there was a role for a thoroughly
transformed, secularised, Christianity which might function as a form of epistemological
social and political closure.
16 This is Destutt de Tracy's Memoire sur lafaculte depenser (Notes on the faculty of thinking).
Azouvi goes on to say that it is mainly because of Destutt de Tracy that ideology came to be known
in the United States. He maintained a steady correspondence with Thomas Jefferson beginning in
1806, noting that Jefferson translated one of Destutt de Tracy's works.
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It is difficult to leave Comte's role in the development of modem empiricism at just these
brief comments for there is no doubt that present day historiography has barely done justice
to his contribution. Fletcher puts it more firmly when he points out that many critics are
'deriding that of which they have read only a caricature' and that despite Comte's
'idiosyncrasies' and 'extremes' 'No one has more succinctly laid bare the many-sided
nature of the dilemmas that are still alive in our experience, and still form the substance of
our problems' (Fletcher: 1974:4).
More particularly for the purposes of this study it is necessary to note that Comte's
awareness of aporia, his empirical response to it and, as John Skorupski argues the essence
(rather than the actuality) of his spiritual humanity, can be found in the writings of J.S.MiII.
Skorupski opens his study of Mill by recognising that for all his problems Comte: 'did
convince him [Mill] that the leading role in social science would be played by a historical
sociology which pictured society as a functional organic 'consensus' of all its aspects
cautiously evolving through time' (Skorupski: 1998:18). It is therefore to Mill's social or as
Skorupski sees it, organic, closure and through this towards a very present day view of
empiricism, which the discussion of this chapter must now turn.
S«tiOD IV
John Skorupski acknowledges at the outset of his study of J.S. Mill, that although Mill took
a rather hostile attitude to Hume, whom he saw as pretentious:
the philosophy and politics associated with Bentham from
which Mill sprang, shares important doctrines with Hume.
Bentham generously acknowledged Hume's influence in
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leading him to a clear distinction between the normative
and the factual (Skorupski: 1998:7).
Bentham, James Mill and John Stuart Mill all share with Hume an adherence to
associationism. I? Moreover, Mill placed followers of Reid, together with Kantians, in what
he variously called the 'intuitional'. 'transcendental', and 'a priori school' - to which he
opposed his own school of 'experience and association'. (Skorupski: 1998:7).
The connection between Millis and Hume goes deeper than mere influence. Structural
similarities can be detected. For example Mary Warnock has pointed out how a broadly
utilitarian position was first articulated by Hume,19 and that Bentham readily admitted that
he (and by implication the Mills too) had followed in Hume's footsteps
(Warnock: 1962: 14,16, 23). The same can be said for Mill's relationship with Comte. In his
main work on Comte's thought Mill shows just how close they were. He did not rest with
describing Comte' s arguments but added examples to support them, just as though they
were collaborators (Mill: 1866: 16-17). Indeed there is some evidence to suggest that they
actually were collaborators. The friend and intellectual associate of Mill, Alexander Bain,
has recorded how, not only did Mill organise financial assistance for Comte but Comte
assisted Mill with the formulation of Mill's logic and helped him shape his political
philosophy (Bain: 1882:72). Moreover later, when their friendship had cooled and Mill
became critical ofComte, Mill did not change those ideas which he had shared with Comte
(Bain: 1882:72). Indeed Mill was careful to make it clear that his differences with Comte
were about style rather than about substantive epistemology; about traits of personality
17 'Associationism' refers here to Hume's closure of constant conjunctions - his theory that causes
are known through the empirical observation of consistent associations of effects
(Hume:1955:Ch5).
18 unless otherwise specified 'Mill' refers to John StewartMill.
19 This is hardly to wondered at for in the absence of absolute moral certainty what could bemore
sensible than to follow broadly one's own, or one's own community's, interests.
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(Mill: 1866:15,27,31,131,137-9), rather than a conflict between for example individualism
and collectivism, such as existed between Comte and John Grote (Bain: 1882:75).20
It perhaps hardly needs saying that like Hume and Comte, Mill's influence on mainstream
western empirical thought has been profound. Less well known has been his influence via
pragmatism on American (Quinian) postmodernism. This has been acknowledged by no
less significant a figure in that genre than Richard Rorty (Rorty: 1989: xiv, 45; 1980: 119,
148-9,160,235,270,308; via Cahoone:1996:585).21 Certainly Mill's pre-eminence is widely
accepted, whether at the popular level, where his simple method of difference and
similarity lies at the heart of his logic, or in his more naturalistic writing where his social
and political thought has been so enormously important (Kitcher: 1998:58 and
Mcloskey: 1971 :7).
Mill's aporetic awareness is unmistakable. He argued for example that 'the good' could
never be proved and that we must rest content with 'acceptance' (Mill: Utilitarianism via
Warnock: I962:255). Mill's account of logic was one in which logic did not attemptto
reach certainty or absolute truth; it was really no more than a guide to our thinking
(Mill: 1930:3&5). Similarly, science for Mill was thoroughly sceptical and he believed that
to look for any kind of original certainty was to seek for metaphysical explanations
(1930:4). Like Comte he emphasised that he was speaking only for his own time and
circumstances - not laying down truths for all time (p4-5) - and that the criteria for the
rules of logic which he was proposing came from empirical experience (p6). In fact Mill
20 Joseph Hamburger has drawn on Oscar Haac's translation ofComte's correspondence with Mill
(1995) to argue that their relationship was a particularly tight one. Hamburger notes that what began
to separate them was their differences over whether their atheism should be publicly acknowledged
(Mill refused to do this) and differing views about the role of women in society (Mill argued
strongly in support of gender equality). Gradually however, after the initial loosening of their
collaboration other differences - eg on financial matters - began to grow in importance. The point
is that these factors do not relate to their shared epistemology.
21 Rorty is supported here by Haber: 1994: 83 and Skorupski: 1998: 4.
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argued for a form of nominalism (almost a 'linguistic tum') long before it became
fashionable after Saussure's work at the tum of the centwy.22
Mill's closure - his response to aporia - takes the by-now normal empirical criterion of
experience based upon perceived regularity. This was no simple gesture, for Mill regarded
not only the canons of logic and the truths of science but also those of mathematics to be
based on human experience (MilI:1930:147, 214). But his contribution to empiricism went
even deeper than simply this recognition of experience as being the central basis for
knowledge. Mill extended his work into explaining how experience might work at the
everyday level of social policy and morality. This refers of course to his famous
intervention into Humean and Benthamite utilitarianism. His contribution to utilitarianism
is said to have combined romanticism with the enlightenment project
(Critchley:200 I :42,45). Whether or not this was the case - and there has been some
suggestion that he was merely distancing himself from his father's influence
(Sabine: 1963:706) - the distinction he made between higher and lower pleasures
transformed utilitarianism. This is so because it released the theory from the limitations of
the much criticised Benthamite 'pleasure calculus'. At a risk of making utilitarianism all
things to all people (McClosky: 1971 :70-71), Mill's redefinition of pleasure enabled it to
function as a modem mass epistemological closure. Since Mill's contribution made
pleasure within utilitarianism something akin to 'interests' or 'motivations' rather than
'hedonism' 'the greatest good for the greatest number' became a support for a humanistic
approach to life. Thus instead of believing that humankind's purpose on earth was to
further God's will, the point of human existence - in the absence of a point - became one
in which humans sought their own, or their society's own, perceived best interests. In this
sense we are all utilitarians now. Mill himself expressed the democratic implications of
utilitarianism in an individualistic manner. For example his concept of the 'tyranny of the
majority' (Mill: 1962: 126-140) limited democracy to a position that could be thought
22 See also Richard White (2003:213) for further evidence of this.
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subservient to the maintenance of private property rights and thus to existent power
structures. But of course utilitarianism could equally well support a communal ethic and in
twentieth century socialism there has been a demonstrable attempt to do so.
The distinction Mill made between higher and lower pleasures might be thought to have
brought his criterion of experience to a resounding halt, as the notion of being able to tell
the difference between higher and lower anything, let alone something as nebulous as
pleasure, presupposes some objective means of measurement. Mill's own explanation has
emphasised that danger since he stressed that 'higher' pleasures would be chosen by those
who had experienced both levels. In fact a close reading of Mill's actual point in
Utilitarianism (via Warnock: 1962:259) shows that it is not so much the case that people
who have experienced both forms of pleasure will automatically value one over the other,
although given Mill's narrow social circle we could easily understand why he might have
thought so. Rather the more general criterion which Mill was recommending was that
assent to standards should be sought from those people who have experienced both higher
and lower pleasures, rather than from those (from the majority, in Mill's own society, it has
to be said) who might have experienced only the lower ones. Thus in seeking to maximise
experience as a means of assessing the competing claims of needs and pleasures, Mills
keeps utilitarianism well within his overall closure of experience and indeed in the process
shows that he sees it as having a social/cultural base. This is a refmement of experience
which begins to be really quite recognisable as a criteria for knowledge in the
twentieth/twenty-first centuries.23
23 Iona and James Tarrant (2004) offer an insightfuJreading ofMiIJ's utilitarianism in which the
essentialist 'pleasure' principle of Bentham's utilitarianism is contrasted with the more genuinely
'utilitarian' (as they term it) 'preferences' criterion of MiII's version. They argue, convincingly, that
Mill's utilitarianism provides an argument for the value of broad liberal, over narrow vocational,
educational objectives since the former enables students to develop their existing preferences as
against merely developing skills. The point for this study is that the notion ofa hierarchy of
preferences is compatible with aporetic awareness whereas that of pleasures, with its more
objectivist connotations, is not.
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Although both Mill and Comte applied the insights of modem empiricism to the needs of
nineteenth century society, Mill showed himself to be rather more successful than Comte at
this. While Comte's thought remains controversial Mill's approach to knowledge has
become so accepted that, one hundred and fifty years on, it has become almost common
sense. This is not to say of course that Mill's work escaped controversy entirely.24
Utilitarianism in particular has attracted a massive literature. His empirical scepticism too
has been criticised. Typical of this was that ofW.L. Courtney, one of Mill's contemporaries
and a self avowed metaphysician. His criticism was that since Mill's epistemology was
essentially sceptical it could not, by definition, achieve knowledge (Courtney: 1879: I,
24,45).25 Whatever the merits of this charge - and of course from a sceptical position, this
was not a telling criticism - there is no doubt that Mills's outlook was empirical.
Throughout his whole programme, whether in relation to science, mathematics, logic, the
nature of philosophy, causation, his concept of philosophical necessity." utilitarianism, the
role of women in society or even how to determine what it is that is to count as pleasure,
Mill's criterion for knowledge was human experience. Utilitarianism was reason (De leuze
via Pearson:1997:54) and connotation everywhere determined denotation
(McClosky: 1971: 17). It appeared to Mill there was nothing to be known beyond this and
therefore nothing could ever be certain in human affairs. As William James pointed out,
even after the insights of utilitarianism had been applied to a problem, it might still be
necessary to agonise over a decision (James via Putnam: 1997: 100). To seek to go beyond
such a sceptical base was for Mill, as it had been for empiricists back to Sextus Empiricus,
indicative of an involvement with mystifying metaphysical ruminations. As Mills said
24 For example the apparent contradiction inMill's account of liberalism, between his emphasis on
freedom of the individual in the West compared with his very different attitude towards people in
the Third world has been critically examined by Richard White, who concludes that it is necessary
to differentiate between lapses by the individual theorist and the broader coherence of their writing.
Thus here Mill is seen as simply erring in terms of his own work, which in fact supports
multiculturalism despite the individual views of its creator.
2S Resonance between such a critique and that of the postmodem historians is all too clear.
26 This is his argument that if we have all of the circumstances relating to a human problem then we
can work out what a person's response to it will be. The objectivist associations here are dispelled
by Mill's clarification that this 'necessity' has no more strength than that which experience provides
(Mill: 1930:547-8), that empirical laws in social science are only generalisations (p.S92).
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himself, 'It appears then that we need experience to inform us in what degree and in what
cases, or sorts of cases, experience is to be relied on' (A System of Logic: 1930:209). It is
hard to imagine a more experiential position than this.
Section V
Important though Mill's thought still is,27the aims of these two chapters on empiricism will
not have been achieved unless it can be shown that empiricism remains aporetic in the
present day. In one sense this is not difficult; examples abound, and indeed some have
already been given in these chapters to show that a significant number of present day
historians of philosophy are aware of the sceptical core that exists in empiricism. But in
another sense the sheer ubiquity of aporetic awareness now, makes it difficult to do justice
to the task. My intention therefore is to confine this discussion to two areas. First I want
to trace the evolution of an illustrative strand of empiricism from Mill to a point where it
can be directly compared with one version of postmodernism and second, in order to
broaden this illustration, I shall sketch briefly some of the more prominent examples of
how empiricists appear to be successfully handling aporia."
The connection between Millsian empiricism and American Pragmatism - between
especially the 'classical' pragmatism of William James and John Dewey - has already been
noted. Richard Rorty points out that 'James not only dedicated Pragmatism to John Stuart
Mill, but reiterated some of Mill's most controversial claims' (Rorty: 1997:84). James
himself con finned this when, he explained the title of his text Essays in Radical
Empiricism (1996:ChII, pp.39-91). His pragmatism (and that of Peirce with whom he
collaborated) was first and foremost empirical in that 'it is a philosophy of plural facts like
27 See Glover: 1990 for an example of how utilitarianism remains a live - and lively - philosophical
topic.
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that of Hume and his descendants' (pA2). It differed from Humean empiricism he argued,
in that it was 'radical'. What he meant by this was that empiricism's closure - that which
prevents interpretation from continuing into infinity, and therefore what constitutes what
we call knowledge - has to be overtly acknowledged rather than implicitly so, as in the
European empiricism ofHume, Comte and Mill. James himself expresses it thus:
To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit to its
construction any element that is not directly experienced, nor
exclude from them any element that is directly experienced.
For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences
must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of
relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything
else in the system (pA2).
In other words the experiences that give rise to the perspective - ie. the overall point of the
exercise - is as important as the resultant knowledge itself.
For James, two things followed from this principle. First was the view that it was this
tendency of empiricism hitherto to ignore its criteria for closure, that has allowed
rationalism the opportunity 'to correct its incoherences by the addition of trans-experiential
agents of unification ... '(p.43).29 Pragmatism was an improvement in that the experiences
that gave rise to a particular closure needed to be acknowledged. Second was the belief
that 'truth' was a function of those experiences. This is the basis for the so-called cash
value of pragmatic truth. As James explained;
21 For clarity, 'Trace' and 'evolution' here are used conventionally to refer to the tracking of
accounts within the historical record, rather than to any kind of notion of a posited essence of
empiricism existing outside of discourse within a supposed objectively existing past.
29 In fact exactly the same could be said of the relationship between empiricism and postmodemism
today. It is this weakness of empiricism, in relation to closure, that has allowed it to be regarded by
postmodems as a correspondence theory.
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I am well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me
say that an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our
lives (James inGoodman:1995:63).
It is not difficult to see how this insight could appeal not only to more empirical historians
but also to Marxists and to certain types of postmodemists.
In John Dewey's work Peirce and James's case for a critically self-aware approach to
knowledge is given a content that, in light of the value placed on pedagogic practices of
student centred active learning, may seem quite familiar in the present day. Dewey shared
the aporetic awareness of Peirce and James, holding that 'meaning ... is more precious than
is truth' (Kestenbaum: 1977:2) but for him closure implied not just theoretical notions of
self-awareness but the lived experience of it. It is 'immediately lived meanings [that]
disclose the world and order reality' he argued (1977:3). For this to take place the total
organism must be 'implicated in the constitution of the object' (pAO). And as John Stuhr
notes, Dewey's form of pragmatist critical reflection'? is 'genuinely genealogical' in that it
is a form of destabilisation of the present; an ' "intellectual disrobing" - a critical
inspection at times of some of the intellectual habits that clothe us as members of a
particular culture at a particular time and particular place' (Stuhr: 1997:ix). Thus, Dewey's
pragmatic empiricism implied an emphasis 'on practice, on the actual ways in which we
learn to do things by doing them' (Solomon and Higgins: 1996:262).
Thus for these philosophers pragmatism shared empiricism's awareness of aporia as well as
its experiential response to it. What separated them from empiricists was that pragmatism
acknowledged the nature of its response - its closure - as part of its actual practice of
30 It is this form of reflection on one's own epistemological thought processes that I am referring to
when using the expression 'reflexivity'.
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knowledge-making, whereas empiricism has tended not to do so. There may be several
reasons why this has developed and, although I am conscious of the dangers of developing
broad historical speculations, it is worth pausing to note two possible reasons why it may
have happened. In doing so the connection becomes the clearer.
The first of these is that modem empirical methodologies have grown in the face of a long
established and powerful Christian epistemology which had by its central definition
stressed a foundational role for a supra-human knower - God. Similarly in post-
enlightenment modernity the Kantian sub-tradition has functioned as an on-going
competitor to Humean empiricism, maintaining a secular version of Christian metaphysical
epistemology. In both cases stress has been laid on stronger forms of a priori; more
absolute in their assumptions than the empirical use of it as simply a hypothetical starting
point. A similar problem - and one which lay closer at hand for English empiricism - was
the realism of the so-called 'common sense' school of philosophy arising from Thomas
Reid's critique ofHume and owing for its insights to the influence of the Christianity of the
Cambridge platonists (Hutton: 1999:366-373). Here Reid's belief in humans having a
common nature implied unavoidable and certain (in that they were necessarily common) a
priori." In forging a position distinct from the metaphysics of Christianity, Kantianism or
realism, the a priori was an obvious area of difficulty for empiricists and it is
understandable that they should have played down its importance in their approach to
knowledge.
The second possible reason for this neglect is a social, that is to say a political, one. It is
an obvious point but one worth recalling that until the mid twentieth century when a
broadening of mass education began in earnest, the making and control of knowledge in the
western world was largely in the hands of a white male middle-class. The diversity of
31 An effect of this can be seen in Reid's intuitionism in ethics although it is very different from
Mill's utilitarian conclusions.
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contact across ages, nations and cultures which is currently assumed in almost any
understanding of 'mass society' was then largely unknown. So while the assumptions,
beliefs and understandings which comprised the starting points in empirical knowledge-
making (ie. a priori) may well have been a necessity at the theoretical level there was
perhaps less need for it in practice. It is well understood in the present day that to have had
an education before the age of mass education was, almost by definition, to have been a
part of a single, classics-educated, white and male intellectual society. What is important is
that within such a society it could be assumed that starting points were held effectively in
common. Their assumptions would therefore have needed no elucidation and could have
quite reasonably have been left at the level of general understandings, to be discussed only
when or if the need arose. It is these conditions along with other changes in modem
society, which are now changing and to which postmodems refer in their use of the
historical term 'postmodemity'.
It is not now difficult perhaps to imagine how in the America of the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, their version of empiricism may have evolved with a greater concern to
articulate interpretative criteria - ie. closure. As the 'New World,' much of the cultural
memories and habits of thought deriving from early modem European struggles between
secular and ecclesiastical interests may well have had a looser hold on the American
cultural consciousness than it had still in Europe. Similarly, the influx into America of
very large numbers of immigrants during the early part of this period, may have produced a
somewhat earlier version of the discursive circumstances - the multi-faceted capitalist
milieu - that postmodems currently identify as the conditions of postmodemism
(Harvey: 1989). In these circumstances it is not hard to see that there could be a premium
placed on incorporating into one's perspectives the criteria that has given rise to it, for the
common cultural context, so easily relied on in Europe, may simply not have functioned so
effectively in the USA.
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There is another link that can be seen between pragmatism and the empiricism of Hume,
Comte and Mill and it is one that has a bearing on the similarity between empiricism and
postmodemism - the postmodemism that is, of the pragmatic postmodem theorist Richard
Rorty. In commenting on the decline and resurgence of pragmatism around the mid
twentieth century, Cornel West has noted several reasons why, despite pragmatism's being
widely regarded as the American philosophy, it never achieved a hegemonic position
within US universities and indeed its popularity dipped in the 1940s. He posits several
factors; for example that pragmatist thinkers tended to be engaged public philosophers
rather than influential professionals and that the work of Russell, Whitehead, Lowenheim,
Skolem, Church and Godel on symbolic logic rather crowded out pragmatism, which had
little to say about that aspect of philosophy (West:1989:182). Most important he says, is
the fact that 'Austrian and German emigres, in flight from the Nazis, brought to the
American philosophical scene a project of rigor, purity, precision and seriousness -logical
positivism' (1989:183). The work ofRudolfCamap, Reichenbach, Tarski, Feigl and
Hempel was immense, he suggests, and in comparison, made pragmatism seem 'vague and
muddleheaded' (p.l83).
In fact that situation did not last. The movement of ideas in the post-war years was clearly
moving in a more open-ended direction. In particular this form of positivism did not
survive W.V.O. Quine's famous critique where he showed that the analytic-synthetic
foundations of logical positivism were susceptible to a destructive sceptical analysis.32
(Stroll: 1999:64 7-65 I). In retrospect this should hardly have been surprising since logical
positivism's origins in Comtean positivism are so clearly also aporetically sceptical. In this
sense the 'logical' extension of positivism was merely an attempt to fum up on the
certainty of positivism's response to aporia, but it was an attempt that has been subjected to
ongoing critique almost from the outset, not least by A.J. Ayer, one of its own central
32 Quine's main critique of logical positivism was in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' Philosophical
Review 60, 1951. There is a bibliographical history of the work in (Quine: I969:20),
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architects. Moreover Ayer repeatedly acknowledged his debt to Hume and Mill and thus to
sceptical empiricism (Ayer:1940:244; 1971:9,42; 1976:106). What Quine did was simply
to point out the degree to which logical positivism had lost contact with its own aporetic
centre. A caution is necessary here for although clearly logical positivism is a version of
empiricism, not its genus, some theorists, not least Quine, but also more recently Mark
Bevir (1994, 1999 & 2000) have apparently worked with that assumption. This needs to be
taken into account, particularly with Quine's critique, for this is directed at logical
positivism's verifiability not to empiricism in general. That becomes obvious when the
significance of that critique is seen, for as Rorty notes, Quine'S intervention resulted in the
're-pragmatisation ... of American Philosophy' in the post-war years (Rorty: 1999:31).
Cornel West has charted how, in the 1950s this new more thoroughly aporetic pragmatism
enjoyed a revival and, through the works of Wilfred Sellars in the 1960s and Nelson
Goodman in the 1970s, it mutated into Richard Rorty's current postmodern-like position
(West: 1989:Ch5).
Rorty is an important figure here because postmodernists claim his support for their
positions (for example Jenkins in general but specifically: 1999:Ch4:98) and this has been
accepted by philosophers outside postmodernism (eg. Haber 1994). Rorty himself
describes his own ideas as 'pragmatist' and has readily accepted that pragmatism is close to
empiricism (Rorty: 1989: XIV; 1998: 308; 1999:148). Thus if the sceptical empiricism of
Hume, Comte and Mill can be equated with pragmatism, and the latter with Rorty's version
of postmodemism which in turn has been claimed for the postmodern side in the historical
controversy, then it obviously follows that whatever the differences between either side in
that controversy, these cannot be as fundamentally epistemological as both sides seem to
accept. But there is a sense in which this conclusion should not come as a surprise. Even a
cursory glance at present day debates about empiricism shows that, although without the
kind of apocalyptic claims that have accompanied some of the postmodern critiques, and in
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the face of dismissals by empirical historians, an easier acceptance of aporia and a more
overt acknowledgement of position, has become a more evident feature of empiricism. 33
As Quine himself saw, the failure of symbolic logic to produce a response to aporia that
was more reliable than 'experience' meant that philosophy remained much as Hume had
left it but, drawing on Jeremy Bentham's work on the meaning of sentences, as distinct
from words," Quine developed pragmatism into a form of naturalistic epistemology,
which response to aporia was to focus on the closure - that is, on the psychology of the
knower (Quine: I969:69-90). Donald Davidson's takes a similar approach, in The Folly oj
Trying to Define Truth (1996is and Wittenstein's later work on language games was a
holistic contextualist response to aporia which, like Quine, assumes 'a lack of sharpness'
on 'the boundary between rule and empirical propositions' (Trigg:1993:p.25-31). Less
contextualist, although more in alignment with Dewey's experiential response to aporia,
was Gilbert Ryle's mid twentieth century work on 'knowing how and knowing that' which
appeared in 1949 (Ryle:2000:ChII). Bernard Williams too, although vigorously opposed to
the idea that truth was not a useful concept because it was seemingly unachievable, avoided
correspondence theory or a realist stance. Instead he concluded that truth was form of
effective communication (Williams:2002:271). Moreover he criticised Jurgen Habermas's
concept of an 'ideal speech situation' for Habermas' s having not sufficiently realised that
'the force of reason can hardly be separated altogether from the power of persuasion and as
the ancient Greeks well know, the power of persuasion .•. is still a species of power
(2002:226).36
33 This is discussed further in the next chapter.
34 Bentham called this form of contextual definition 'parapbrasis' (Quine:1969:72).
35 From reprint in Blackburn& Simmons:1999. Here Davidson argues that 'the truth of sentences
depends on the inner structure of the sentence, that is on the semantic features of the parts'
(1999:3111-2).
36 Habermas's ideal speech situation was a thought experiment in 'Modernity an unfinished Project'
that attempted to sanitise interpretativeknowledge from all forms of power and potential coercion
(Habermas:1981via D' Entreves& Benhabib:1996:38-55). There is a major literature on the
subject but it is beyond the scope of the argument of this study.
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In political philosophy - on the edges of a postmodem analysis - John Gray has seen the
importance ofpyrrhonism. In the conclusion of his work Liberalisms (1989) he refers
rather cryptically, to the possibility of a sceptical political pyrrhonism, based on Hume's
thought, that he sees as a position able to sustain a post-liberal society (Gray: 1989:261-
264). More thoroughly worked in the philosophy of science, are some now fairly well
established means of handling aporia. The work of Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos is
widely known. Both have improved on Popper's falsiflcationism" by emphasising in their
slightly different ways, how research programmes are more significant than Popper's focus
on individual theories (Brown, Fauvel & Finegan:1981:Chs 4-5». In both cases their
insights are predicated on an awareness of aporia and an experiential response to it.
Somewhat more controversial is Paul Feyerabend's self styled anarchistic argument that
scientific knowledge rests on 'an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible
alternatives [PF's emphasis.] (Feyerabend:1993:18&Ch2). It is likely that Feyerabend's
position is perhaps closer to postmodernism than it is to empiricism but he admits to having
been influenced by Wittgenstein and Quine (1993:212-3) and he agrees with Kuhn on the
importance of the history of science as being an inseparable part of science itself (p.21).
Ultimately his aim is to generate aporetic awareness; as he says himself, it is simply to
show that 'all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits (p.23).38
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the current spread of contemporary aporetic acceptance, in
empiricism, is to be found in philosophical textbooks. For example Robert Audi, in his
introduction accepts that knowledge - or at least justified belief-is possible whether or not
scepticism has validity (Audi: 1998:307). Similarly in a discussion of coherence theory in
William Hughes's basic text Critical Thinking, Hughes readily acknowledges what is so
37 Popper's falsiticationism was itself a development of Mill's method of induction (Mill: 1930:Bk.3
Ch.14).
38 A similar pattern can be seen within the methods and philosophy of sociology. Examples include
Michael Young's ground breaking work on the social organisation of knowledge (1971) and
Anthony Giddens's account of 'high modernity' where aporetic awareness implies 'a fuller
understanding of the reflexivity inherent in modernity itself" (Giddens: 1990:49).
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widely accepted now viz. that 'the very act of recognising or knowing that something is a
fact necessarily involves an element of selection and interpretation' (Hughes: 1997: 113).
Nicholas Everitt and Alec Fisher introduce their text Modern Epistemology by accepting
that its design was influenced by the ideas of Quine and Wittgenstein (Everitt &
Fisher: 1995:xiii). And finally D.Z.Phillips's Introducing Philosophy is centred around an
examination of scepticism. Phillips concludes that although it appears not to be possible to
reject scepticism as such, this fact nevertheless does not stop the making of human
knowledge. His treatment of the theme is interesting - especially for a basic text - since he
leaves the significance of aporia appropriately open, arguing that its apparent existence
does not logically compel any kind of response, whether of resistance or accommodation.
(Phillips: 1996: 183-191).
This brief review - of necessity taking these accounts at face value - has of course barely
scratched the surface of the issues, but it has perhaps done enough to show the prevalence
of aporetic awareness within contemporary philosophy. Taking these two chapters - Two
and Three - together I think I have shown that the kind of aporetic awareness that can be
seen in the broader historiographic debate is evident in western empirical philosophy
generally. Itwould be easy now to use this evidence to suggest that empirical historical
practice is essentially aporetic in this way and thus postmodem critiques within the narrow
historical controversy have been mistaken in their analysis. Undoubtedly there is some
truth in that. But uncomfortably the same evidence could be deployed to argue equally
convincingly that the postmodem critique of Jenkins et.al. is basicalJy correct in that, whilst
empirical historiography does not carry the realist or correspondence theory assumptions
that have been alleged, its practice has been misleading and unhelpful in its refusal to
acknowledge its criteria for interpretation.
What such a situation does most obviously indicate is that a shift in the positions of both
sides is called for. Clearly empiricist historians cannot stand out indefinitely against more
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widely accepted understandings of empiricism. At the same time the ubiquity of sceptical
themes in western philosophy, as these chapters have shown, rather calls into question the
validity ofpostmodern 'end of historical knowledge' scenarios.
Itmight then seem that with these comments the matter is settled and the aim of this project
achieved. But an essential question still remains; that is how - in what condition - will any
adjustments by these combatants in the controversy, leave the discipline of history? Will it,
for example, maintain the status quo broadly, or develop radically within a fresh paradigm
of knowledge? The warning that D. Z. Phillips gives about assuming that methodological
adjustments in response to aporetic awareness will overcome political or epistemological
difficulties, is well made. Yet at the same time, although a more coherent historical
practice is certainly a step forward compared with this sterile controversy, it still needs to
be seen how such coherence might interact with contemporary Marxist historiography and
with the postmodemist insights of the broader debate. To attempt this task it is necessary
to return the discussion to the discipline of history.
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Chapter Four: Bridges Within History
Chapter Three established that the deep involvement of empiricism with scepticism that
was seen in antiquity, can be found also in the modem world within the work of Hume,
Comte, Mill and modern-day pragmatists. In terms of the study as a whole, this means that
empirical historians, and history teachers, can approach issues of sceptical subjectivity in
their daily work with a fresh confidence. Itmeans that they no longer need be concerned
that the aporetic awareness deployed by the postmodern challengers, necessarily calls into
question their core empirical methods. However this does not in tum imply that traditional
empirical practice should as a result be thought adequate to present-day needs and neither
does it, of itself, identify a way forward for such historiography. Nevertheless in rejecting
the narrow conceptions of the postmodern challenge within the controversy, the way is now
open for a clearer examination of alternatives - stronger alternatives - presented by the
broader debate.
Thus the intention of this final chapter is to place this now more sceptical empiricism
alongside critiques of the discipline offered from within the debate. It will be argued that a
degree of reflexivity, held within a critically aware methodological practice, can be thought.
to be an area of commonality between empirical, Marxist and some poststructuralist
thought and that it is capable of providing a working dialogue between these approaches to
history. This is not to try to flatten out differences between these perspectives - nothing
would be gained by attempting that. Rather the aim is to help the insights of each be
available to all. In attempting this research I have held the assumption that such a wider
intercourse between historians will benefit the discipline as a whole; certainly it is a facility
that is barely possible at present. Itmay well be that empirical historians are different by
temperament, or by political inclination, from Marxists and poststructuralists and will
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always wish to keep their methodological distance from them. It would perhaps be naive to
imagine otherwise, but this is not a problem once commonality is established for (with my
own Marxist starting position inmind), it would then no longer be possible for such
differences to be used for political ends - for arguing that 'this is simply how the world
was' and thus 'is'. Similarly, from a more liberal perspective it is reasonable to think that
better history will emerge from a discipline in which there are a multiplicity of
methodological practices, reflecting a variety of interests, but which nevertheless coheres
around a common epistemology, than would be the case from a group of irreconcilably
different historical sects. There are however several difficulties still to be addressed before
that situation could be anticipated.
There are three such areas for consideration. The first is the need to determine whether the
assertions of the empirical defenders in the controversy really are empirical in any sense
that that can be equated with the empirical tradition discussed in this study. It will be
found that this is indeed the case, but with important qualifications in relation to the
contribution of Collingwood. The second task is to investigate the relationship between
empiricism and modem Marxist historiography in the light of postmodem dismissals of
Marxism. I It will be suggested here that a Thompsonian Marxist model of history,
modified by Patrick Joyce's engagement with postmodemism, ofTers the potential for the
kind of critically aware methodology that is being sought in this study. The third question
to be examined is whether postructural insights are necessarily - in their entirety that is-
committed to the negativity of the postmodem challenge; that for example of Jenkins,
Munslow and Southgate. In response it will be argued that not all poststructuralism is
I For example, within the controversy, Keith Jenkins refers to Marxism as 'absurd' and as an
example of what he calls the collapsed 'upper case' - in his terminology, metaphysical- approach to
history (Jenkins:1997:7). SimilarlyAlun Munslow considers Marxism in general, and
E.P.Thompson in particular, as constructionist and therefore, in his terms, realist and metaphysical
(Munslow:2000:7&160).
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suffused with negativity; more optimistic and useful forms are on offer.' Indeed in
Chapter One it was noted that there is a flourishing debate by historians about the nature of
the discipline, a debate that has been largely unaffected by the issues of the controversy and
which has utilised Marxism and poststructuralism to positive advantage. In this final stage
of the study it is suggested that a 'modernised' - ie. more overtly sceptical- empirical
historiography might begin to participate in that broader debate. Overall it is argued that
the need for empirical historians to be more overt about their closures - obvious, now that
empiricism's aporetic core is apparent - is capable of being brought into a focus with a
concept of 'reflexivity,' and thus into discursive range of Marxist and poststructuralist
insights.
Section I
It is not difficult to make a prima-facie case that current empirical historical practice shares
the empiricism of the tradition discussed in this study.
Ernst Breisach points out for example that Gibbon held that Hume's empirical history
'dominated the field until that of Macaulay found greater favour' (Breisach: 1994:215-6)
2 Hitherto, following broad general usage, I have employed the terms 'postmodemism' and
'poststructuralism' in a rather easy conflation, but this needs now to be more tightly defined. There
is little in the literature that is consistent to guide the use of these terms - they are often employed
interchangeably- but in this chapter 'postmodemism' will be deployed to indicate the broad genre
of criticism and well as its species observable in the controversy. As a part of that genre,
'poststructuralism' will be used to suggest a more technical foci - that for example of Lyotard, Rorty
and Derrida - upon which much of the more general postmodem discussion rests but does not,
arguably, exhaust.
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and Macaulay's methodological accord with Carlyle and J.S. Mill is easy to see.' So too
is the influence of J.S. Mill, via Henry Sidgewick, upon Maitland (Elton: 1985:6) in whose
tradition lay Namier and later Trevelyan. Trevelyan is important here. It is true that his
simple narrative - and whiggish - style is no longer popular with present-day empirical
historians, but many expressions of affinity with Trevelyan's general approach can be
found among today's empirical opponents of postmodem history. Marwick for example
has noted approvingly how despite Trevelyan's well known antipathy towards so called
scientific historiography (eg. that of Ranke, Acton and Bury) his account of history
embodied characteristics quite acceptable to current mainstream historiography. These
facets of the discipline were
the scientific (collecting and weighing of evidence as to facts),
the imaginative or speculative (selection and classification),
interpretation and generalisation and the literary. This last
function, whose importance Trevelyan deliberately stressed, he
defined as "the exposition of the results of science and
imagination in a form that will attract and educate our fellow
countrymen" (Marwick: 1981: 60).
In the same vein Fritz Stern considered that Trevelyan 'has done more than any other living
English writer to restore history to its earlier station as a literary art' (Stem: 1970: 227) and
both Evans and Marwick have pointed out that Trevelyan, like Macaulay, accepted that
historians were selective and, as Trevelyan himself makes clear (Stern: 1970: 243), he held
a sceptical empirical position (Evans: 1997: 181; Marwick: 1981: 60-61). Evans goes on to
3 This is notwithstanding the sharp, but inconsequential, exchanges which took place between
Macaulay and James Mill over the extent to which it is appropriate for notions of human nature to be
deployed as a priori in the production of political and sociological knowledge. (Ryan: 1974: 20-26,
38-40,88-91; Skorupski: 1998:208-9, 218).
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associate his own approach to history with the same tradition. Thus it is possible to make a
clear connection between the empiricism of David Hume and that of Richard Evans. 4
That such a connection can be made is unsurprising. If the empiricism of most present day
mainstream historians were actually as realist as Munslow and others have charged (as was
noted in Chapter Two), then some remnants at least of the eighteenth and nineteenth
century argument between these two epistemologies, realism and empiricism, would likely
still be running as a methodological debate between them within the discipline. There
would thus currently be a controversy in existence between realist and empirical historians
just as there was in earlier times between Humean empiricists and Reidian realists, or
between J. S. Mill and Reid's intuitionist follower, Sir William Hamilton
(Skorupski: 1998: 141-3). At the very least there would be historians arguing for historical
knowledge as being, as Reid described language, 'the express image and picture of human
thoughts; and from the picture we may draw some certain conclusions concerning the
original' (Bracken: 1999:484). In fact there appears to be no such debate at present. The
nearest to it seems to be Christopher Lloyd's critical realist claim that it is possible to have
the historical equivalent of what he thinks science does, ie. to 'uncover the microscopic
entities and powers and deep causal structures and properties of the natural world' (Lloyd:
1996: 205), or perhaps the realism of Robert Kirk's Relativism and Reality (Kirk: 1999). It
would be hard to extrapolate from these that realism was an active force in the defence of
empirical history
This is not to argue that realism is entirely absent from contemporary historiography but
rather to say that it has not gained a hold in history. Even Geoffrey Elton who has largely
been regarded as occupying the prime position on the reactionary wing of empirical
4 Trevelyan's regrettably nationalist and genderist assumptions, although perhaps uncontroversial in
his time, make it difficult now to accept his values, but it is Trevelyan the empiricist, not Trevelyan
the man, that is being discussed here. Nevertheless his example acts as a powerful reason for
insisting that the closures of empirical historians need to be more explicit than hitherto.
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historiography was very far from being a realist. Elton's well known proclamations of
certainty are, in themselves, no worse than those of Keith Jenkins."
It would seem then that it is possible to make at least a preliminary case that present day
empirical historians could see themselves as functioning with a version of empiricism that
can be compared with that of Hume, Comte, Mill and the pragmatists. If this can be more
finnly established, it provides strength to empirical historiography's claim that it is
aporetic.' The question still remains however whether this traditional historiography has
been significantly compromised by its undoubted association with competing philosophies
during the past century or so.
To deny the existence of Reidian realism in contemporary historiography is not the same as
saying that there has been no influence on it from other metaphysical approaches to
knowledge; for example, from Christianity and from idealism.' There is no doubt for
example, that the ideas of Ranke have left their mark on the discipline of history in the
years since his direct influence has waned. However it is still the case that such residues
have not altered the essentially sceptical empiricism within which present-day mainstream
historiography functions.
'An example of this is, 'at the level of the historical text it just happens to be the case that
interminable openness is logically unavoidable: there is no way that any historical closure can ever
be achieved - that is certain' (Jenkins: 2003: 3).
6In making these broad comparative claims I am influenced by John Breuilly's approach to
comparative history in Labour and Liberalism in Nineteenth-century Europe (1994). See in
particular Breuilly's Introduction and Conclusion for his methodological stance and his rejection of
the historicist demand that historical periods and arguments had to be understood only on their 'own
terms' (p.279).
, For clarity, I am regarding as metaphysical, any account of knowledge that seeks a degree of
certainty beyond what is possible by the use of human senses and by reflection on that sense.
Knowledge statements that fail to explain their criteria for the selection of their material ie. are not
overt about their closures - and here traditional empirical historiography might well be located (eg.
Trevelyan) - clearly lay themselves open to the charge that they carry metaphysical assumptions.
However I do not think contlating these two essentially different 'moves' in knowledge-creation, is
helpful and I distinguish between them here because simply ignoring one's closures is not the same
as seeking greater epistemological certainty beyond what appears possible from the senses.
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The point is that western historians employed what they found useful in the work of Ranke
- largely his methods - and ignored his metaphysics. R.W. Southern long ago suggested
that Ranke's popularity in Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century was the
result of a practical need by historians. He argued that with the growing influence of
Hume's empiricism, as the academic status ofhistory increased, a reaction developed
against the discipline's association with theology. As a result the traditional historical
method ie. where practitioners merely commented on old authorities, gradually came under
pressure. (Southern: 1961 via Stem: I970:407).8 Ranke's methodology - notably his
strictures about accuracy and fidelity to evidence - provided a convenient set of rules for
historians. Whatever was the basis of his position, the recommended practices cohered
with Humean, Comtean and Millsean sceptical empiricism at a functional level.
Ranke's aporetic awareness is plain to see in his assumption that the human achievement of
knowledge was no simple affair, viz.:
What an infinite amount of material! What diverse efforts! How
difficult it is to only grasp the particulars. Since moreover there
is much we do not know, how are we to understand the causal
nexus everywhere, not to mention getting to the bottom of the
essence of totality? Iconsider it impossible to solve this
problem entirely. God alone knows world history (Ranke in
Bums et.al.:2000:93.
• This interest in German scholarship was not confined to history. It had been partly responsible for
a major challenge to accepted practices within the Church of England, as the debate in the English
journal Essays and Reviews during the 1860's testifies (eg. Wilberforce: Jan.l861& Stanley:
Apr.1861 in Golby:1990:50-56).
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Ranke's response to aporia is best seen in contrast with that of the empirical whig historian
Macaulay, who accepted the apparent limits to human knowledge by settling for a
narrative method or, at best for history as a form of literature (Macaulay: 1828 in Stern:
1970:71-89). A 'good' history for Macaulay was one which was convincing. For example,
A perfect historian must possess an imagination sufficiently
powerful to make his narrative affecting and picturesque. He
must control it so absolutely as to content himself with the
materials which he finds, and to refrain from supplying
deficiencies by additions of his own. . .. history begins in novel
and ends in essay
(Stern: 1970:72-3).
For Ranke this was unacceptable. To achieve what he thought were the desirable ends of
history ie. the seeking to know 'what really happened,' historians were counselled to
follow a strict methodological regime (his famous emphasis on primary sources and the
valorising of national history). This was to be carried out to the extent that the result might
be 'harsh, disconnected, colourless and tiring.' (Stern: 1970:55). Clearly for Ranke truth
value was the prime quality. In addition to these methodological rules he considered that
the past had a coherent shape and a uniqueness which needed to be respected by historians.
This aspect of his work has been the subject of much discussion by western historians.
David Bebbington has described it as an assumption of linearity and attributed it to
broader, Christian, notions of time, capable of being distinguished from Classical or
ancient assumptions that time moved in a cyclical manner. (Bebbington: 1990:Ch I). More
widely the expression 'historicism' has been employed, but with little settled acceptance of
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how it should be understood," The difficulty that empirical historians have experienced
with the parts of Ranke's thought which Jay beyond his practical use of sources is
indicative of the way that the Ranke's position as a whole was alien to empirical thinking.
This is because underlying his practical response to aporetic awareness was a further
position, that such truth as humans needed to live satisfactory lives was vouchsafed by
God.
Thus behind Ranke's call for careful and accurate use of primary sources, or for the
understanding of past actors' own ways of making sense of their worlds, was a claim of a
quite different kind from that held by empiricists. For example Ranke held that: 'the
human race moves along a course of uninterrupted progress, in a steady development
towards perfection' (Stem: 1970:58). Of course, as has already been discussed,
assumptions of progress in the human condition were widespread in the late eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. However, Ranke's teleology cohered with his other claims such as
that the past 'does have an inner connection of its own' (Stem: 1979:60). He held that this
connection was independent of the historian, but if the right methods were employed and at
the appropriate level ie. the national level, then it was possible for historians to do more
than just make sense of the past. They could uncover 'universal history [which]
comprehends the past life of mankind, not in its particular relations and trends, but in its
fullness and totality' (Stem: J970:6 J). This was possible for Ranke because in his schema
the historian was engaged in a supra-human enterprise secured by a belief that 'each epoch
is immediate to God' (Bums and Rayment-Pickard: 2000: 90). There was therefore in
Ranke's work a claim stronger than any of those made by empiricists.
9 Discomfort with the concept of historicism crosses the postmodem empirical divide. Arthur
Marwick referred to the term as 'that dread tenn historicism' (1981:39) and Alun Munslow has
called it 'a troubling concept' (2000:130-133). A variety of accounts of historicism can be gained
from Appleby et.al 1994; Breisach: I994;Collingwood:200 I; amongst others, but I find useful
Tosh's view that it can be understood as a two way process. For him historicism implies that the
past can be seen as being 'a unique manifestation of the human spirit' whilst the nature of the
present is conversely to be understood in its relationship to contextualising time. (Tosh:1991:12-13).
Thus if it is accepted that there can be no knowledge beyond knowledge, a sense of historicised
linearity of the past can be recognised. This is discussed further, later in this section.
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This metaphysical support was not however taken up by western historians. Peter Novick
has shown how, despite Ranke's widespread popularity with American historians towards
the end of the nineteenth century, his metaphysics were never embraced. Novick argued
that this was the result of an 'almost total misunderstanding' of Ranke's overall conception
of history, in the sense that his methodology was thought to be, simply. scientific - quite
the opposite of what it is now widely understood to be (Novick: 1988:26). The Americans
were not alone in thinking this. Stem has pointed out that the aspiration to write history
that could be thought to be objective. as it really happened, was regarded by many Anglo-
American historians as a kind of 'pretentious positivism' (Stem: 1970:55).
Perhaps because ofan increasing disenchantment with the narrowness of Ranke's methods,
or maybe because, by the tum of the century the historical community had assimilated all it
needed of Ranke's practical methods of scholarship, successors to Ranke, notably Acton,
attracted much criticism for what was then clearly perceived as a metaphysical approach to
history. Hugh Tulloch for example pointed out that although Acton had been successful in
widening the scope of Ranke's methods, by broadening what might be thought an historical
source, he was nevertheless not fully accepted by the empirical historical community. As
his essentially Rankean metaphysics became more thoroughly understood he became
increasingly regarded as promoting an unacceptable model of history (Tulloch: I988:98-9).
More recently Gertrude Himmelfarb has argued that Acton conflated judgement with
science and similarly both Elton and A.J.P.Taylor criticised his position (Tulloch:p.2 &
101).10
There is evidence too that this selectivity in the way historians have handled Ranke's ideas
has continued into the present. John Tosh has brought out clearly the sense in which
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empiricists such as himself, currently understand the term 'historicism.' He saw it as
meaning that historical periods had internal coherence within the historicised past. For
Tosh, as for other empirical historians, there can be certainty of no knowledge, coherent or
not, existing outside of what historians, or people acting as historians, make of that past.
At the same time as Tosh articulated this useful reading of historicism, he warned against
accepting too readily what he saw as an irrationalism at the heart of the Rankean project
(Tosh: 1991: 12-13). Marwick has approached Ranke in a similar manner. He too has been
careful to separate the practical from the metaphysical and to note that: 'while the
methodological revolution ofNeibuhr and Ranke had a powerful and salutary influence
throughout the world of historical studies, that world by no means succumbed to the
overlordship of Ranke' (Marwick: 1981 :40). Overall however nothing illustrates more
clearly the partial use of Ranke made by present day empirical historians, than Keith
Jenkins's criticism of Richard Evans on exactly those grounds; for having selectively
picked up only on the practical aspects of Ranke, leaving the metaphysics to one side
(Jenkins: 1999: 106-7).
If Ranke's approach to history has left no metaphysical residues on empirical practice it
might still be the case that other Christian historians have done so. After all, it is not
difficult to see that in terms of the 'aporia and response' model of knowledge used in this
study Christianity can be regarded as an epistemological closure that lies at the more,
certaintist ie. the metaphysical end of a spectrum of possible responses to aporia. Perhaps
the clearest way of examining this question is to consider Herbert Butterfield's treatment of
Christianity and history. As an example he is particularly useful because he so explicitly
criticised empirical whig historiography and in tum has become a target for a postmodern
critique. Moreover, not only have the postmodern challengers firmly rejected Butterfield's
10 It must be said that not all historians misunderstood Ranke's position for his metaphysical
assumptions were challenged inUSA, in Britain and also in Germany (Breisach:I 994:286; Beard in
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critique of The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), they have dismissed it as a
metaphysical genre, dubbing it 'own-sakism' (Jenkins: 1995:9). Thus for both his strongly
held Christian beliefs, as well as his critique of so-called whiggism, it would be easy to see
Butterfield's undoubted influence on twentieth century historiography as being one through
which metaphysical assumptions have been propagated within current historical practice.
Such a view would however be hard to sustain. Certainly there is clear evidence in
Butterfield's work that he regarded his religious belief as having influenced his
understanding of the past. This cannot be denied, but that influence, like the political
conservatism (judged by today's standards at least) of J.S.MiII, has functioned at the level
of content, not as method or epistemology as with Ranke. In terms of his approach to
knowledge of the past Butterfield can be seen as having been thoroughly empirical. His
attitude to religion as well as to science shows his awareness of aporia.
On both sides of the Galileo controversy ... we see the effect of
the mind's presumption - we see a little of that intellectual
arrogance, or mental rigidity, or stiff-necked self assurance which
manages to interpolate itself into all forms of scholarship and
science. If anybody were to doubt the existence of this, it is
always sufficiently evident when we tum back to examine the
dogmatisms of scholarship in any generation previous to our own
(Butterfield: 1949: I0).
He was sceptical too about claims of historical truth. They 'must be regarded as fulfilling a
more limited and humble rote than many people take for granted' (1949:11). But at the
same time he did see science as providing an epistemological role; one in which it acted as
a basis for a succession of ongoing closures, or responses to aporia. For example:
Stem: 1970:317 - 320).
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The development of the scientific method in nineteenth century
historiography did not merely mean that this or that fact could
be corrected, or the story told in great detail, or the narrative
amended at marginal points. It meant that total reconstruction
proved to be necessary .•.. evidence which had seemed to mean
one thing might prove capable of an entirely different
construction (1949: 14-5).
Thus for Butterfield 'there exists in most historical writing, therefore, an appearance of
definition and finality which is an optical illusion' (p.lS). In reality, he thought, historical
explanation was driven by 'insight, sympathy and imagination' (p.17). His Christian faith
cohered with this modem empirical approach to knowledge by functioning as a form of
'back stop'. II His view was that in the same way that science could not provide absolute
truth, Christian insights could not do this either, at least not in a way suitable for the
everyday operation of knowledge. 'Although the Christian must find that religious thought
is inextricably involved in historical thought' (p.3) it would be a mistake, he thought, if:
the debate was forever returning to the same issues and they
[the historian or the knowledge-maker] could not discuss the
ordinary operations of nature [or history] without perpetually
coming back to their basic theological or philosophical
differences (p.19).
IIDifficulties in defining religion are of course legion (see Bruce:I995) and perhaps the more
successful accounts, such as that ofNinian Smart have achieved their longevity by sheer breadth of
expression (Smart: I977:Ch.l). I am therefore using Smart's multi-dimensional approach in an
articulatory way (rather than as a finn definition) to conceive of religion as a response to the aporia
of 'religious experiences'. In this chapter I am regarding Butterfield as thinking of history in a
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In short, it is possible to see in Butterfield's account of history an empirical approach to
knowledge supported by Christianity, but one comparable with the way that the historical
insights produced by a non-Christian historian might be supported by a set of political
views, a moral code or by normative assumptions - in other words Christianity here is but
one of a variety of possible a priori.12
This is not to say that Butterfield's approach to method is beyond criticism; far from it.
John Tosh has pointed out that Butterfield scared off a whole generation of historians from
explanatory (or present-minded, or a priori) history (Tosh:1991: 147). It would seem that
Butterfield's case has been too good - his argument too strong and his rhetoric too
persuasive. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that Butterfield was a
metaphysician, for in the absence of an articulated account of a priori within empiricism, it
is not surprising that misunderstandings should have occurred.
Butterfield's empiricism is plain to see and the evidence for it is in the parts of his work
where he was most firmly critical of what he saw as sloppy history. Of course it may have
been that he erected the whigs as a straw target for his account of history, but that issue is
not germane to the purpose of this chapter and is ignored here. What is important though,
is the breadth of Butterfield's understanding of history. In The Whig Interpretation of
History he showed, through the qualifications that he added to each of his points, that to a
considerable extent he agreed with the position he was criticising. With this in mind, his
argument is better understood, less as a denial of a particular form of historicising, than as
an attempt to broaden our historical conception of the past. Far from narrowing it, as might
similar manner - ie. one in which historical knowledge, like religion, responds to aporia, but unlike
religion, it operates at a wholly human level.
12 Paul Sharp's study of Butterfield's contribution to the development of disciplinary international
relations in the I960s has brought out the extent of his aporetic awareness - for example
Butterfield's agreement with Ranke that 'all historical epochs are equidistant from eternity'
(Sharp:2003:862). But more importantly Sharp shows how Butterfield saw history as a valuable
enterprise, although one quite distinct from Christianity that, as almost a 'technical' matter, was
'incapable of answering the most important questions about human life and its significance'(2003:
866).
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be thought, he has expanded the intellectual scope of the discipline. His response to aporia
- his closure - is one in which he tried to express a sense of the profundity of the enterprise
of history. He was thus an exemplar for what has become regarded as the best of
traditional historical practice; and this is quite distinct from any consideration of his
religious beliefs.
To appreciate the power of Butterfield's contribution to twentieth century western
historiography it is helpful to look in a little detail at what he actually said about the whigs.
And what can be seen is a rather more nuanced account of history than that offered by the
postmodern challengers. In his opening statement in the main body of the argument,
Butterfield's careful qualifications are immediately evident. Thus:
The primary assumption of all attempts to understand the men
[sic] of the past must be the belief that we can in some degree
enter into minds that are unlike our own. If this belief were
unfounded it would seem that men must be for ever locked
away from one another (Butterfield: 1931:Ch2,p. l)
So, it is clear that however much he thought historical writing should be cast for the sake of
the past itself, he did not mean this to be wholly at the expense of understandings of the
present, else, as he said himself, there could have been no communication. Similarly he
showed that to quite an extent he himself shared the position he was criticising. For
example he said:
It is part and parcel of the whig interpretation of history that it
studies the past with reference to the present; and though there
may be a sense in which this is unobjectionable if its
implications are carefully considered, and there may be a sense
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in which it is inescapable, it has often been an obstruction to
historical understanding because it has been taken to mean the
study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the
present (1931 :2).
Similarly Butterfield pointed out repeatedly that the historian 'can never entirely abstract
himself from his own age' (Ch.2, p.3). In effect he was keen to redress what he saw as an
imbalance that had crept into empirical historiography, rather than simply to prohibit
historians from using their present to explain the past. For example he spoke of the whig
treatment of present-minded ness as being 'an oversimplification of the relations between
events' and indeed he saw 'own-sakism' as something which could lead to poor history, for
we cannot save ourselves from tumbling headlong into it .... and
very soon we may be concentrated upon the most useless things
in the world - Marie Antoinette's ear-ring or the adventures of
the Jacobites (Ch 2, p.2-3).
The point has perhaps been sufficiently made; that neither in his Christian beliefs, nor in a
critique of whig uncertainties about a priori, can Herbert Butterfield be thought to be
metaphysical in his approach to historical knowledge." Inconveniently, the same cannot
be said about R.O. Collingwood, for his has been a more ambiguous role in empirical
historiography. Certainly the more obviously idealistic aspects of his approach to history
have been ignored or rejected by historians, as was Ranke's, but unlike Ranke,
Collingwood's influence has been more directly epistemological than practical.
Importantly, Collingwood can be seen as giving support to the development of reflexivity.
13 For a more thorough treatment of the issues raised here see Nick Jardine's 'Whigs and Stories:
Herbert Butterfield and the Historiography of Science' (Jardine:2003).
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In fact he points the way towards the kind of common ground for historical discourse that
is being sought in this study.
From within the controversy, enthusiasm for Collingwood's approach to history has come
mainly from the postmodem side. For example Alun Munslow acknowledges that
Collingwood's thought is 'among the best explanations of how inference works' in history
and that what is particularly helpful is that he makes room for 'the exercise of the
historian's imagination' (Munslow:2003:IO). By contrast Marwick has recently described
Collingwood's work as 'complete rubbish' (Marwick:2001:15). Despite this, it is the case
that few commentators on the nature of the discipline have avoided engagement with at
least some aspects of his philosophy of history - indeed including Marwick in earlier years
(1970:81-82 & 1981 :81-85). Collingwood's work is therefore important. Nevertheless the
lack of widespread and fulsome praise for him - in the light of his centrality - does suggest
that there is some justification for Niall Ferguson's view that despite Collingwood's
undoubted influence on the broader debate between historians, he nevertheless remains
rather an outsider to the historical community (Ferguson:1977:5112). But it is this
widespread engagement with him that is important to the discussion here, and there is no
shortage of evidence for it.14
The problem is of course Collingwood's idealism , which has not gone unnoticed by
fellow historians. Aletta Biersack has seen this as a position akin to realism in the sense
that Collingwood 'envisioned historical "facts" as indices of an underlying experiential and
conceptual reality' (Biersack: 1989:75). Ernst Breisach expresses his account of knowledge
as one from which Collingwood denied the possibility of the past being studied from the'
14 See for example Aletta Biersack:1989; Ernst Breisach:1994; William Dray: 1980&2001; Richard
Evans: 1997; Hans Kellner:1995;Giuseppina D'Oro:2000&2004; Christopher Parker:2000; John
Passmore:1968; Karsten Stueber:2002; Jon Tosh:1991; Richard Tuck:1992; Dimitrios
Vardoulakis:2004; Adrian Wilson;1993&2001
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"outside" with the methods of the natural sciences" (Breisach:1994:333). For Ferguson,
Collingwood held the teleological 'assumption that the present was always the end-point
(and implicitly the only possible end-point) of the historian's chosen narrative'
(Ferguson: 1977:67). More specifically both Christopher Parker and Dimitrios Vardoulakis
have drawn upon Collingwood's own testimony that he embraced idealism (Parker
:2000: 181). CoJIingwood explained his position as being a ' ''theory of reality" within
which 'the experience of understanding presupposes a "general conception of the world as
a whole" and an awareness of "'the ultimate unity of the world as a whole"
(Vardoulakis:2004:5). Clearly aspects of Collingwood's thought bears some affinity with
that of Ranke; indeed Richard Evans - and John Passmore before him - have placed
Collingwood in the same - Kantian - tradition (Evans: 1997a:30/31; Passmore: 1968:56)16.
It is not therefore surprising to see contemporary historians handling Collingwood as they
have done Ranke; that is to say they have made use of him, and especially his theory ofre-
enactment, but they have done so in terms of their own empiricism. Thus Richard Tuck
notes how John Dunn and Quentin Skinner have accepted Collingwood's argument that a
desirable way of reading an historical text in the history of political thought is to
understand the intentions of the author. However neither of them have supposed that such
meaning should be limited to authorial intention. Instead, re-enactment should simply be
another method of historical analysis (Tuck: 1992: 194). Richard Evans too, selects what he
finds useful. He notes approvingly that Collingwood's deployment of Croce's famous idea
that "'all history is contemporary history" into '"all history is the history of thought" had
the effect of encouraging the blurring of a distinction between fact and interpretation, since
the 'very act of observing ... was itself governed by the historian's a priori beliefs about the
U This would also of course have put his account of history at some distance from the core
methodological assumptions of empirical historians who, since Hume, have tended to affiliate their
epistemology with that of the natural sciences.
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past' (Evans:1997a:31). Nevertheless Evans does not accept Collingwood's theory of re-
enactment since, as he points out, historical sources can be placed in juxtaposition with
other sources 'to reveal more than its author thought' (pp. 91-92). He concludes with the
standard empirical position that 'what the historian writes, and what the documents say, are
two different things' (p.93). Similar views can be found in, for example John Tosh's work
- that re-enactment is useful but can be exaggerated since historians know what happened
later (Tosh: 19:147). Peter Burke's criticism is similar; he points out that collective forms
of explanation such as movements of prices and wages, go well beyond the perspective of
the individual agent (Burke: 1992:5).
Perhaps the best example of how Collingwood has been interpreted by empirical historians
is offered by Adrian Wilson. In his original article (1993), and in the more detailed
reworking of it in a recent article for the Collingwood Society (2001), Wilson's discussion
goes beyond the mere use or otherwise of re-enactment, to an account of Collingwood's
methodology as operating on three levels. In the first of these there is the now ubiquitous
recognition of a difference between the past and history but it is one in which historical
knowledge is created from inferences drawn from the sources, which are regarded as
'authorities'. This results for him, in his famous 'scissors and paste' history
(Wilson:I993:306 & 2001:8-10 & 39). Collingwood's second level, as Wilson argues, is
fairly well what might be described as sound empirical practice, where historians are
aware, to a greater or lesser extent overtly, of the different possibilities that exist for
interpreting their methodological selections and the sources they use. Wilson calls this the
historiographical level and he recognises that Collingwood himself saw it as empirical
(Wilson:200 110-14 & 23). It is at the third level- the level that Wilson regards
Collingwood as recommending - that the idealism becomes apparent. Here, instead of
developing his methodological model towards a greater sense of observational self-
awareness; ie. that would have led it closer to present day modem and postmodem
16 See also Beverley Southgate's view that Collingwood sees history as 'the unfolding of God's pre-
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thinking, Wilson represents Collingwood as doing the exact opposite. Thus for Wilson,
level three historical practice returns the historian's attention to the object of study, to the
genesis of the source, to re-enactment of the historical agent's thought and to a supposed
means of reaching:
... a general logic of historical thought ... (which) ... must be
philosophical as opposed to an empirical science, and must
establish a priori the pure principles on which all historical
thinking is to proceed (Wilson:2001:23).
The point for this study is that, as Wilson laments, Collingwood's 'historiographic
revolution' ultimately failed (Wilson:2001:59-63). Whether this was because mainstream
British historians 'failed to grasp the full significance of his achievement' (P.60) or
whether they grasped it only too well and rejected it, is not clear. What is clear though is
that that whether one focuses on Ranke, Butterfield or Collingwood there is ample
evidence to suggest that empirical historians have consistently rejected methodological
theories and practices that might have compromised their traditional sceptical empiricism.
But moreover, although not as overt as it could be, there is a tacit acknowledgement in
Evan's appreciation of Collingwood - in Evan's awareness of the active constructional
nature of observation - of the importance of critical self-awareness in the making of
historical knowledge. And Wilson's recognition of the ubiquity of Collingwood's second
level historiographic methodology is evidence that Evan's stance is by no means out of the
ordinary amongst mainstream empirical historians.
Interestingly though, this is not the end of the story as far as Collingwood's role is
concerned. It is no accident that Alun MunsJow should view Collingwood's ideas as a
form of support for postmodernism, for their respective positions clearJy have points of
ordained plan' (Southgate:1996:40).
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contact and Munslow is not alone in observing this. Christopher Parker has made much of
such a possible link, arguing that insofar as historians have been influenced by
Collingwood, they have 'become postmodem without joining the postmodemists' (Parker:
2000: 217). I do not wish to explore Parker's argument in suggesting that postmodemism
is a form of idealism; there is a more important point to be made. This is that. as for the
empiricists, what appears to be attractive to postmodems in Collingwood is his interest in
exploring the epistemological constructing 'activity' of the historian - even if that activity
results in the end only in the discovery of 'pure principles' underlying history. It is
understandable why they might find it so, for that theme obviously strikes a chord with
many postmodems. Thus Hayden White had, some years ago, picked up on the
constructional nature of Collingwood, noting approvingly that he was 'fond of saying that
the kind of history one wrote ... was ultimately a function of the kind of man one was'
(White: 1973 :433). More recently Hans Kellner has suggested that it was not the content of
Collingwood's work that was important for postmodems; rather it was his acceptance, like
theirs, that history was undergoing fundamental changes because
the major task of twentieth-century philosophy was to account for
the innovations and accomplishments of twentieth-century historical
discourse,just as the philosophers of the seventeenth century were
confronted with the world-transforming scientific discourse of that
era (Kellner: 1995: 13).
Similarly, Allan Megill, in the same volume has argued that it was the Kantian nature of
the tradition in which Collingwood stood that was responsible for his idea that 'coherence
is rooted in the mind of the historian' (Megill:1995:162). Megill is critical of his idealistic
essentialism (p.161) but considers important Collingwood's view that the historian should
have autonomy over the sources used (p.162). Indeed Munslow - again not as overtly as
he could - makes the further point that a corollary of Collingwood's account is that 'the
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simple level of the empirical' needs to embrace 'self-knowledge' (Munslow:2000:48).17
Thus the influence of Collingwood has helped bring Munslow back towards a more
optimistic stance towards knowledge and towards a recognition that there can be a positive
consequence drawn from aporetic awareness - for example one in which critical self-
awareness is regarded as important. 18
The point now is that in the light of the analysis of this study - ie. the establishment of a
more sceptical empiricism - there would be good reason why defenders of traditional
historiography such as Evans or Marwick should accept that a more overt openness about
selectivity - one's closures - is no threat to empirical methodology. Since some
postmodcms - Munslow for example - also see such openness as possible it becomes clear
that a critically self-aware approach to history is, potentially at least, common to both sides
of the controversy. If this is accepted then it may beMarxist historiography as a model of
history that has successfully come to terms with critical self-awareness, offers a way
forward. For in that perspective lies a ready made and well honed example of how an overt
acknowledgement of closure can function within mainstream historical practice, enabling a
depth of understanding to be achieved.
Section II
What is useful about Marxism for empirical historians, is exactly what more generally they
had criticised in Marxist historiography; ie. their 'bias', or 'subjectivity' or in the terms
J7 Itwould be possible to go one adding examples here, including the linked discussion by Karsten
Stueber (2002) and DimitriosVardoulakis (2004) of Hans-GorgeGadamer's poststructuralist
engagement with Collingwood's thought, especially that of horizons of knowledge. But the point
has been made; this is that whilst avoiding idealism, some poststructuralists, like some empiricists,
have made use of Collingwood's conception of history as being something that is at least partly
made in the present, rather than simply found in the past.
II This is a welcome development, for Munslowappears here - albeit briefly - to be acknowledging
the argument that, as discussed in the introduction, Keith Jenkins and I advocated in the early 1990s,
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being discussed here, their overtly held position. If, as this study has attempted to show,
there is some substance to empirical historians' protestations of scepticism towards
epistemological certainty, then it follows that at root there is no difference between their
own, hitherto barely acknowledged closures, and those more overtly held ones, of Marxist
historians. Empirical historiography cannot have it both ways. If it is to be asserted
(rightly) that objective historical truth appears impossible to achieve in that there is nothing
in the world wholly independent of humans that is able to close the possibility of endless
interpretation, then those closures that are constitutive of knowledge must come from the
present, in some form of association with the knower, or historian. And this has been of
course precisely the ground on which the Marxist account of history has been constructed.
Thus if empirical historians wish to be taken seriously when denying the accusations of
realism by postmoderns in the controversy, they must recognise the extent that they share
the epistemological position, although not necessarily the values, of Marxist historians.
Moreover the latter's own engagement with these issues - specifically with structuralism
and postmodernismlpoststructuralism - can now be seen to be relevant to the needs and
interests of traditional historians. Marxist history has, in effect, the potential to be an
exemplar for empiricists, on how to cope with an awareness of aporia.
What follows in this section is an attempt to draw some simple practical conclusions from
the voluminous material available within the literature on Marxism and history. It brings
Marxism into focus with three areas of the discussion so far. The section examines some
of the more important features of the interface that has developed between empirical and
metaphysical readings of Marx. It looks at the disciplinary context of the manifestly
successful Marxist/social historians who have avoided the stasis of the
empirical/postmodcrn controversy and it sees this as resulting from the work ofE. P.
Thompson. It suggests that the critical self-awareness that is one of the hallmarks of
but which was later abandoned by Jenkins, Munslow and Southgate in the face of their increasingly
pessimistic reading of post modemism.
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Marxist academic work. - evident in the Thompsonian genre - can function as a ready-
made model for non-Marxist empirical historians. Thus whilst accepting the existence of
clear and established differences between empirical and Marxist historiography it is
nevertheless feasible to see the possibility of a closer relationship between their
philosophies of history.
At first glance there appears to be little point in attempting such a comparison, since some
of the principal players on both sides of the controversy have argued that Marxism is
essentially Hegelian and/or otherwise metaphysical and is therefore really quite different
from either postmodcmism or empiricism (Evans: 1997a:61; Jenkins: 1997:7;
Marwick:200 I :4,9,29 & 72; Munslow:2000:7& 160). Certainly there is wider support for a
metaphysical reading of Marxism from both sides of the empiricaVpostmodern divide (eg.
Dreisach: 1994:293 & Berkhoffcr, Jr:I 997:40-4I) 19 However the complexity of Marx's
thought and the variety of actual and possible readings of it rather militates against
expressions of Marxism in the singular.20 Similarly there is a clear spectrum of responses
to postmodemism to be seen in Marxist writings; from for example, outright dismissal by
Callinicos, to the measured rejection of Jurgen Habermas, through the historical creativity
of David Ilarvey to the ambivalence of Fredric Jameson (Callinicos: 1989;
Ilabcrmas:orig. I980, 1996; Ilarvey: 1990; Jameson:orig.1991, 1993). And of course, there
is also the example of Foucault's re-articulation of Marx's concept of power, to provide
encouragement for those who would wish to draw insights between genres of history. For
the purposes of this section however, the focus is on empirical readings of Marx.
19 This is not to suggest that all Marxist metaphysics is Hegelian. See for example Scott Meikle's
Popperian account of Aristotelian essentialism inMarx (Meikle: 1985).
20 There is no shortage of broad useful accounts of the richness and complexity of Marxism. See for
example Cahoone: 1996: Intro; Sharpe:1992:24-39, Southgate:1996:88-93 or White:1973:285-289.
But for a particularly authoritative treatment of some of the issues addressed here see
J.G.Mcrquior·s Wesler" Marxism (1986) especially Parts I& Ill.
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What can be seen here is a struggle within Marxism for what was thought to be its core
characteristics. Although the section focuses on a relatively short period, ie. the emergence
in the 1970's and 80's in the UK ofa specifically empirical form of Marxist historiography,
David Mclellan offers a reminder that this 'moment' can be viewed as part of a longer
term European-wide movement stemming from the development of a humanistic view of
Marxism against an earlier economic, and more deterministic reading of Marx. It was th is
broader struggle which began after the publication of Marx's early writings from the
1920's and which gave rise to widespread debate about the relevance of a distinction
between the 'early' and 'late' Marx (McLellan:1973:13-14). J.G. Merquior has pointed out
that like generic Marxism, humanistic Marxism cannot be seen as a monolith either.
Broadly co-terminous with the description 'western Marxism,' humanistic Marxism was
riven with dissent over the extent that this early work could, or should, be seen as Hegelian
and therefore ideal istic (Merquior: 1986: 1-7). Within this pattern the French structuralist
critique by Louis Althusser, of idealistic humanism within western Marxist discourse, was
itself opposed by the British empirical, Marxist, historian B.P.Thompson, who regarded
Althusser's work as another version of the metaphysics that Marx and Engels had struggled
against. Thompson's position can be seen through historical practice in his highly
successful The Making of The English Working Class (1963), and in theory by his Poverty
of Theory or an Orrey of Errors (1978, here the 1995 edition is used)," As a way in to
Thompson's work it is worth looking briefly at Marx and Engels's objection to
metaphysics, for it is possible to see there, some degree of justification for Thompson's
position.
21 I am conscious of course that Althusser never accepted that he was a part of any school of
philosophy, always warning of the dangers of attempting to explain ideas in relation to their origins.
Nevertheless he has been widely- and convincingly - regarded as a structuralist (eg. Sturrock: 1986:
x&34). For useful discussions of the humanist tradition inMarxism and the empirical challenge to
structuralism by E.P. Thomson and others, see Davies:1997:Ch.2;Hunt:1989:1-22;Tosh:1991:163-
179;Harvey-Kaye:1984:passim).
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Although how theorists see themselves is not of course exhaustive of interpretive
possibilities, persuasive evidence that Marxist thought is more complex than the portrayal
of it as Hegelian, idealistic or in any way essentially metaphysical can readily be seen in
Marx and Engels's own words. In Part One - at the outset - of German Ideology they
explicitly distanced themselves from the German philosophical tradition, which they
considered was idealistic metaphysics (Marx & Engels: 1977:39-40,57,60). In fact they
allied themselves more closely with English empiricism than with German idealism. Lest
there should be any doubt about their position they went on to explain that their
materialism differed from empiricism importantly in that it (materialism) had a criteria for
what was focused upon, (ie. it had an self-conscious starting point) whereas empiricism
appeared not to have one. Indeed they were quite explicit here. Viz:
This method of approach lie. Marx & Engels's materialism]
is not devoid of premises. Its starts out from the real
premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its
premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and
rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptual
process of development under definite conditions. As soon
as this active life process is described, history ceases to be
a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists
(Marx&Engels: 1977:47-8)
There is neither the space nor the need to develop this line of argument here, so I shall
restrict my point to simply observing that if Marx and Engels's writings were to be seen in
this light - as responding to aporia in a similar way to empiricism, but with a more strongly
drawn a priori - other connections would become understandable. There then becomes
much to compare between the respective approaches of Comte and Marx, as Eric Matthews
asserted and as Ronald Fletcher has shown (Matthews: 1996: 109; Fletcher: 1974:246-9). So
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even without taking on board Thompson's argument, it is quite possible to envisage, in
outline, how it might be possible to argue for the existence of an empirical form of
Marxism.
Althusser too, like Marx and Engels, and indeed like Thompson, was concerned to combat
what he saw as a slide into idealism, but he saw idealism as embodied within humanistic
Marxism, which he therefore opposed. The core of his thought on the nature of Marxist
knowledge was contained in two works; For Marx published in 1969 and Reading Capital
which appeared some ten years later. Althusser argued for the acceptance by Marxists of
an alleged scientific methodology - one which for him carried an assurance of certainty, in
terms of Marxist knowledge (Althusser:1969:12,22,30-35,81,111&183). As John Tosh has
summarised, Althusser's strategy to strengthen Marxism against what he regarded as
debilitating (humanistic) ideologies of everyday life, was to
place theory on an elevated pedestal where it is untouched by
the mundane world of empirical evidence: the deeper structures
which underlie both the past and the present cannot be grasped
by assembling all the facts but can be apprehended only by those
in possession of the correct theory .... Correct theory is derived
from a correct reading of Marx's mature works, especially Capital,
in a form that practically amounts to a denial of human agency in
history (Tosh:I991:176).
Moreover Tosh goes on to say that Althusser renounced in its entirety, the empirical
method, arguing that 'the "real" facts of history are beyond our reach, and the distorted
images we have of the past are an irrelevance' (p.176).
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For Marx was widely discussed in Britain but was fairly rapidly rejected by Marxists who,
in the main considered it a deviation from the original ideas of Marx. Norman Geras, for
example, criticised it as being idealist (Geras: 1972:74). The question also arose - an
obvious one for Marxists - about who, or which group within Marxism, might control the
process of discerning appropriate theory. Althusser argued that it was necessary to
'import' such knowledge to the working classes from the theorists - the philosophers.
Workers were unable, he held, to manage for themselves this concept of Marxist science.
The idea that the proletariat needed support from sections of the middles classes was hardly
new (Marx & Engels: 1967:Chl), but Althusser's treatment of the theme was evidently
unconvincing. Perhaps it was that the existence of Stalinism remained still a fresh
memory, but the response of fellow Marxists was to regard Althusser's 'importation' of an
objective - ie. metaphysical- understanding of Marxism as elitist and unworkable
(Callinicos: 1976: I07, Glucksman: 1972:72, Kolalowski: 1971: passim&Shaw: 1975: 110-
112). In fact Althusser's influence, beyond that of a small coterie of enthusiasts, barely
survived the 1970's.
By contrast to Althusser, Thompson's approach, not unlike that ofE.H. Carr, was to use
Marxist ideas as a formative insight - ie. as an a priori - for the writing of general
empirical history (Wilson: 1993: 19). More particularly as Fritz Stem and Dorothy
Thompson have pointed out, E.P. Thompson regarded class as a historical phenomenon,
not as a structural system (Stem: 1970:424; Thompson: 1995:ix). He used it as an empiricist
might (Stem: 1970:426-7). The existence of a thriving group of Marxists working in
broadly the same way as Thompson, is evidence of the acceptance by at least some
Marxists, of an empirical mode of history within Marxism.22 the longstanding popularity of
22 See as a small example Eric Hobsbawm: 1969,1988,1994,1997; Patrick Joyce: 1980,1987,1995,
Robert Gray:1987; Kenneth Lunn& Ann Day:1999; David Feldman & Gareth Stedman Jones:1989
and Donna Loftus: 2000 & 2002. It would be hard to understate Thompson's influence, extending
as it has into studies of the third world (Cooper:1995). Even those who have criticised his work or
politics have recognised his pre-eminent position as a scholar, an historian and a peace campaigner
(egoMcConnell:1983).
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The Making of the English Working Class as an exemplar for his version of Marxism - is
testament to the continuing acceptance by mainstream historians of an empirical Marxism
within mainstream historical practlce."
There is a sense that the empirical/postmodern history controversy is almost a re-run of the
structuralist/empirical Marxism exchanges. Itwill have been noticed for example that
there is a common theme of dogmatic scepticism between Althusser and Jenkins. That is,
they both know that scepticism implies that empirical knowledge is not possible.i" It is this
certainty that Thompson and for example Evans, are respectively combating, that is, the
idea that Althusser or Jenkins somehow knows what can or cannot be known. However the
difference between these two engagements lies in the nature of the responses to that form
of scepticism. Whereas Evans, or Marwick, have been ambivalent about their position,
Thompson has not. And it is a real difference that can take Marwick and Evan's historical
practice forward, if they wish.
In Poverty of Theory Thompson echoed the criticisms of other Marxists. Althusser was
incapable of functioning outside ofan 'either/or' dichotomy (1995:67), Thompson argued.
Althusser's system was a sealed one that was controlled entirely by theory, divorced for
any meaningful contact with 'reality' (p.17). The effect of such a system was to remove
human will from his epistemology (p.119). It was, argued Thomson, a structuralism of
conservatism, of stasis - a result of the environment of the cold war on his thinking
231tis fairly obvious I think, that I am not approaching the depiction of this engagement between
Althusser and Thompson in a spirit of neutral even-handedness. My purpose however is not to re-
fight old battles nor to adjudicate between the merits of either view in relation to their debate.
Rather it is to use the existence of this engagement, within which it appears Thomson worked out his
theoretical position, to illustratehow an empirical Marxist historiography can function as a model
for traditional empirical historians.
24 As discussed in Chapter 2, dogmatic scepticism is distinct from Pyrrhonian scepticism in which
the knower would have no way of knowing either way. Pyrrhonists and their empirical successors
would be unlikely to mount a critique like that of Althusser or Jenkins. Of course it must be
accepted that this comparison goes only so far; their respective responses to their expressions of
aporia are quite different; Althusser's was to rely wholly on Marxist theory and Jenkins's to retreat,
in theory at least, from knowledge-making. It is in their certaintistic assumptions ofan
epistemological standard beyond what is seemingly possible. that they are similar.
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(p.1 00/10 I). It was not that Thompson was against structuralism as such; he drew for
example on Vico's account of structural 'laws' which, like Comte's, were simply
regularities (p.l14). He drew also on Engels's idea of structures, within which it was
possible to see the structure of class (p.117), but for Engels, unlike Althusser, it was a
concept of class that held a degree of free will (although not, of course, - famously - in
circumstances of the knower's own making).
Perhaps the most telling of Thompson's points against Althusser's approach was his
criticism of the latter's concept of observation. Althusser used the term Generalities I to
refer to basic observations, which he considered to be non-knowledge until they were
viewed through the prism of a theory, ie. Generalities II. The application of a theory
produced for Althusser, a science; what he called Generalities III. In terms of Marxist
knowledge, Generalities III was in effect Marxist science, and it was wholly reliable.
Anything other than that was ideology and therefore worthless, or worse. Thompson
argued, on the other hand, rather as the pragmatists had consistently argued, all observation
involves some form oftheory. However simple it might be, observation was theory laden,
and knowledge involves a series of overlaying theoretical perspectives, from the glance to
the philosophical, depending on the circumstances (p14). In the context of Marxism,
workers' own perspectives were not Generalities I, ie. merely unhelpful ideology, awaiting
the application of intellectuals' theory. They were already, at the instant of observation,
theoretical in the sense that their perspectives were meaningful awarenesses of the lived
experience of capitalism (p.19/20). This is not to say that the thought or strategies of
workers could not be sharpened by theory, but to argue, as Thompson did, that Marxist, or
any other kind of theory, does not operate in a vacuum. There is never an observation that
was not always and already constructed at the moment of consciousness by some form of
patterning. It is thus not difficult to see how Thompson's method aided the growing
'history from below' movement of the 1960s and 70's and how it encouraged self-
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awareness on the part of historians, for meaning lay in the gaze, both before and after any
formal theorising.
Like the empirical historians looked at in this study, and like the generic tradition of
empiricism, Thompson made the point that scientific facts do not disclose their own
meanings independently of conceptual organisations' - he accepted that part of Althusser's
view - (p16) and also that few historians expect to find truth (p.20). In his response to this
aporetic awareness Thompson makes it clear that his position is essentially one which
deploys the empirical method - ie. that as for Hume, Comte, Mill and the pragmatists,
Thompson's Marxist knowledge was formed by experience (p.22-23). In the end, he
argued, we are led by our values in the construction of history (59). And in these, value-
laden terms, Thompson's Marxism was empirical too; as he says himself, it 'differs from
other orderings of historical evidence' ie. mainstream empiricism, 'not (or not necessarily)
in any epistemological premises, but in its categories, its characteristic hypotheses and
attendant procedures' (p.59). In other words the difference between Thompsonian Marxism
and the examples of empirical historiography seen so far, is simply that Marxism makes
overt its closures. Its closures are in fact its raison d'etre.
The closer one looks at Thompson's Marxism, the more empirical it looks. For example he
has argued that Marxist models are simply 'expectations' (p60), that historical materialism
is a developing model that changes over time (p.68 & 72) and that in his view Marx and
Engels were firmly against fixed models. They did indeed, Thompson argued, see the
importance of the empirical method as their correspondence over Darwin's anti-
teleological findings demonstrates (p.86). The idea that Marxists were 'moving with the
current' ie. that there were objective forces acting independently of humans, had always
been unhelpful, he argued (p.97). And, as he pointed out, even after using the class
criterion, it was still necessary to do the actual historical work (pp.89-91).
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It has been suggested that the existence of the criterion of 'class struggle' by Marxist
historians has acted as a restriction on their freedom of action as historians and that this has
resulted in Marxist history being poor history (Warren: 1998: 144). It is not necessary for
the discussion of this chapter to become embroiled in such controversy, beyond noting that
the existence of this charge against Marxist historians carries with it an assumption of
acceptance by empirical historians that the Marxist outlook is also empirical, even if they
dislike the form in which it is cast. Indeed Peter Burke has cautioned non-Marxist
historians against conflating the use of the class criterion with a metaphysical approach to
knowledge. Empirical historians, he thought, owed a clear debt to Marx and Engels for
their role in the development of the discipline (Burke: 1992:27,28).
Marwick, McCullagh and Evans have all argued that empirical Marxism has now been
fully integrated into mainstream historiography (Marwick:981 :44-5; McCullagh: 1998: 187;
Evans: 1997a: 169, t 84). Typical is Ludmilla Jordanova's comment, from within a Marxist
practice that:
For those who use Marxian ideas, the claim that
relations of production determine other features of
a society remains central, even if it requires considerable
unpacking. While it may be that the whole package
we call Marxism is now wholeheartedly espoused
by very few historians, many practitioners who never saw
themselves in this camp, are, nonetheless, economic
determinists at heart. (Jordanova:2000:68).
This concurs with the Marxist historian Victor Kiernan's view that without losing its
specific identity, Marxism has become a preferred method of approaching the past for some
historians, but not the only method of doing so (Kiernan: 1983:97). It would thus seem that
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as Joyce Appleby and her co-authors (as empirical historians) and Ludmilla Jordanova (as
a Marxist historian) agree that it is quite possible to be both a Marxist and also a member of
the mainstream of empirical historical practice (Appleby: 1994:80-1; Jordanova:2000: 198).
Importantly Thompson was not alone - his was not an isolated re-interpretation of Marx
and Engels's work. In his work The British Marxist Historians Harvey J. Kaye has placed
Thompson alongside Maurice Dobb, Rodney Hilton, Christopher Hill and Eric Hobsbawm
as together forming the start of an important theoretical tradition. The results of that
formation in which clearly empirical historical research is allied to an obvious or overtly
expressed perspective, can be seen to be flourishing in the work of a range of social and
cultural historians."
There is a problem in leaving the discussion here, with the assertion that Marxists'
methodological self-awareness - that is to say its clarity about its own criterion for
selection of material - offers a way forward for traditional empirical historians. This is that
the latter are unlikely to avail themselves of the offer. The point about empirical tardiness
in making clear their own criteria has of course been seen by Marxists as a strategy for the
masking of values - bourgeois values. And conversely the Marxist criterion has been
regarded by many empiricists as evidence of closed minds that insist on focussing on class
to the exclusion of other factors. This is of course needs no elaboration. So while there
may be no theoretical reason why empiricists should not share Marxists' methods, it is not
2S See for example, Robert Gray's 'The Languages of Factory reform' (1987), Gareth Stedman
Jones's 'The "Cockney" and the Nation, 1780-1988' (Feldman& Jones:1989:272-324) and Raphael
Samuel's influentialHistory Workshop Series at Routledge. See also Lunn& Day's collection of
papers History of Work and Labour Relations in the Royal Dockyards (1999) and the series of
which it is a part - Employment and Work Relations edited by Tony Eiger& Peter Fairbrother at the
Centre for Comparative Labour Studies, Dept. of Sociology, University of Warwick. Also central
here is Patrick Joyce's Work Society and Politics: the Culture of the Factory in Later I~ Century
England (1980) and his other works eg., 1987,1991,1994& 2002. His historiographical contribution
to the debate betweenMarxist social history and poststructuralism is considered separately in the
next section. Indicative too of this approach to history is Donna Loftus's 'Class Co-operation and
the Urban Landscape inMid-NineteenthCentury England' (2000) and 'Capital and Community:
Limited Liability and Attempts to democratise the Market inMid-Nineteenth Century England'
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hard to guess that they probably will not do so in practice - as they have not in the past.
But this is not as negative a point as it may seem, for if the analysis of this study were to go
no further, what it will have regained is the degree of clarity between empirical and Marxist
history that formerly existed. That is to say it is possible to see again, before the
postmodem controversy clouded the issues, that the difference between empirical and
Marxist historians is ultimately not epistemological, but political.
However it is not necessary to leave the discussion at this point, because so far it has
merely raised the possibility of establishing some commonality between empiricist and
Marxist history. A continued analysis of the broader debate can show how this is possible
in practice. This is because Thompsonian Marxists, particularly Patrick Joyce," have had
their own engagement with poststructuralism. The result of this has been a more optimistic
account of knowledge, and history, than the one that emerged from Jenkins, Munslow and
Southgate's reading and which formed the postmodem challenge within the controversy.
Of course, differences of values between Marxists and others rightly remain, but it can be
seen that poststructuralist insights are capable of softening the edges between the now more
sceptical empirical historiography and Thompsonian Marxism. And they can do the same
too for the interface between empirical history and poststructuralism. They are therefore
indicative of the discursive basis sought for in this study.27
(2002). Other work by Thompson, contributing to this tradition, includes 'The Peculiarities of the
English' (1965), 'CaudweU' (1977) and 'Class Struggle Without Class' (1978).
26 Generally Joyce describes himself as a social historian, but he has at times made it clear that he
works within a broadly Marxist position (eg.Joyce: 1996:96).
27 For clarity of expression in the fmal section of this chapter, I am using the term 'aporetic
empiricism' to denote the more overtly sceptical empirical stance argued for in earlier chapters of
this study. Likewise I am employing the description 'empirical Marxism' to refer to the
Thompsonian tradition discussed in this section.
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Section DI
Keith Jenkins's use ofpostmodern insights is a useful point to begin this final section of the
discussion - for two reasons. As with Marxism there is an initial issue to be addressed in
relation to poststructuralismj" This is that within the controversy - especially evident in
Jenkins's contribution - there is an assumption that poststructuralism provides an argument
for the impossibility of knowledge. It is of course this that fuels notions of negativity in
relation to aporetic awareness. Although such epistemological negativity could simply be
omitted for the purpose of this chapter, it is helpful to indicate briefly why I find it
unconvincing, since this has a bearing on the way poststructuralism might be seen
differently. The second, and more important, reason for starting with Jenkins is that,
despite h is own reading of it, he provides some splendid evidence of how poststructuralism
can be seen positively, as not only supportive of the possibility of knowledge, but also as
providing a valuable model for sceptical empirical historians. In short it is possible to
select, profitably, from Jenkins's work.
For example in Why History 29 it is clear that he relies heavily on a reading of Derrida to
support his position. The picture that Jenkins gives of Derrida's account of knowledge is
useful indeed, for it is one with which no pyrrhonist could disagree. All the pyrrhonian
strictures against essentialism, objectivist or dogmatic knowledge, are there. In Sextus
Empiricus's pyrrhonian work the central dimension is a reductive one - ie. that any
justification of knowledge relies upon further justifications and so on. This of course tends
to emphasis how closures (responses to aporia) pile up one upon another to produce the
epistemological raft that we call knowledge. On the other hand, the central emphasis on
28 I am broadly following John Sturrock's view of poststructuralism as encompassing the works of
Claude Levi-Strauss, RolandBarthes, Michel Foucault, Jaques Lacan and Jacques Derrida.
Sturrock:1979& 1986). But because of the focus on Jenkins's work I include also, as he does,
Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard and Richard Rorty Jenkins:1999). However I accept David
West's focus on a 'decentring of the subject' principally by Foucault and Derrida, as perhaps
constituting the core of the concept (West:1996:Ch.6).
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language in Derrida is a highly appropriate means for our own times, by which it is
possible to see the same process - ie a coagulation of 'responses' into meaning - being
formed and transmitted within concepts and across socially constructed usages of language.
Certainly Derrida's treatment of the issues is a good deal more sophisticated than the
fragments of pyrrhonism that now remain, but their common role in enabling the
understanding of how aporia might be thought to produce knowledge, is unmistakable.
Although the general thrust of each is to debunk notions of objective truth, they both carry
clear recognition that lower case (to use Jenkins's expression) everyday truths (responses to
aporia) are both possible and necessary. For example Jenkins explains:
To be sure Derrida knows that to get around in the world 'we'
need some fictive stabilities to (albeit imperfectly) occur ..•
"Thus it becomes necessary to stabilise precisely because
stabilisation is not natural." (Jenkins:1999:44io
Clearly on this evidence it is obvious that Derrida, like pyrrhonism, is supportive of the
possibility of ordinary everyday knowledge - everyday (lower case) historical knowledge.
31 Yet this is precisely what Jenkins has argued against, using Derrida as his primary
justification. It is not unreasonable to ask why this should be so. Unfortunately the answer
is not clear - Jenkins is uncharacteristically reticent here. There is no doubt that Jenkins's
quarrel is with what he regards as metaphysical history, but his response to the issue is a
29 This is Jenkins's most systematic explanation of his 'end of history' argument.
30 Here Jenkins's Derrida can be directly compared with Sextus Empiricus's acceptance that it is
quite possible to have knowledge provided always that one does not believe it to be objectively true.
See the discussion on pyrrhonian epistemology in Chapter Two.
31 Optimistic readings ofpoststructuralism are not difficult to find. See for example Hugh Rayment-
pickard's 'Derrida and Fidelity to history' where it is argued that Derrrida is 'a philosopher who
cares very much about truth, in particular about historical truth' (Rayment-pickard:2002:13). See
also Rodolphe Gasche's 'Infrstructures and Systematicity'). Gasche argues that 'Oerrida's
philosophy is more often than not [wrongly] constructed as a license for arbitrary free play in
flagrant disregard of all established rules ofargumentation, traditional requirements of thought, and
ethical standards binding upon the interpretative community' (Gasche: 1988:3). Similar arguments
can be found in Christina Howell's Derrida, Deconstructionfrom Phenomenology to Ethics (1999)
and Christopher Norris's Derrida (1987).
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call for the ending of all forms of history, not just for those demonstrating metaphysical
assumptions. It is nothing less than for everyone to - 'live out of history but in time ... '
(p.206).
It is possible that Jenkins's argument - from the evidenced 'particular' to the asserted
'general' - is simply the result of exuberance of rhetoric, but this is perhaps unlikely. A
more feasible explanation might be that his argument simply slipped. It is noticeable that
when in the book he first presented his account ofDerrida, due regard was given to the
importance that Derrida places on knowledge, especially on that of 'emancipation' (eg.
pages 38, 40 & 41). When Jenkins later drew his conclusions from his reading of Derrida
and others, there was no longer any reference to their acceptance of closures in the every-
day construction of knowledge - the 'getting about in the world'. Jenkins acknowledged
that 'Derrida doesn't go on to consider this context of lower case history, concentrating on
the metanarratives of yesteryear' but he went ahead anyway to include it in an all-
embracing ban. Moreover in his continual reference to Derrida throughout the conclusion
of his argument, he leaves the reader with the impression that Derrida supports this
inclusion of lower case history just as if Derrida had included it in his target. Thus in the
absence of any further references to 'fictive stabilities' Jenkins regards all form of closure
as metaphysical and therefore needing to be expunged from intellectual life.
Of course it is possible that I have misread Jenkins's account here, but in the absence by
him of any serious analysis of lower case complicity in metaphysical historicising, a degree
of conjecture is necessary. Clearly then, on its own, Jenkins's reading of Derrida's
poststructuralist stance towards history is hardly compelling. Munslow and Southgate, who
support his work generally, have been decidedly ambivalent on this issue and, as
previously mentioned, in recent works they have both become noticeably more optimistic
about a future for history. Thus in the absence of substantive support from other
postmodemists within the controversy it would seem sensible to lay Jenkins's version of
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poststructuralism to one side. It is true that these brief comments hardly constitute an in
depth analysis of his case. But it is obvious that there is a problem - a lacuna - in the
justification Jenkins offers for epistemological negativity. Indeed the problem may be
indicative of a deeper difficulty in his approach to aporia. It has, for example already been
noted that the degree of certainty with which he discusses the existence of postmodernity
sits uneasily on his espoused scepticism (Richard Evans in Chapter One of this study).
Similarly Patrick Joyce regards Jenkins as offering 'a kind of idealist or subjectivist
postmodernism which is the objectivist position stood on its head' - that, in effect, Jenkins
and Evans 'mutually constitute each other.' (Joyce 1998:23 I). 32 Such further analysis,
however, would take the discussion beyond the scope and aims of this section. If there is
no obvious reason why awareness of aporia should imply a problem with the making of
knowledge in the ordinary sense of the word, then there is no reason why sceptical
empiricists should not seek insights from other, readily available and more positive
explanations of poststructuralism.
To do this it is helpful to return to the Marxist social history experience, for as empirical
Marxists they have had a comparable 'controversy' themselves, first briefly with traditional
empirical historians but subsequently in the form of an internal discussion about the lessons
to be learned from poststructuralism. The result has been quite different from the outcome
of the controversy in that Marxism has unambiguously endorsed a reflexive approach to
history.33
32 A related area of analysis might focus on theorists who regard the existence of aporia with all its
messy uncertainty as a major problem (a problem always putatively for others). It might compare
this response with empiricists' easy acceptance of the need to make 'the best of it'. and conclude
that the problem for such theorists is not in aporia itself, but in their own anxiety towards it.
33 Use of the word 'unambiguously' prompts the need for a qualifier. First it is not strictly accurate
to say that this part of the debate has been separate from the controversy. not least because most its
contents would have been known to Jenkins, Evans et.al. This is evidenced by the inclusion of some
of these papers within Keith Jenkins's collection The Postmodern Reader (1997) and elsewhere.
Nevertheless the respective patterns are sufficiently different for the distinction to stand.
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The exchanges began in May 1991 with the publication of the now well known short piece
in Past & Present by Lawrence Stone in which he expressed a concern at new ideas about
the nature of historical knowledge. (1991 :217/8). It was clear that Stone did not have a
strong understanding of poststructuralist concepts such as 'nothing beyond the text'. the
'real is as imagined as the imaginary' or what he regarded as New Historicist ideas of 'the
"real" as being constructed as it was apprehended' (Stone: 1991 :217). Patrick Joyce's
response to this, later in 1991, was robust, pointing out that some of these so called threats
to history were coming from mainstream figures such as Bakhtin. Despite Joyce's
combative stance the stasis of the controversy was avoided by his suggesting a way
forward for the discipline - methodological self-awareness. His paper was accompanied
by a similar although more conciliatory piece by Catriona Kelly who, using women's
studies as an example, explored common ground between postmodern and empirical
positions. She argued that in the twentieth! twenty-first century, in conditions of mass
education and communication, the now more varied constituency of history-making,
implied that there was a need to define the context giving rise to particular selections and
interpretations of evidence. Kelly argued that a consequence of this was that meaning had
to be defined by understanding the multi-faceted nature of context - in other words, by
reflexive practice. Here then at the outset of these exchanges, was a practical suggestion
for a sceptical empirical methodology that was more flexible than empirical Marxism's
class criterion, but nevertheless shared its overt constructivism.
This paired reply to Stone was in tum responded to by Stone and Gabrielle Spiegel the
following year. They readily acknowledged that theirs was sceptical empirical practice and
they accepted a degree of constructivism in their understanding of history, but they
continued to assume that there was a core of historical knowledge that was not susceptible
to interpretation. Spiegel, for example, welcomed the use of deconstructive strategies in
reading historical texts as
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powerful tools of analysis in uncovering and dismantling the
ways in which texts perform elaborate ideological
mystifications of which it is proper to be suspicious
(Spiegel: 1992:204).
But at the same time she still spoke of 'extreme' poststructuralists and posited
poststructuralism against 'history' as though it was possible to separate knowledge as such
from its means of achievement (p.207). Thus they still differed from postmodemists about
whether in the last instance there was a core of historical knowledge that eluded
interpretation. However I do not find this point too discouraging. Spiegel largely agrees
with the poststructuralist process in which knowledge is formed - through what she calls
'mediation '( 197/8). She explains it thus. It functions:
both for the operation of mediation in the past (that is, for example,
as embodied in a discourse that mediates between a social world and
its literary and discursive consciousness of its own nature) and for the
historical analyses that we undertake of that world, allowing historians
to comprehend historical experience via the linguistic evidence - whether
literary or documentary - by which we come to know and understand
the past (Spiegel: 1992: 198).
That is to say (on behalf of Spiegel) that whilst she believes there is a world existing
objectively of the knowing subject (and this is common ground) it can only be known
through human discursive patterns. If this is so, it leaves her supposed unproblematic 'last
instance' fragile indeed, and susceptible to an understanding of it as being sedimented
layers of interpretation, rather than a form of realism. In other words, I consider there to be
little of principle between Spiegel and for example Kelly and I am hopeful that the kind of
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empirical analysis of empiricism offered in this study, will prove helpful in supporting a
continued dialogue between these positions.
The following year (1993) in Adrian Wilson's Rethinking Social History, Patrick Curry
turned the focus onto Marxism, arguing that it had a future only in the post-Marxist form
that he saw emerging from Thompson but also more recently from Ernesto Laclau and
Chantal Mouffe and Patrick Joyce. Interestingly (in terms of the historical connection
between pragmatist/postmodernism and empiricism discussed in the previous chapter)
Curry considered that, epistemologically if not politically, this form of Marxism was
coherent with Rortean postmodernism. After two somewhat combative papers in Social
History (1994) by, James Vernon and Neville Kirk. the postmodern analysis of Marxism
gathered pace with Patrick Joyce's paper in 1995 when he suggested ways in which
Marxist social history could address the issues being raised by poststructuralism. Far from
the negativity of the controversy, his was a positive response that followed the example of
Foucault, drawing from Marxism what was useful whilst avoiding what was outdated or
unhelpful. In particular Joyce argued for a broadening of the concept of class towards a
more fluid, flexible, articulation (1995:86). Class was not to be abandoned so much as
rethought. It was no longer feasible he argued, to simply invoke class as a 'coded term for
the real' (p.78). 'This referent, the "social" is itself a "discursive" product of history'
(p.82). Thus 'the search is now for how meanings have been produced by relations of
power, rather than for "external" or "objective" class "structures", or other "social"
referents.' Moreover, the role of the individual had become more obviously multifaceted,
he argued; 'many identities press and react with one another' (p.82). Again, 'there (in the
new postmodern sociologies) the whole emphasis is against understandings of society as a
system or a totality, and upon self-constitution, randomness and the reflexivity of subjects'
(p.90). Poststructuralism in his view became an exciting catalyst for change, for renewal
and development in Marxist social history. And there was, in effect, nothing in his
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approach that, of necessity, would bar the involvement of sceptical empirical historians so
long as they were willing to adopt a more reflexive practice.
Later in 1995 Joyce received something resembling a 'dressing down' from fellow
Marxists GeoffEley and Keith Nield who considered his intervention to be too hostile to
traditional concepts of class and too certaintistic in its general tone.34 Although in 1996 he
replied, re-asserting his core claim that Marxist social history must rethink its working
concepts by engaging with poststructuralism, Eley and Nield's critique had an effect. Thus
Joyce contributed a piece (to Past and Present) that was noticeably more optimistic than
before, about history. Poststructuralism perhaps implied 'not the end, but the return of
history' (1996:235). Postmodemism was as much a product of social change as its
instigator and therefore other forms of expression may be more effective than
postmodemism in bringing about methodological change (p.209). These other forms may
include traditional historiography itself, he reasoned, for history had become looser in
recent years and practitioners had become more aware of their constructive role (p.209).
And the aim now, he thought, was for historians to see 'the inescapable operations of
power in the creation of discourse (p.21 0). What was needed he suggested, was a form of
reflexivity that recognised what Berkhoffer had called 'the inevitability of narrative
historical knowledge, but yet seeks to subvert the tendencies to closure evident in all
narratives' (Joyce: 1996:216).35
Joyce continued this optimistic theme in 2001, in an auto-biographical piece for rethinking
History. Here he considered that 'power and truth in history do not seem to me to be
incompatible' although he acknowledged that a certain tension could result. Indeed the
historian had 'a sort of duty to doubt' (p.368). His conclusion was again that reflexivity
34 For simplicity of exposition I am ignoring other criticisms such as Joyce's avoidance of
engagement with Fredric Jameson's account ofpostmodemism as the 'cultural logic oflate
capitalism' (Jameson:1991)which, although important for the participants, has perhaps less value
for this study.
3S I am assuming Berkhoffer is using the term closure to indicate upper case objective certainty and
not the kind oflower case 'means of making sense' ie. closing ofTthe potential for ongoing
interpretation, as I have used it in this study.
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was the way forward for historians. It would be possible to go on, exploring the byways of
these exchanges between Marxist social historians and those in favour of poststructural ist
change, but the lesson from them can now be drawn.
The contrast between the dynamics of these exchanges and the static controversy of
Jenkins, Munslow and Southgate with Evans, Marwick and Zagorin, could not be more
marked. In the controversy, as was noted in Chapter One, the participants are still arguing
about objectivity and the possibility of knowledge in conditions ofpostmodemism. Here
between Marxism and poststructuralism, both of these positions are theoretically aware and
the discussion has become one about responses to aporia. What appears to be happening is
that the influence of poststructuralism is nudging Marxist responses away from the
traditional criterion of class, with all its apparent reliability, and towards a more open-
ended, linguistic, flexible reflexivity. It is not that they are claiming that class longer
functions as a closure, but that its appropriateness needs justifying in particular
circumstances, rather than being taken as 'a given'. Naturally enough not all Marxists are
likely to be happy with such changes - Marxism is nothing if not alive to the existence of
political positions that would want to neutralise its effective edge. There is no need
however for this discussion to become involved in the desirability or otherwise of this shift
of closure except to note that the reflexive form makes it easier (as will be apparent) for
empirical historians to locate themselves alongside, rather than as epistemologically
opposed to, Marxism.
Several questions need now to be answered before it is possible to see clearly a common
base between these positions of empiricism, Marxism and poststructuralism. The first is
about the nature of this term 'reflexivity' that has been used until now interchangeably with
'methodological self-awareness'. How exactly does the former differ from the latter? A
preliminary answer might be that methodological self-awareness seems to carry an
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assumption that if the historian gets the method right, then 'right' kind of knowledge
results. With reflexivity, there is a sense that the model implies a double effect. First there
is an awareness of the choices that are being made in forming any historical knowledge and
that these draw the intellectual activity of the knower, always already in existence in an act
of knowing, more closely towards being a core part of the practice of history. Secondly
there is a similar awareness that the knowledge thus produced by that
selection/interpretation affects in turn the perspective that gave rise to it. Therefore
knowledge builds, as if on a raft, floating on an acceptance of a world outside human
knowledge (this is no idealism) but unconnected with that world in any meaningful way
(ie. all knowledge is a human construction). In this way the 'activity' of the knower
becomes a necessary part of the construction of historical knowledge and not merely an
optional add-on. The historian, working such a model of history, needs to be as much
aware of this process of reflexivity as of the use made of sources.
What follows now, in this discussion, is a brief examination of how poststructuralists
themselves have treated issues of reflexivity, and thus of how mainstream empirical
historians could begin a dialogue with them, for poststructuralism is a response to aporia
that has made the study of closures absolutely central to its approach to knowledge. It can
be seen here that not only is there nothing in this reading of poststructuralism that is likely
to prove at all problematic in reflexivity for empirical historiography, there is much that is
positively beneficial, not least its ability to effect a dialogue between empiricism and
Marxism.
It is not difficult to see that although traditional (now aporetic) empirical historians might
balk at using a traditional Marxist form of methodological awareness as a means of
practising history, they are more likely to be persuaded to accept the need for a greater
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degree of reflexivity in their work. In this sense reflexivity is not any less value laden - or
political - a process than methodological self-awareness; it only seems so, but it does offer
a more flexible means of handling values in history. Reflexivity then, could in both theory
and practice, become a common methodology for empirical as well as Marxist historians.
If this should be the case, it is reasonable to ask whether reflexivity is stable as a closure-
whether it provides stable knowledge.
The answer is, not entirely unexpectedly but equaJly not inappropriately, ambivalent.
Hilary Lawson's poststructuralist approach helps here. She speaks of reflexivity as being
'a mystery' (1985:Ch.1) and warns that no 'self conscious nod' in the direction of
reflexivity will settle the matter of aporia and the identification of 'correct' responses to it.
I have given here three quotes from her work Reflexivity (1985) which I find helpful as a
way into an understanding of the concept. Thus for her reflexivity is:
A turning back on oneself, a form of self-awareness that has
been a part of philosophy from its inception, but reflexive
questions have been given their special force in
consequence of the recognition of the special role played
by language, theory, sign and text ... paradox rules (1985 :9).
Similarly:
Through language, theory and text, we close the openness that is
the world. The closures we make provide the world - they are in a
sense all that we have and all that we could have. To want a final
description of the world is to want more than this! (p.128).
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And perhaps crucially:
There are a multiplicity of possible closures but each
closure textures the world and thereby enables us to
do things in the "world". The choice of closures is not
merely a theoretical affair, for it determines the
possibility of action open to us (p.129).
Clearly traditional empirical historians do not, at present at least, talk about their closures,
that is to say their interpretations, in this way, but they could so; nothing that they have at
present would be lost except the masking oftheir values, and this they deny anyway! Were
they to model their practice in terms of reflexivity, then a wealth of theoretical insights on
the nature of closures - of poststructuralism - would be available to them. But this tum
would raise further questions, the most pressing of which is whether, or the extent to
which, poststructuralism - or deconstruction, which is in effect the same as
poststructuralism - differs from empiricism and pragmatism. The answer here is that there
is perhaps a difference, but it is not one that implies epistemological nihilism; in fact quite
the reverse. Christopher Norris has pointed out that there is a point at which Derridean
deconstruction parts company with postmodern pragmatism in its various forms
(Norris: 1987: 161). However, for Norris this is not because, as so often assumed, the
former is more radically sceptical than pragmatism so much as more intellectually rigorous.
36 Norris's point here is that pragmatism's response to aporia is to accept a consensual
account of knowledge, a view that I have suggested is shared with empiricism.
36 It is worth recalling here the argued connection between empiricism and pragmatism (Ch.3).
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Deconstruction on the other hand. Norris argues, considers the process through which
arguments are created. ie. the nature of closures.
However - and this enables Derrida's thought to be of value to empiricists - it is essentially
metaphysical assumptions and especially Kantian claims to certainty, that is the target of
Derrida's critique - not knowledge in its entirety. For example:
I have argued (and understood Derrida as arguing) that
deconstruction is a rigorous attempt to think the limits
of that principle of reason which has shaped the
emergence of western philosophy, science and
technology at large .... thus the outcome of
deconstruction is strictly inconceivable outside the
tradition of enlightened rational critique whose classic
formulations are still to be found in Kant. (1987: 162).
Christine I lowell otTers a useful, albeit lengthy, explanation of how deconstruction might
be understood, thus:
Deconstruction may set out to 'read between the lines', or
even 'read against the grain', but it always attempts to
read, and to understand. The so-called 'play of
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interpretation', which Derrida refers to as
'dissemination', is a play in the linguistic
mechanism perhaps, but it is not the 'free play' beloved
of some of Derrida' s less rigorous followers. It is rather
the demonstration of textual self-contradiction which is
the essence of the deconstructive project. It differs from
the standard philosophical technique of finding flaws in
the logic of an opponent's argument in that the
contradictions uncovered reveal an incompatibility
between what the writer believes him or herselfto be
arguing and what the text itself actually says. This gap
between authorial intention and textual meaning is a
key focus of deconstruction (Howells: 1999;3).37
My intention here is not to attempt to offer an assessment of these 'definitions', much less
so of the concepts discussed. Rather it is that, in showing what poststructuralists are
currently saying about their approaches to knowledge, I am showing too - hopefully - that
their critical focus on linguistic closures offer a new intellectual resource upon which
aporetic empirical historians can draw, to the benefit of their practice. But - and this is the
next of the pressing questions - can it still be said that poststructuralism is political if it
abjures the class criterion? Is it not the case that accounts of the world that try to cope with
every aspect of values are likely to have little effect on any of them?
37 See also John Sturrock's useful work Structuralism (1986) especially Chapter Five.
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The answer here is that there is no doubt that poststructuralists attempt to be political.
Whether they achieve it is perhaps something that needs to be discussed in relation to
particular issues and circumstances - a generic response is inappropriate. Here Keith
Jenkins has provided useful evidence. In this example his extract follows Derrida having
argued that democracy is something that may, and should be, sought, but that it will never
be achieved in the sense of being unable to be improved upon." Derrida is nevertheless
keen to stress that he does not mean that democracy as such - in the usual everyday sense -
cannot happen. Thus:
emancipation is once again a vast question today and I
must say that I have no tolerance for those who -
deconstructionist or not - are ironical with regard to the
grand discourse of emancipation. This attitude has
always distressed and irritated me. I do not want to
renounce this discourse (Jenkins: 1999:41 ).39
Aside from Derrida, Honi Fern Haber has examined and compared particular expressions
of poststructuralism - ie. the closures - of Jean-Francois Lyotard, Richard Rorty and Michel
Foucault from her standpoint as a socialist woman of colour (Haber: 1994). She concluded
that although all three of them held positions that could be regarded as ostensibly
supportive of her own, in fact only Foucault handled power in knowledge in a way that
someone in her position might find practically useful. She found that Lyotard universalised
difference (ie. scepticism) to the extent that in no act of closure would work adequately-
all was and remained, interpretative. For Haber this had real significance in
38Derrida'saccount of the unrealisability of democracy and other value laden concepts is discussed
inmore detail in Chantal Mouffe's Deconstruction and Pragmatism (1996) Chapter One and, more
~enerally, in Derrida's Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (2001).
9See also Derrida's heavy criticism of Heidegger's politics in 'Geschlech III' (Sallis:1972). Culler
too discusses the issue of poststructuralistpolitics, making the point that deconstruction is a way of
taking a position that although 'too political for some, it will seem paralyzing to those who only
recognise politics by the most familiar road signs' (Culler:1983:IS6).
197
disenfranchising emergent 'voices'. Similarly Rorty's abandonment (as Haber saw it) of
rigorous analysis for consensus epistemology, tended to have the same practical effect as
Lyotard, namely that of valorising existing class, gender and ethnic power (Haber: 1994:
7/8).40 Foucault by contrast, shows how power and knowledge intersect, she argued. Thus
Foucault recognises the
ubiquity of power and that this is a thesis that
encourages imaginative reconstructions of everyday life
along lines that are in keeping with the postructural
insight that subjectivity and intentionality are not prior
to, but functions of forms of life and systems of
language, and they therefore do not constitute the world
but are themselves elements of a linguistically disclosed
reality (Haber: 1994: 78).41
The final, perhaps most important question, is how exactly might newly converted aporetic
empirical historians use these poststructuralist ideas in their daily work. What follows can
only be sketched lightly, for the aim here has been to provide a path towards a possible
dialogue between empiricism, marxism and poststructuralism, rather than to host the
dialogue itself. Nevertheless it must be clear to the reader by now that the ground I see as
40On the face of it the connection (made in this study) between aporetic empiricism and Rortian
pragmatic postmodernism would seem to suggest that modernised empiricismmight itselfsutTer
from the same defect, that both Haber, and Norris, have identified. However there is a reasonable
chance that empiricism's own tradition of analytical rigour will be protection against this possible
narve consensualism (or constructualism). Certainly this is not an issue that I think is necessary to
address here.
41 See also Eric Matthews's Twentieth Century French Philosophy (1996) where he makes the same
point about Foucault as was made about Derrida. Thus for Matthews, Foucault sees ideas existing in
their social context as part ofa 'modem scepticismabout the possibility of metaphysics.• Foucault's
critique is firmly against the 'formation of general a-priori accounts of an unchanging "human
nature'" (1996:149), his treatment of genealogy applying itself to institutions as well as discourses
(p. I52). Matthews's reading of Foucault brings out - positively - the tension seen between a sense
of permanent critique of the self resulting from the enlightenment and notions ofa fixed concept of
human nature as a consequence of humanism (p.l53). For a less sympathetic reading of Foucault,
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potentially existing, on which this dialogue can be built, is that of reflexivity. It is
reflexivity - in the sense of making more overt its closures - that is now possible for
aporetic empirical historians. It is reflexivity in a rather different 'methodological' form
that has long been a part of empirical Marxist historiography and it is reflexivity that is the
raison d'etre of poststructuralism, to the extent that it is reasonable to look to its theorists
for guidance and insights as to how the concept can be effectively used. Again, Derrida's
work is pre-eminent.
Sturrock explains how deconstruction might be employed. This turns on Derrida's critique
of the mctaphysics of presence. Sturrock summarises it as an assumption that Derrida has
regarded as fundamental to the western tradition," which 'assumes that whatever is
present to us is wholly and immediately so, grasped in an act of "pure" intuition which has
no recourse to sign. Presence (in this view) precedes signification' (Sturrock: 1986: 138).
The point is that for Dcrrida presence can apparently be known only by language and, post
Saussure, (moderated by Dcrrida) once language is brought into the process the connection
between meaning and the referent (the Kantian 'thing in itself' ) is only by a system of
signification (ie. a language with all its cultural implications) and by a matrix of difference
ie. by comparison with what it is not. Sturrock again: 'we are conscious of what is present
to us as being present; and the concept of presence like all concepts, is not a self enclosed
unity. but one inhabited by its contrary' (1986: 138).43
Thus, in history, the more that the meaning of an organising concept, a perspective or the
result of an analysis of a source, etc. is understood to be constructed in part by its
see Walzer's argument that power without a centre is an essentially conservative doctrine (1986: 54
&. 67). Also useful more generally, is Hoy's collection of papers (1986) and Merquior (1991).
421 am not at all sure that my analysis of the longevity ofempiricaJ forms ofaporetic awareness sits
easily with Derrida's somewhat universalist characterisation of the metaphysics of presence, but I
see no reason why selections should not be made from his work as happened with so many other'
theorists.
4) In practice I have found helpful Catherine Belsey's somewhat sloganised summary of
deconstruction as being 'the other invades the selfsame' (Belsey: 2002:81,82 &. 113).
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differential relations with other concepts, perspectives or analyses, then the clearer is going
to be the understanding gained (constructed) from the past. What this implies in practice is
the desirability of history in which the selections, options, principles and values are
included as prominently as are currently the more obvious and physical means of making
sense of the past ie. the sources and conventions. By making them overt and obvious,
historians make it easier for those with whom they communicate to 'deconstruct' the
intellectual component of their historical knowledge and thereby to understand what is
being communicated better. This for me is reflexivity and this is what I should like to
commend as the base-line benefit for empirical historians, teachers and students in
following such a route to understanding the past." I have tried to model this practice here
in this study, in the explanatory remarks made in the introduction and at times in the body
of the work.
There are of course other concepts and procedures of poststructuralism that are of
considerable benefit in constructing histories and which an interperspectival dialogue might
pick up on and explore and which cannot be discussed to any useful extent here. One such
concept has been available for a long time - and regarded as almost pre-poststructuralistf -
ie. Mikhail Bakhtin's idea ofheteroglossia. What it shares with current poststructuralism is
its rigorous working of issues relating to language against a cultural context - in fact that of
class. In brief hcteroglossia is intended to signify the multiplicity of voices that can be
heard within a text and which become merged in the process of understanding. It indicates
too the tension that might be thought to exist in the use of words as between the pull of the
44 This is not to say that once an open reflexive attitude to the past has been adopted, that is the end
of the business of making sense of the past. Culler points out that deconstruction does not set
everything straight. The historian can still be left with all sorts of contradictions and difficulties to
sort out in the process of making historical knowledge (Culler:1983:109) .
•, This is a rather controversial issue. See Thomson (2001 :85) and Sturrock (1986:136) for a
discussion of Bakhtin's credentials as a poststructuralist.
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'centre' ie. the meaning of the word within the system of language which it inhabits and the
often contrary pull of the actual use of the word in particular circumstances and context."
Clearly these comments on poststructuralism and history are very far from exhaustive, but
perhaps they give a sense of a useful - and epistemologically coherent - range of
possibilities that can be accessed by hitherto traditional empirical historians who are
prepared to reconsider their historical practice in the way suggested here. To reach this
point this final chapter started by sketching out how present day empirical history could be
thought to be associated with the longer tradition of generic empiricism discussed in
Chapters Two and Three and which was shown to have long been aporetically aware. In
doing this it was noted although empirical historiography had been influenced at times,
from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, by historians of more metaphysical
inclinations, its empiricism has remained intact. An exception to this pattern was seen in
relation to Collingwood's work where his influence was towards encouraging a welcome
degree of self-awareness of the constructivism inherent in the making of history. The focus
then moved to consider Marxist history and it was noted that this awareness - a
methodological self-awareness - was not only a hallmark of a now more empirical
approach within Marxist historiography, but also a link between aporetic empiricism and
the linguistic concepts of poststructuralism. Thus I have suggested, and I conclude this
chapter by contending that despite their obvious differences, empirical, Marxist and
poststructuralist historians can, if they wish, enter into productive dialogue with each other
around a focus on reflexivity.
46 See Dentith (1995) for a thorough discussion of Bakhtin's thought (and that of his collaborator V.
N. Voloshinov and the complex authorial relationship between them). See too John Arnold (1998)
for an example ofheteroglssia in historical use. Nancy Fraser (1997:155) is useful for an explanation
of what she calls Bakhtin's 'pragmatics model' and Lynette Hunter (1999:139) for a discussion of
his accompanying concept - 'dialogism'. Bakhtin's Marxist base is usefully explored in Pechey's
review article on Ken Hirschop's work on Bakhtin (2001).
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Cenclusion
In engaging with the scepticism of this postmodern challenge to empirical history, I hope
that I have helped in several ways, to move the debate forward. First, in identifying the very
many examples of scepticism evident in the western historical tradition, I have attempted to
show that scepticism is a more important dimension of philosophy than merely a component
of a particular reading of postmodernism. Second, in doing this I have offered an account of
empiricism that I believe can meet the postmodern challenge (specifically that of Keith
Jenkins, Alun Munslow and Beverly Southgate) on its own philosophical grounds. Third, I
have tried to draw out from this controversy, and from the broader debate that stands behind
it, a core criticism of traditional empirical historiography (eg. that of Richard Evans, Arthur
Marwick and Perez Zagorin) that has seemed to me justified and easily capable of remedy.
Finally I have pointed to some implications of this critique for the way that empirical
historians might continue their practice in the face of post modernism and how, within this,
teachers of history can begin to respond to these issues. In short the aim of this study has
been to find a better understanding than currently exists, of the relationship between
postmodemism and empirical historiography.
The problem with the empirical position in the controversy has been its vagueness - almost
incoherence even - in grounding its knowledge-claims. Empirical historians seem to have
accepted that the account of scepticism given by this particular version of postmodemism is
the only way that interpretation in history can be expressed. Their rejection of the
postmodern critique has been accompanied by a tendency to resist also any discussion of
historical theories and methods and this has added fuel to the criticisms made of them, that
empiricism is resistant to change and unwilling to debate the issues. The postmodemists by
contrast have offered a trenchant critique of what they consider to be a complacent, naive
form of realist empiricism. But they too have been unconvincing, partly because of their
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general negativity in relation to knowledge (this includes a complete denial of the possibility
of history by Jenkins) but also because their position lacks convincing analysis of how
precisely it compares with generic empiricism. Indeed, the weakness of the controversy as a
whole is that its grounds are narrow. Justifications for both positions have been drawn
largely from the present or the very recent past. The postmoderns have developed their case
from postmodernlpoststructuralist philosophy in seeming disregard of the broader discussion
of scepticism by philosophers and by historians of ideas. The empiricists have mirrored this
weakness by drawing their own evidence narrowly, from only late nineteenth or twentieth
century historical practices.
The unsatisfactory nature of the controversy has been amply demonstrated at the time of
writing. by a short review in the Times Higher (August 27 2004).This was a critique by
Professor Jeremy Black, of Beverly Southgate's recent work Postmodernism in History:
Fear or Freedom (2003). Black criticised Southgate's claim that all scepticism in the
western historical tradition is evidence ofpostmodernism to come - much as I have criticised
it myself in Chapter One of this study. But unhelpfully, Black then avoided the question of
what is implied by scepticism for historical practice. He simply dismissed Southgate's
central argument as 'a somewhat marginal debate' and allowed his review to be read as a
general deprecation of historical theory with phrases such as ' ... most historians get on with
research'. Thus another opportunity to discus this important question of how interpretative
issues in history should be conceived and handled, was lost. Equally importantly, the
improbable idea that all scepticism in the past can be understood as proto-postmodernism -
described by Jenkins on the book cover as 'a depth of learning few carry so easily' - was not
adequately engaged with. Moreover the intemperate nature of the exchanges between these
historians in the controversy is perhaps evidence ofa degree of stasis within the controversy.
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To move the discussion on. it has increasingly seemed necessary to find some common
ground as premise for constructive argument I
There have been several reasons why I have considered that the ground of this controversy
was capable of being moved. The first was that it was possible for empirical historians to
broaden their focus and draw more widely on the tradition of empiricism outside of history,
to offer an epistemology equal to postmodernism in terms of its awareness of aporia, but one
not susceptible to negativity. Second, there has been evidence of another broader debate
within history. between Marxism and poststructuralism and this one has not suffered the
same stasis as the controversy.i Third. there exists poststructuralist arguments that have not
been pessimistic about the possibility of knowledge and which, far from condemning the
discipline of history in its entirety, offer concepts that can improve its ability to function in
conditions of mass society.
The common ground that I have sought here can be summarised by the term 'reflexivity'.
This expression has emerged from poststructuralism. It can be understood as identifying a
need for a degree of refl ect ion about one's practice. but it means rather more than simply
reflection. What is additionally implied by the term is a sense of self-awareness that there
exists a dynamic relationship between knowledge gained from the past and the gaze, from
the present to that past, which constructs to some extent the knowledge that is produced by
the gaze, The concept rests upon the idea that knowledge, of the past or indeed of the
present, is what humans make in response to a perception of aporia. This awareness of
I It is important for any debate to move on from time to time and to be seen to be providing new,
interesting or useful understandings of the discipline, however minor these might be. This is
especially so in this case because the static and seemingly increasingly rancorous nature of the
controversy carries a danger oftuming otTthe interest of students and student teachers of the
discipline. The significance of this for the future of the discipline is obvious.
2 The term 'controversy' has been used to indicate the exchanges between Evans/Jenkins et. al. to
differentiate it from the 'broader debate' involving Marxist historiography and other more positive
reading! of poststructuralism.
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aporia is, in turn, a consciousness that complete certainty of knowledge of the world appears
impossible to achieve.
Poststructuralists use reflexivity as a way of expressing and handling what they see as an
essentially linguistic nature of the response that we count as knowledge. Marxists have been
introduced to poststructuralism largely by Patrick Joyce who has suggested that the linguistic
closures that constitute poststructuralist reflexivity, can incorporate Marxist methodological
self-awareness (of class). At the time of writing it appears that Marxist historians have
largely accepted Joyce's arguments and have thus come to terms with reflexivity as an
epistemology through which Marxist history can be produced. To provide the possibility of
a connection - a dialogue - between empirical historians and both Marxists and
poststructuralists I have focused the central part of this study, Chapters Two and Three, on
identifying an alternative genealogy for empirical historiography, drawn from the broader
accounts of empiricism outside of history and considered over the longer period of the
western tradition. This has been an important part of this project, for if it could be shown -
as indeed it has - that empiricism had long been associated with broadly the same kind of
epistemological scepticism as found in Marxism and poststructuralism, then the way would
be clear for an identification of the sought-for common ground.
Chapter Two considered empiricism in the ancient world. To facilitate the discussion, a
particular model of knowledge was used; that of 'aporia and response'. What was implied
by the expression is that an awareness of the apparent impossibility of gaining certain
knowledge of the world seems to be a constant, experienced by humans at widely different
times and places. The 'response' is what humans do, in different ways at different times and
places and by different people, about this realisation. Empiricists generally can be seen to
rely on the senses; realists, idealist or Christians make, or assume the possibility, of other
responses. Apart from a brief consideration of Plato and Aristotle, to clarify the model
being used, this chapter has focused on two important forms of empiricism, sophism and
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pyrrhonism which, although different according to time, place and person, can be seen
nevertheless to be linked by a reliance on the senses. Moreover between sophism and Sextus
Empiricus's pyrrhonism, a degree oftentativeness can be thought to have become
incorporated within empiricism. Thus from Pyrrhonism onwards, the empirical awareness of
aporia is characterised by a belief in 'apparent' aporia, rather than in the certainty that no
certain objective knowledge can exist This seemingly insignificant, but crucial, feature
allows responses to aporia to be treated as if knowledge could be relied upon to be possible,
tentatively but practically. It also evades the otherwise rather serious charge of a
performative contradiction i.e. if knowledge is not possible, how can that statement be
made? This model is by no means new. Historians of philosophy have been well aware of
the issues involved but this has not before been employed in the empirical/postmodem
history controversy in this way.
Chapter Three brought the discussion into the modem world. It argued that the empiricism
of David Ilume, August Comte, J.S.MiII, the pragmatist tradition of William James and John
Dewey and the nco-pragmatism! postmodernism of Richard Rorty could all be linked via this
same model of 'aporia and response'. They all showed awareness of aporia in the tentative
manner of pyrrhonists and they all relied, for their response to that aporia, on the senses and
what could be made of them. The same pattern could be seen too in a variety of present day
expressions of empirical philosophy. The chapter thus concluded that although empiricists
may not make their responses sufficiently overt they nevertheless share with the
postmoderns an awareness of aporia.
Chapter Four returned to the discussion of history, to place empiricism, Marxism and
poststructuralism in juxtaposition with each other in terms of their use of - or potential use
of - reflexivity. The chapter opened by sealing the link between empirical historiography
and the larger general tradition of empiricism that had been examined in the previous two
chapters. It then focused on Marxism, noting how since E.P. Thompson's intervention,
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Western Marxist historiography has been empirical in terms of its basic epistemology and,
under the influence of Patrick Joyce, is in the process of moving closer to poststructuralism
by becoming more reflexive. The point here is that there is no reason why empiricism
should not do the same.
There really is no need for the defensiveness that has been characteristic of the empirical side
within the controversy. The example of Marxism has shown that other, more optimistic
readings of poststructuralism exist than those deployed by the postmodernism of the
controversy. It can be seen that poststructural use of the term 'closure' refers not to notions
of absolute truth, but to criteria that enable knowledge statements to be made which close,
for the time being, the potentially endless flow of interpretations - i.e. which enables
knowledge to function. Each of these positions, empiricism, Marxism and poststructuralism
either is, or has the capacity to be, reflexive in one form or another. Empirical
historiography has hitherto bothered little ahout its criteria for explaining knowledge
statements. Marxist historiography, for political purposes, has seen its closures as relating
primarily to class, and poststructuralism's reflexivity has concerned itself most especially
with the implications of language as a means of expressing closures generally. It is not being
suggested here that differences between these positions will evaporate in the light of
common ground between them being identified. That is neither expected nor desired, but
what may happen if this research is accepted by practitioners, is that an easier discursive
relationship could develop between these positions. This in tum could bring about an
important change to mainstream historical practice.
The hoped-for result is that traditional empirical historians might become more open about
their everyday closures. At one level this has little to do with recognising aporia and a good
deal to do with clarity of communication. What I mean by this is that poststructuralist
deployment of linguistic expressions of closure is indeed right for 'our times.' Linguistic
concepts are capable of carrying a sense hoth of individuality and of community, be they
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national, regional, class gender, or ethnicity. It may be that in earlier times the constituency
of historians was so narrow (in terms of class, gender or ethnicity) that they did know what
every concept, comment or allusion was intended to mean, without further explanation.
Their common ground was provided by common education and by membership of a
common elite culture. This no longer the case and explorations into greater linguistic
awareness in the closures of knowledge-making is perhaps poststructuralism's greatest asset.
The ability of empirical historians, and Marxists, to debate with them is arguably well worth
the effort. Similarly it makes sense for history teachers to reflect this is their own practice.
There is no reason why a new generation of historians, and those who have studied the
subject academically, should not find reflexivity a perfectly normal part of historical
knowledge.
What reflexivity means in this practical sense is something that needs to be worked out once
a theoretical background for it is accepted. It is however possible to suggest that at the level
of principle it is quite simple. If access to a final truth appears to be out of the question,
what needs to be included in any act of knowing (in relation to the present as much as the
past) is information about the nature of the response being made to a necessary potential
aporia. Those to whom the knowledge is communicated need the reasoning - the thinking -
that has prevented that reductive process from continuing out of control. In other words
what is required is information on how and why meaning has been constructed as it has.
There are many ways in which this can be achieved in practice. In the classroom a start
could be made by letting students in on the thinking behind what has already been chosen
prior to their arrival. For example all courses come to life via discussions of exam or course
boards, through options chosen or rejected, through assumptions about the nature of history
or judgements about resources. Thus students might begin to see in ways appropriate to their
level that traditional notions of history as for example 'facts plus interpretation' is
meaningless in the sense that both of these categories are interpretations, at different levels.
Thus nothing is wholly given, in making sense of the past.
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This does not imply that every statement on a history course must be qualified by
intenninable value statements, nor that it is impossible to appreciate 'better' or 'worse'
explanations of the past. But it does mean that if the criteria for such judgement are not
given by the past itself, and as Keith Jenkins put it, we can never get back there to check if
our understanding is correct (1991 :Ch.l), then the criteria must come from the present.
Criteria therefore needs to be explicit - making more transparent, historians' reading of the
past. Once this principle is accepted, enterprising teachers will have no difficulty in
working through the details for their practice, and the debate will have moved on from a
focus on scepticism to the practical responses that might be made to it, in the twenty first
century.
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